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ABSTRACT 
This research develops a methodology to analyze stakeholder-decision logic in dynamic, 
multi-agent political systems. The backdrop for this study is Lebanese Hezbollah decision 
making in a system including Iran, Syria, Israel, and the U.S.  A thorough historical 
review of the Middle East provides the foundation for accurate definition of each 
stakeholder’s interests and feasible actions. Additionally, the historical review provides 
the basis for specifying model relationships and initial, notional probability data to 
inform the model. A conceptual model is then developed representing the system using 
influence diagrams. This conceptual model is adapted to enable implementation of two 
models, one for each research question posed by the Unified Combatant Command. To 
solve these models, a Java application was developed and described in detail. The 
application provides the user with the capability to manipulate the model and inputs to 
suit their analytic needs and to evaluate the efficacy of model variables. User interface 
and convenient model diagnostics, together, provide the Unified Combatant Command 
with the desired decision support complement to their current analytic techniques. 
Finally, several important insights are presented relating to modeling methodology and to 
the specific decision-making logic of Hezbollah and other stakeholders in this system. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within the 
time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logical errors, they 
cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without additional 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis represents the first step toward developing a modeling technique and analytic 
methodology to explore decision-making logic in complex political systems that evolve over 
time and that involve multiple stakeholders.  A U.S. Unified Combatant Command 
commissioned this research to add an analytic and quantitative complement to currently 
employed methods for analyzing these systems.   
 The backdrop for this research is an analysis of a system of political stakeholders, 
with particular emphasis on the decision-making logic of Lebanese Hezbollah.  The two 
research questions posed by Unified Combatant Command that prompted this research effort 
are: 
• How would Lebanese Hezbollah respond to an Israeli strike against Iranian 
nuclear facilities? 
• Under what conditions would Lebanese Hezbollah retaliate for the death of 
Imad Mughniyah? 
As with any system of political stakeholders, there are a wide variety of state and 
non-state actors that have interests, directly or indirectly, related to Hezbollah, Lebanon, and 
the Middle East in general.  This thesis begins with a thorough historical review of the 
Middle East to frame and define the system.  Of particular importance is concisely defining 
who the stakeholders are, what they want, and what they can do to get what they want.  As a 
result, the system of actors involved in this system was narrowed to include the following 
stakeholders:  the Islamic Republic of Iran (IR), the United States (U.S.), Syria (SY), 
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), and Israel (IS).  All other state and non-state actors’ stakes in this 
system are implicitly modeled through one or more of these actors. 
One unique challenge of modeling a political system with quantitative methods is 
mapping qualitative data into a form that is digestible by a quantitative model.  Here, 
techniques of Decision Theory are applied to allow model users to estimate preference 
ordering of all stakeholder interests, assigning a utility value to various combinations of 
realized interests.  In so doing, stakeholder interests are placed on a quantitative scale where 
the relative ordering and distance between preferences is measurable, but also provides the 
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ability to compare decisions and provide results that can be analyzed and interpreted 
quantitatively and qualitatively.  Additionally, a number of probability estimates are required 
to account for the inherent uncertainty of the system.  The historical review presented in this 
thesis also provides the foundation for understanding and estimating these probabilities. 
Having defined and framed the system, this thesis then seeks to develop a full 
conceptual representation of the system that is simple enough to evaluate, detailed enough to 
capture key relationships, and transparent to users of the model.  To meet these criteria, 
influence diagrams are employed.  A generalized conceptual model using influence diagrams 
is developed in this thesis to provide a graphical representation of the system under study.  
From this generalized model, each question is modeled and implemented with adjustments 
for the nuances of each research question. 
The first model developed—the one that explores Hezbollah decision making after an 
Israeli strike against Iran—seeks to represent the system and then initiate a “shock” event 
(i.e., the strike).  The purpose then is to enable analysis of how Hezbollah’s decision making 
might change once the shock is introduced.  The second model—regarding retaliation for 
Mughniyah’s death—considers the system from a different angle.  Instead of introducing a 
catalyzing event, it is framed to allow the user to explore the conditions that could induce a 
retaliatory attack by Hezbollah.  
The thesis sponsor, Unified Combatant Command, sought a methodology that could 
be applied to these questions, but general enough to apply to future work.  With this in mind, 
the research and work performed in this thesis aimed at developing mechanisms that allowed 
the user to interact with the model on the front end.  To achieve this, a Java application was 
developed, STANA (STakeholder ANalysis Application) that provides an interface between 
Genie v2.0 decision analysis software, Java, and Microsoft Excel.  This provides the user the 
ability to manipulate or construct models in an intuitive, easy-to-use interface.  Java provides 
the flexibility to add dynamic and multi-agent capabilities that are not native to Genie.  
Finally, Microsoft Excel is used to conveniently enter model parameters and read out data.  
Combined, STANA provides a flexible application that enables the user to investigate a 
broad range of “what if” scenarios with one or two decision makers in a system with 
temporal dependencies. 
The real value provided by analysis is often found in the insights gained by exploring 
relationships between variables within a model.  With that in mind, an additional capability 
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was sought to allow Unified Combatant Command to quickly evaluate model sensitivity to 
each variable in the model.  STANA was designed to have the capability to automatically 
generate sensitivity data to allow the users to quickly see which variables are having the most 
impact.  This has several benefits.  First, it will allow the user to focus research efforts toward 
understanding these highly sensitive areas to ensure they are well understood.  It will also 
allow the user to see how these variables are affected by changing inputs, or by adjusting 
relationships within the model.  This diagnostic capability functions for the both the one and 
two player version of STANA. 
While development of modeling methodology and implementation is the focus of 
effort for this thesis, the research provided in this thesis reveals a number of insights 
pertaining to Hezbollah and the other stakeholders in these models.  This thesis stops short of 
prescribing or claiming definitive conclusions on the decision-making logic in the system or 
of any of its stakeholders.  This would require a much more extensive examination, 
considering multiple formulations of each of the models and running multiple “what if” 
scenarios using these different formulations.  In short, it is the author’s opinion that the 
models presented have not been sufficiently validated on a broad enough range of scenarios.  
Nonetheless, this thesis presents some insights relating to the modeling, the methodology, 
and the decision system that is studied.  The bullets below represent a summary of these 
insights. 
• The most critical element in understanding a system of stakeholders is to define and 
understand what it is that each actor wants (i.e., their interests).  Stakeholder interests 
drive the decision-making logic and can be complex, interdependent models in their 
own right.  The process of modeling helps reveal the structure of these relationships. 
• LH seems to have an incentive to attain its objectives politically, but LH’s political 
base seems to be defined in terms of its opposition to Israel.  As such, it is likely that 
LH will continue to antagonize Israel enough to ensure its base stays unified. 
• Regarding Lebanese opinion outside of its base, it seems that LH should desire tacit 
support or at least general indifference.  Should a significant portion of Lebanese 
reject LH outright, LH’s survival may become tenuous.  Therefore, LH seems bound 
to behave in a manner short of provoking a full Israeli response. 
 xx
• If the observations above are valid, the following consequences may be in order: 
o Demonstrated constraint by Israel could, over the longer term, allow for the 
development of some distance between LH’s base and the Lebanese 
population at large.  Or, at a minimum, it could prevent LH from expanding 
support beyond its Shi’a, pro-Syrian base. 
o LH’s militia may be the organization’s center of gravity by providing it the 
instrument of power necessary to impose its will, even if the general 
Lebanese population were to consider rejecting LH.  
• LH derives financial support and support in the court of international opinion via the 
Lebanese Diaspora.  However, it is the opinion of this author that there exist 
significant correlations between Diaspora support and Lebanese Popular Opinion.  
That is, there is a component of Diaspora support that may be allocated by the 
Lebanese Population and there may be a component that is allocated independent of 
the Lebanese population.  It is unknown to the author the extent or magnitude of each 
of these components.  A better understanding of Diaspora’s role in allocating power 
and resources to Lebanese political factions would enhance analysis derived from 
these models. 
• The U.S. and Iran seem to serve similar roles in this system.  That is, the U.S. and 
Iran are involved in a global confrontation and both LH and Israel are actors in this 
game.  Whether or not LH and Israel serve as proxy mechanisms for these powers in 
not clear to the author.  However, in the context of this larger conflict, LH and Israel 
each seem to have incentives to maintain hostile dispositions, while, at the same time, 
the U.S. and Iran seem to constrain Israel and LH from engaging in full-scale war.  
An interesting application of this model might be to run a U.S.-Iran scenario to 
develop a better understanding of the roles these actors should play in the LH-Israel 
game. 
The result of the research and analysis in this thesis is a framework and methodology 
for development of systems of political stakeholders.  Additionally, it provides a tool that, 
while limited, is flexible enough to allow exploration of a wide range of scenarios and 
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possesses diagnostic capabilities to assist the user in sharpening the model’s formulation.  
This thesis also provides a solid consideration of the decision-making system that surrounds 
Lebanese Hezbollah and other important actors in the Middle East.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, this thesis is the first step toward modeling dynamic, multi-agent systems  
of stakeholders using influence diagrams.  There is significant potential for future 
development of the capabilities that resulted from this thesis.  Below is a brief summary of 
future work that could be pursued: 
• Expand to explicitly model the decisions of more than two players.  The current 
implementation is limited to one or two players. 
• Improve dynamic behavior.  The current implementation requires the user to 
specify temporal relationships and specify probability tables for each.  This limits 
the usefulness of time dependencies.  However, it seems possible to develop 
behaviors over time, allowing the system to “evolve” without extensive 
specification of probabilities by the user. 
• Prior information and Bayesian updating.  This thesis failed to implement a 
critical component of influence diagrams: prior probabilities inferred using 
Bayesian updating.  Adding this capability would greatly enhance the usefulness 
of the models presented. 
• Learning effects for decision makers could be added in future versions. 
• Imperfect perception of the system could be built in to the implementation.  
Currently, both players operate on the same chance structure, essentially meaning 
they have the same perspective on the system.  However, it is possible to allow 
decision makers to operate on different versions of the chance model, having the 



























 First, I would like to thank my wife, Jennifer, for her love and support during the 
seven months that went into making this a reality.  I know she did the best she could, 
listening to my incessant rambling about why Java refused to do what I thought it should and 
about things like transition matrices, conditional probabilities, and backward induction.  The 
same can be said for my two beautiful daughters, Megan and Zoe, who, incidentally, endured 
the same incessant ranting about things they should not have to concern themselves with.  
And they provided breaths of fresh air on a daily basis, as they always do. 
 The highly professional and genuinely dedicated personnel of the Unified Combatant 
Command sponsoring this research made this experience both educational and rewarding.  
These folks were a pleasure to work with and I know they supported my experience and 
education at least as much as—if not more than—I was able to support their research efforts. 
 A special thanks to Roberto Szechtman whose guidance kept my efforts focused and 
relevant.  His simple, no-nonsense approach to research and his ability to see the bottom line 
was refreshing and instructional, and will benefit me as an analyst and as a Marine.  
Additionally, I would like to thank Mike Atkinson, Moshe Kress, and Aaron Burciaga for 
being always on-call as a sounding board for ideas, even those that were painfully misguided.  
Together, this group was an interesting and talented team of professionals that made this 










A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
 The U.S. has significant national security interests at stake in the Middle East.  Of 
these, two are vital:  access to Middle Eastern oil and the threat posed by state/non-state 
actors that oppose U.S. interests.  To achieve these strategic interests, the U.S. has long 
sought political stability in this region.  However, historical tensions among Middle Eastern 
nations have repeatedly frustrated efforts for long-term stability in a manner favorable to the 
U.S.  The nature of relations among state and non-state actors is so profoundly complex that 
policy makers struggle to understand what actions might be effective in achieving strategic 
objectives.   
 As Iran may get closer to nuclear capability, the existential threat perceived by Israel 
grows more compelling.  Iranian leadership has made it clear that they do not recognize 
Israel’s right to exist and have called for “extermination of the Jewish state.”  Israel—who 
most believe possess nuclear capability—has made it equally clear it will not stand for a 
nuclear armed Iran and has vowed to take any action necessary to prevent this outcome, 
including direct application of force.  The current trajectory may be unsustainable, as it seems 
likely to lead to a nuclear-armed Iran, which could disrupt the balance of power in the region.   
 Recently, Unified Combatant Command has sought a new course for analysis of the 
Middle East region.  Unified Combatant Command is currently pursuing research to improve 
understanding of the regional situation and key drivers of decision-making by employing 
analytical tools of Operations Research and descriptive methods of social sciences.  In 
support of this effort, this thesis will analyze the system formed by state and non-state actors 
with political stakes in this region.  The research performed for this thesis will emphasize 
Lebanese Hezbollah decision-making logic and the underlying forces that drive its actions. 
 Unified Combatant Command’s ultimate goal is to become proactive in its approach 
to Middle Eastern policy.  It seeks a well-grounded decision support methodology that will 
serve as an analytic forecasting aid to better understand systems involving one or more 




model and methodology that is general and can be applied more broadly.  More specifically, 
this thesis will support Unified Combatant Command’s effort in the following ways: 
 
•  Identify and understand the logic underlying the decision-making tendencies of key 
stakeholders, with particular focus on Lebanese Hezbollah. 
•  Contribute to understanding how “shocks” influence the political system, the 
stakeholders within that system, and how the decision-making logic is affected by 
these shocks. 
•  Identify key factors that drive Lebanese Hezbollah decision making to help gain 
insight into stakeholder-decision processes. 
•  Analyze the nature and scope of decision-making relationships in order to identify 
shortfalls in current intelligence (i.e., highlight intelligence gaps). 
•  Provide an easy-to-use decision support tool that takes as inputs parameters of a 
political system (i.e., states, interests, and actions of key stakeholders), and produces: 
o Insights about possible courses of action of key stakeholders, and 
o Guidance concerning the effects of shocks to the system. 
B. PURPOSE 
 The primary purpose of this thesis is to develop an analytic methodology that allows 
for the analysis of the underlying decision-making logic of a well-defined system of 
stakeholders.  This thesis uses Lebanese Hezbollah as the subject for this analysis, at the 
request of Unified Combatant Command, the sponsor for this research effort. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were posed by Unified Combatant Command: 





• Under what conditions would Lebanese Hezbollah retaliate for the death of 
former Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyah? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The scope of this thesis is centered on the development of a decision-support aid that 
allows for the analysis of the two research questions mentioned above.  The intent is to 
develop a model that allows the user to consider decision making over time and within the 
framework of a multi-player decision system.  Allowing the user to interact with the model 
will aid in understanding the system in question by requiring the user to carefully define 
these relationships and think through cause-and-effect associations among variables. 
The model developed in this thesis will allow the user to specify the parameters of the 
model, the relationships, and define stakeholder interests in a manner that allows for analysis 
of the decisions that result from a set of inputs.  Equally important is to provide the ability for 
the user to introduce effects—or “shocks”—that may abruptly change the decision-making 
situation.  This will allow for in-depth analysis for the first of the two research questions 
considered in this thesis. 
The second research question requires an analysis of the range of inputs that could 
induce a stakeholder—in this case Lebanese Hezbollah—to take a certain decision.  
Therefore, the model developed herein must have the capability to allow for easy and 
intuitive inputs and a mechanism for allowing the user to run repeated iterations of the model 
in order to investigate the situation under a wide range of circumstances. 
Finally, to identify key drivers of stakeholder decisions, the model developed must 
provide the user with the ability to quickly and easily generate data required for sensitivity 
analysis.  This will provide the user the ability to quickly identify which variable(s) play key 
role(s) in decision making, allowing analysts to focus time and resources to understand key 
variables and system components. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. Background Research and Literature Review 
 The nature of this thesis requires the fusion of social sciences and quantitative 




system requires a thorough understanding of the actual system.  This is accomplished through 
a thorough review of the history of the Middle East and by visiting and interviewing regional 
experts from Unified Combatant Command.  Additionally, other modeling approaches that 
seek to understand decision systems is considered and drawn upon, where applicable.  
Chapter II provides a thorough review of the region’s history from the points of view of key 
stakeholders and then considers other approaches that have been attempted to address similar 
problems.   
2. Modeling 
The model for this thesis is developed in two parts.  First, a conceptual 
representation of the models is developed drawing on concepts of Systems Analysis and 
Decision Theory.  Influence diagrams are used to provide a means to define key 
relationships between stakeholders, uncertainty components, and stakeholder interests.  
Having conceptualized the models, the second step is to implement these models.  For 
this, a Java application was developed to interface with Genie v2.01, providing the 
capability to solve multi-player, temporal influence diagrams.  The user specifies the 
nature of the system, the actors, their interests, and the probability model, and the Java 
application solves it over the user-specified time horizon.  Chapter III details the 
development of two models, one for each of the research questions posed by Unified 
Combatant Command.   
3. Results and Analysis 
Using one of the two models developed in Chapter III, several “what if” scenarios 
are considered to display how the subject questions can be analyzed using the modeling 
approach and applications developed in this thesis.  For each of these scenarios, single-
variable sensitivity analysis is conducted to display the capabilities of the Java 
application, which automates sensitivity analysis if the user so desires.  From this 
                                                 
1 Genie v2.0 is decision analysis software developed at the University of Pittsburgh.  The software is 




sensitivity analysis emerges a more robust understanding of the key variables in this 
system.  Chapter IV provides the results and analysis of a few select scenarios. 
F.  ASSUMPTIONS 
• Rational under uncertainty.  The models developed in this thesis are solved 
using decision analysis software—with the mentioned modifications—that solves the models 
based on the expected utilities of available actions.  This implies that the decision makers in 
this analysis are rational under uncertainty, satisfying the well-known rationality axioms.  For 
a complete listing of the rationality axioms, refer to James N. Webb’s Game Theory: 
Decisions, Interaction, and Evolution (2007). 
• Unbounded rationality.  The algorithm that solves the models is based on 
dynamic programming and backward induction.  Since all players satisfy the rationality 
axioms, this implies that each stakeholder has the ability to calculate his own and his 
opponent’s expected utility over the entire user-specified time horizon, whether that time 
horizon is two or fifteen time steps.  Of course, many decision makers do not have the ability 
to assess uncertainty accurately.  This is especially true of future uncertainty.  If a decision 
maker can’t calculate future uncertainty, then he will have difficulty calculating his and his 
opponent’s future expected utilities, which are the basis for these decisions.  However, 
backward induction requires just these sorts of calculations. 
• Equivalent perceptions between players.  All players operate on the same 
probability model.  As such, there is an implied assumption that both players perceive the 
system’s uncertainty in exactly the same way. 
G. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
• Actions.  Actions are applications of an actor’s resources that (may) influence 
the state of one or more stakeholders.  The set of feasible actions may depend on the state of 
the system. 
• Stakeholders (or actors).  The countries, political organizations, or groups 




• Interests.  Each stakeholder has interests it cares about.  Interests are 
discretized into 2–3 factors. 
• Factor.  The possible outcomes of an interest (i.e., high or low, strong or 
weak). 
• Utility.  The value a stakeholder places on a combination of interest factors.  
• Salience.  Salience is an absolute measure of magnitude that indicates how 
much a stakeholder cares about an interest. 
• Power.  Power is an absolute measure of the capabilities a stakeholder 
possesses in the context of the system.  These capabilities can be real (such as military or 
economic strength) or abstract (such as religious or ideological). 
• Influence.  Influence is a relative measure that is the product of Salience and 
Power (salience x power).  It can be thought of as the influence of a stakeholder relative to 
the sum of all potential influence that exists in the system.  A stakeholder may be extremely 
powerful (i.e., the U.S.), but not care (low salience).  On the other hand, a stakeholder may be 
relatively weak, but may spare no effort in achieving its goals (de Mesquita 2009). 
• State Space.  The state space of a stakeholder with interests x and y is the set 
{(xi,yj):i,j = 1,2,3}  formed by the possible interest level combinations, (xi, yj).  Each instance 
is a state of a stakeholder. 
• Shocks.  Shocks are events that have a significant impact on the outcome of 
the situation. Shocks may be triggered by stakeholders’ actions or by external events (e.g., 




II. BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter reviews and explores the historical and political context of the regional 
actors in the Middle East, as it pertains to the questions addressed by this thesis.  The purpose 
of this chapter is to develop the foundation for a robust understanding of who the key actors 
are in this political system (e.g., the stakeholders), each stakeholder’s situation (e.g., its 
state), what each stakeholder wants (e.g., its interests), and what actions each stakeholder 
may have available to enable it to achieve its interests.  The stakeholders considered in this 
thesis are:  The Islamic Republic of Iran (IR), Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), the United States 
(U.S.), Israel (IS), and Syria (SY).    
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS 
 This section begins with a brief discussion of origins of conflict, and then discusses 
modern history from three perspectives: 
• History of Iran.  This section focuses on the Iranian Revolution, Iran in the 
context of the U.S. Global War on Terror, and Iran’s nuclear program. 
• History of Lebanon.  This section focuses on the period from 1975 to present, 
emphasizing the Lebanese Civil War and its relationship to Hezbollah, Syria, 
and Iran. 
• History of the U.S. in the Middle East.  This section focuses on the history of 
U.S. Middle East involvement. 
1. Origins 
a. Islam 
  The origin of one conflict in the Middle East can be traced to the founding of 
Islam— and the “Great Schism” that followed between the Sunni and Shi’a sects (Farndon 
2007).  After the Prophet Mohammad returned to Mecca in 630 AD, he ruled for only two 
years before his death in 632 AD.  He left only a daughter, Fatimeh, who could not rule due 
to Arab custom.  The patriarchs of Mecca selected a Caliph to succeed Mohammad, 




leading to what is known today as the Sunni tradition of Islam (Farndon 2007).  However, 
Fatimeh, Mohammed’s eldest daughter, had a husband, Ali, and two children, Hussein and 
Hassan.  Many considered this the legitimate royal family, bearers of Mohammad’s true 
bloodline.  Ali led an exemplary, humble life and attracted a considerable following that 
came to be known as the Shi’a Ali, the founding of what is known today as Shi’a Islam 
(Farndon 2007). 
  Fatimeh’s son, Hussein, became an important figure to Shi’a for his link to 
Persia and his model of martyrdom, self-sacrifice, and social justice (Farndon 2007).  
Hussein is believed to have rescued the last Persian princess from persecution at the hands of 
the Umayyads, the Sunni invaders of Persia (Farndon 2007).  This established a connection 
between Persians and Shi’a Muslims.  Hussein is also the Shi’a symbol of martyrdom and 
self-sacrifice because of his stand at Karbala against the Umayyad leader.  Greatly 
outnumbered, Hussein was “hacked to pieces and beheaded.”  This sacrifice would forever 
link Shi’a Muslims to the city of Karbala (Farndon 2007).  The Karbala massacre inspired the 
Ashura, an intense and emotional remembrance of Hussein’s sacrifice that forms the basis of 
a common narrative on Shi’a concepts such as social justice (Farndon 2007), martyrdom, and 
struggle against oppression (Norton 2007).  
  Persian—and therefore Iranian—ties to Islam also date to the 7th century AD 
when the Arab Muslim army swept into Persia and displaced the Sassanid Dynasty (Farndon 
2007).  Persia’s religious origins are based on Zoroastrianism, thought to be the first religion 
to divide the world into good and evil (Farndon 2007).  Due to the corruption of their 
Sassanid rulers, Persians embraced Islam and the Koran—particularly Shi’ism—and 
incorporated elements of Arabic culture and language into their society (Farndon 2007).  
However, despite the quick rise of Islam in Persia, Persian culture endured and began to 
“seep back into Islam” in what John Farndon describes as a “Persian Renaissance” that 
occurred from the 8th–11th centuries (2007).   
  Today, Sunnis comprise 85–90% of all Muslims (Slavin 2008).  The only 
place where Shi’a Muslims are the majority is in the Islamic Republic of Iran, southern Iraq, 
and southern Lebanon (Coughlin 2009) and have considerable constituencies in Afghanistan, 
India, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf (Slavin 2008).  Within Shi’a Islam, there are sub-sects 




and Iranian Shi’a recognize 12 (Farndon 2007).  Iranian Shi’ism is often called “Twelver 
Shi’ism” (Farndon 2007).  The 12th Imam is the “hidden Imam, ” or Mahdi, who will one 
day return to rid the world of all injustice (Farndon, 2007).   
b. Palestine-Israel Conflict 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict centers on claims on an area historically 
known as Palestine2.  This conflict dates to the end of the 19th century where severe 
Jewish persecution led to the rise of Zionism3 (Harms 2008).  Despite the historical 
tracings of Palestinians and Israelis, the events that led to the Palestine-Israel conflict as it 
is known today actually originate in the 20th century, with the results of World War I 
laying the foundation for conflict and then World War II formalizing those results 
(Harms 2008).  Since the mid-20th Century, the Palestine-Israel conflict has been a central 
impediment to Middle Eastern peace and stability, and remains so today.  This section 
briefly reviews events considered critical to the development of this conflict.  
(1) World War I—World War II. During World War I, Britain, 
France, and Russia created spheres of influence in what was then known as the Ottoman 
Empire (Harms 2008).  The Ottoman Empire sided with Germany in the war and, as 
consequence of Allied victory, was divided up by the victorious powers in a system 
known as a mandatory (Harms 2008).  After World War I, the mandates were distributed 
in the San Remo conference of 1920 where it was determined that Great Britain would be 
the mandatory for Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq while France would be the mandatory 
for Lebanon and Syria (Harms 2008).  As Palestine’s mandatory power, Britain made a 
string of promises, the most notable of which was the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that 
made conflicting promises.  To Zionists the declaration promised Jewish settlement in  
 
                                                 
2 From Encyclopedia Britannica: The word Palestine derives from Philistia, the name given by Greek 
writers to the land of the Philistines, who in the 12th Century BC occupied a small pocket of land on the 
southern coast, between modern Tel-Aviv and Gaza.  According to Gregory Harms in The Palestine-Israel 
Conflict, Palestine was not a singular administrative geo-political entity until the advent of European 
nationalism in the early 20th Century (Harms 57–58). 
3 According to Gregory Harms, “the desire for a safe haven state…motivated almost exclusively by 
what they suffered and endured in Russia” (Harms 51).  For a more thorough treatment on the origins of 




Palestine, while to Arabs living in Palestine, it pledged that “nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine” (Harms 2008). 
However, World War II resulted in a global redistribution of power.  
Britain was broke and beleaguered and began to concede much of its colonial holdings, 
including Palestine (Harms 2008).  The U.S. was torn between sympathy for the Zionist 
cause and its desire to curry favor with Arabs in its effort to contain Russian expansion 
(Harms 2008).  Together, the U.S. and Britain convened a council to help solve the 
“immigration/refugee impasse” but, by February 1947, the British had decided to take its 
hands out of the conflict and left the issue to the UN General Assembly (Harms 2008). 
(2) 1947–1948: UN Partition, Israeli Statehood, and War. With 
the U.S. and Russia in favor, the UN General Assembly voted on 29 November 1947 to 
pass Resolution 181 to establish “two states, Jewish and Arab, with Jerusalem existing as 
an international entity” (Harms 2008).  With questionable legal authority for the UN to 
partition Palestine, and because it amounted to the U.S. and Europe giving 56% of 
Palestine to 30% of its population, Arabs were outraged and refused to accept the 
resolution (Harms 2008).  This resulted in a war between Jews and Palestinian Arabs (the 
civil war from November 1947 to May 1948) and then between the new state of Israel 
and the surrounding Arab states of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, 
Lebanon (Harms 2008).  By war’s end, the area of Palestine would assume its present-
day form (Harms 2008). 
The first phase of this war—between Jews and Palestinian Arabs—
would result in the official beginning of the Palestinian refugee crisis.  During this conflict, 
an estimated 300,000 Palestinians would be displaced (Harms 2008).  The second phase, 
known as the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, was sparked when David Ben-Gurion declared the 
establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, one day before British possession 
officially expired (Harms 2008).  This declaration immediately sparked a full-scale war.  The 
war resulted in a clear Israeli victory, which was codified in the 1949 Armistice agreement 
(Harms 2008).  Israel expanded its territorial holding from 56% of Palestine to 78%, 
including possession of Gaza from Egypt and the West Bank from Transjordan (Harms 




the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring Arab states (Harms 2008).   By the end of the 1947–
1948 Wars, Israel became a fixed reality in the Middle East, and the mass migration of 
Palestinian refugees into neighboring states would eventually lead to the Palestine-Israel 
conflict being broadened into an Arab-Israeli conflict (Harms 2008). 
(3) 1967: The Six-Day War and UN Resolution 242. Following 
the 1947-48 Wars, Israel and its neighbors remained in a state of “no war-no peace” 
characterized by sporadic cross border violence that, against a Cold War backdrop, would 
frame and build toward the next conflict (Harms 2008).  In 1956, Egyptian leader Gamul 
Abdul Nasser defiantly decided to nationalize the Suez Canal (Harms 2008).  Britain, 
France, and Israel devised a plan in which Israel would invade to recapture the canal, and 
then Britain and France would intervene and make Nasser an offer he had to refuse 
(Harms 2008).  Once refused, Britain and France would then have justification to directly 
intervene and regain control of the canal (Harms 2008).  The UN, U.S., and Russia all 
harshly condemned the action and passed a resolution calling for a cease fire.  However, 
Israel succeeded in reclaiming Sinai first (Harms 2008).  The Suez Crisis resulted in 
regional recognition of Israel as a formidable military power.  However, it also resulted in 
Nasser becoming a nationalist Arab hero and it hardened many Arabs’ view of Israel as a 
tool of colonial Western imperialism (Harms 2008). 
   The Suez Crisis was followed by continuing cross-border violence 
and infiltration into Israel through the late ‘50s and into the ‘60s, inching the region closer to 
another war (Harms 2008).  The recently formed militant group Fatah4 (1958) began a 
campaign of incursions into Israel in 1964 and the Palestinian Liberation Organization5 
(PLO), while lacking organization, provided ideological support to Israeli resistance (Harms 
2008).  The increase in violence eventually led to a harsh reprisal by Israel on the West Bank 
town of Samu, where homes and buildings were destroyed and 18 civilians were killed 
                                                 
4 Al-Fatah was founded in 1958 and was led by a young nationalist name Yasser Arafat.  Fatah, 
compared to the early PLO, operated with “far greater ideological resolve” and “felt violence should 
precede diplomacy and politics” (Harms 108). 
5 The PLO was founded in May 1964 and came under the control of Egyptian leader Gamul Abdul 




(Harms 2008).  Neither Jordan nor Egypt responded, resulting in harsh Arab condemnation of 
the two leaders as being weak on Israel (Harms 2008).   
With tensions high, reports began to emanate about an Israeli troop 
buildup.  Though the reports were verifiably false, it began a sequence of mobilization and 
preparation actions that culminated in Israel’s pre-emptive invasion of Jordan on 5 June 1967 
(Harms 2008).  Within three hours, Israel destroyed the air forces of Jordan, Egypt, and 
Syria;  within six days, it achieved decisive victory (Harms 2008).  With the end of the war, 
Israel had tripled its size by gaining control of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank (including all of 
Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights (Harms 2008).  Additionally, with the acquisitions of 
Gaza and the West Bank, Israel came in control of 1.1 million Palestinians (Harms 2008).  
UN Resolution 242 officially ended the war and became the basis for all peace negotiations, 
and remains so today (Harms 2008). 
UN Resolution 242 added another document to the list of ambiguous 
agreements that would complicate attainment of Middle East peace.  The gist of 242 is “land 
for peace,” essentially calling for Israel to relinquish control of territories acquired during the 
war while Arab states would acknowledge sovereignty and territorial integrity of “every state 
in the region” (Harms 2008).  However, Israelis interpret the document to mean relinquish 
“some of the territories” and Arabs interpret to mean “all of the territories” (Harms 2008).  
With the exception of Sinai, the borders established after the 1967 war are essentially the 
same as they are today (Harms 2008).  Resolution 242 also had the effect of reducing the 
Palestinian issue to a human rights problem by affirming necessity “for achieving a just 
settlement of the refugee problem” (Harms 2008).  UN Resolution 242 has and continues to 
be the basis of all efforts at resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict (Harms 2008). 
(4) Palestinian Nationalism, the PLO, and the Yom Kippur War. 
With over 1 million Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, a sense of Palestinian 
identity began to emerge (Harms 2008).  Israel’s humiliation of its Arab neighbors fuelled 
resistance and its occupation of territory won at Arab’s expense combined to fuel an 
increasing shift toward militant resistance to Israel on behalf of Palestinians (Harms 2008).  
This combined with the reduction of Palestinians to a human rights issue from UN Resolution 
242, led to groups such as Fatah and the PLO seeking international recognition through 




had the effect of driving thousands of Arab nationalists into Fatah and the PLO (Harms 
2008).  By 1968 in Jordan, the PLO had become a state within a state and had revised its 
charter specifically in terms of “armed struggle” against “Zionist and imperialist presence” 
(Harms 2008).  In 1969, Yasser Arafat—leader of al-Fatah—was elected chairman of the 
PLO (Harms 2008). 
Relentless provocations by the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine6 (PFLP) brought harsh reprisals by Israel, which “King Hussein of Jordan 
wished to avoid” (Harms 2008).  Violence erupted between the Jordanian Army and the 
PFLP resulting in a small-scale war inside Jordan.  The Jordanian Army handily defeated 
the PLO, leaving thousands dead in what came to be known as Black September (Harms 
2008).  The matter was settled by the Cairo Agreement of 27 September 1970 and, within 
a year, Hussein had expelled the PLO from Jordan.  The PLO moved their base of 
operations to Lebanon, where the PLO would further destabilize an already unstable 
country (Harms 2008).   
While events in Jordan were unfolding, Israel was engaged in tit-
for-tat violence with Egypt, mainly over control of the East Bank of the Suez Canal 
(Harms 2008).  Egypt was now under the leadership of Anwar Sadat, since Nasser died 
the day after signing the Cairo Agreement (Harms 2008).  Sadat, courting Soviet 
sponsorship, was trying to gain control over territories previously lost to Israel.  In an 
effort to achieve this, Sadat tried to unilaterally negotiate with Israel, but Israel refused to 
relinquish territory, at least partially owing to U.S. pressure aiming to minimize Russian 
influence in the region (Harms 2008).  Having failed to achieve ends diplomatically, 
Sadat went to work in 1973 against Israel by engaging Syria in war plans—a surprise 
attack—to help both nations to regain lost territories (Harms 2008).  Egypt and Syria 
attacked the Sinai and Golan, respectively, on 6 October 1973 in what came to be known 
as the Yom Kippur War (Harms 2008).  Israel sensed an attack was coming, albeit late, 
but decided against preempting the attack for fear of losing U.S. aid (Harms 2008).  
                                                 
6 The Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is one of the more militant organizations within 




Though caught on its heels, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) recovered and managed to 
fight off both Syria and Egypt (Harms 2008).  Israel turned the tide and ended up 
claiming more of the Golan than it previously possessed and, with respect to Egypt, 
crossed the Suez and pushed into the mainland (Harms 2008).   
In agreements known as Sinai I and Sinai II, Israel relinquished 
some of its gains in the Golan in return for Syria’s non-belligerence (Harms 2008).  Israel 
managed a military victory, but paid a heavy political price through popular resentment 
and anger toward its leadership (Harms 2008).  Egypt, on the other hand, had been dealt a 
severe military defeat, but managed a psychological and moral victory.  Egypt had earned 
international recognition for its territorial dispute with Israel and, more importantly, 
gained a good relationship with the U.S. (Harms 2008).   
(5) Camp David Accords (1978).  Between the Yom Kippur War 
of 1973 and 1978, there had been a turnover of leadership in the U.S. and Israel.  Jimmy 
Carter was elected in 1976 and brought the hope of settling the conflict with multilateral 
negotiations (Harms 2008).  Sadat—still leading Egypt—was interested in repairing Egypt’s 
economy and reclaiming the Sinai.  Israel saw a turn toward hard-line conservative thinking 
with the emergence of the Menachim Begin and the Likud party, who emphasized intention 
to retain the West Bank and Gaza (Harms 2008).  It was under Begin and the Likud Party the 
issue of settlements7 would become a political focal point (Harms 2008). 
   The Camp David Accords were a multilateral meeting between the 
U.S., USSR, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt and was patterned on Resolution 242, as it called for a 
resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, settlement of the Palestinian refugee issue, and Israel’s 
withdrawal from “territories occupied” (Harms 2008).  The accords were signed as a 
framework for continued peace negotiations.  While many issues were not addressed (i.e., 
occupation of East Jerusalem and Golan Heights) and others were left to final determination 
(i.e., West Bank and Gaza), the accords resulted in a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel, 
attended by Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai (Harms 2008).  Though Israel and Egypt 
                                                 
7 Settlements are housing and land developments where civilians from the “occupying power” take up 
residence in the occupied territories.  The UN asserts that settlements are illegal based on (1) the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (August 12, 1949); and (2) the 




established a lasting peace, not everyone was happy with it.  In 1981, Anwar Sadat was 
assassinated by extremists who were displeased with Sadat’s foreign policy (Harms 2008). 
(6) Lebanon, the PLO, and the First Intifada. The Lebanese Civil 
War (this will be discussed in more detail later) and the PLO presence in Lebanon created a 
platform for Palestinian resistance against Israel.  Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon 
began with Operation Litani in March 1978, a reprisal for PLO commandos hijacking a bus 
near Haifa (Harms 2008).  Israel occupied southern Lebanon for three months before UN 
Resolution 425 called for Israel’s withdrawal and establishment of UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) (Harms 2008).  But clashes between Israel and the PLO continued with 
Israel conducting heavy bombing raids in south Lebanon and Beirut in 1981 and the PLO 
sending artillery and rocket attacks into northern Israel (Harms 2008).  Israel would launch a 
full-scale invasion (80,000 troops) in June 1982 aimed at the destruction of PLO forces in 
Lebanon (Harms 2008).  Israel quickly dismantled resistance in southern Lebanon and moved 
on to seal off Beirut.  The Israeli forces proceeded to shell Beirut for the next few months 
(Harms 2008).  Arafat was forced to withdraw from Lebanon in August of that same year 
(Harms 2008).  A few months later, the recently elected president of Lebanon, Bashir 
Gemayal, was assassinated in East Beirut.  Gemayal shared the Israeli desire to dismantle the 
PLO in Lebanon (Harms 2008).  As a result, 150 Phalangist8 militiamen entered Beirut and 
massacred between 800 and 2,000 unarmed Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refuguee 
camps, without any intervention by Israeli forces (Harms 2008).    
   The wars in Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila massacres caused 
internal divisions within Israel and the PLO.  Israelis began to protest the Begin 
administration for its list of failed achievements—i.e., lost Israeli lives, no peace treaty, and 
increased Palestinian nationalism (Harms 2008).  Begin resigned his premiership and retired 
into obscurity (Harms 2008).  The elections that followed showed a polarized public, with the 
Likud and Labor parties splitting the vote.  This resulted in a coalition government with 
Yithak Shamir and Shimon Peres representing the Likud and Labor parties, respectively 
(Harms 2008).  Yasser Arafat, now relocated to Tunis, faced deep divisions of his own.  
                                                 
8 The Phalanges Libanaises was founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel.  Its initial aim was to protect the 
Maronite position in Lebanon; in 1958 it entered the political arena to oppose growing Arab nationalism 




Palestinians saw a weak response to the Sabra and Shatila massacres and began to view 
Arafat as a too-moderate diplomat willing to concede to foreign powers (Harms 2008).   
   With the PLO leadership defeated, continuing strife in Lebanon, 
and continued Israeli occupation, Palestinians were politically isolated (Harms 2008).  
This combined with a budding Palestinian youth movement and increasing influence of 
Muslim militant groups to set conditions for rebellion (Harms 2008).  All that was needed 
then would be a spark, and it was provided on 8 December 1987, when an IDF vehicle 
crashed into a truck carrying Palestinian laborers (Harms 2008).  Demonstrations 
followed immediately and Israeli forces, believing this to be another routine 
demonstration, attempted to suppress the demonstration with rubber bullets and tear gas 
(Harms 2008).  However, the demonstration erupted into what came to be known as the 
Intifada (“shaking off” or uprising), and was the beginning of four years of active 
resistance to Israeli occupation resulting in over 100 Israeli and 1,000 Palestinian deaths 
(Harms 2008).  By 1991, the Intifada began to fade and deteriorate,  due primarily to 
infighting among the various factions.  However, ”four years of resistance and protest not 
only withstood severe oppression, but was unified by it” (Harms 2008).  The Intifada also 
led to a sharp increase in the popularity of a new radical group called Hamas, who 
emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood in January 1988 (Harms 2008).  Hamas, unlike 
the PLO who wanted a secular state in the West Bank and Gaza, wanted an Islamic state 
in all of Palestine and was willing to achieve this through armed violence if necessary 
(Harms 2008).   
(7) The Peace Process. With the end of the Cold War, 
Lebanon’s Civil War, and the Intifada winding down, the 1990s presented an opportunity 
to pursue peace through diplomacy.  The situation in 1991 was this:  The U.S., now as the 
world’s sole superpower, garnered some support from a few Arab states.  The former 
Soviet clients of Syria, Iraq, and Libya were left without backers after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Harms 2008).  The PLO, who had sided with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf 






opinion of the PLO (Harms 2008).  The following section captures the most important 
peace initiatives advanced over the last two decades with brief commentary on the 
essential elements and importance of each: 
• Madrid Conference 1991–1993 (Harms 2008):   Based on UN 242, 338, 
and Land-for-Peace.  Parties:  Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, Syria, U.S., USSR, and joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.  Significance:  First time these parties had gathered face 
to face and the first time Israel and Palestinians met in open dialogue.  
• Oslo Accords—September 1993 (Harms 2008):  Secret negotiations 
between Israeli and PLO leadership that ran concurrently with the final year of Madrid 
Conference.  Oslo was not a treaty but an agreed agenda from which to negotiate.  
Significance:  Mutual recognition and Declaration of Principles.  Mutual Recognition was in 
the form of exchanged letters between leaders of Israel and the PLO.  Declaration of 
Principles was the outlining of responsibilities for each party.  Main agenda items include: 
Israel withdrawal from “Jericho area” in the West Bank and establishment of Palestinian 
security force and governing authority.  Permanent status negotiations would begin in two 
years and final settlement to be achieved within five years. 
• Oslo II—September 1995 (Harms 2008):  Also known as the Taba Accords, 
Oslo II was the “two-year” negotiation follow-up set forth in Oslo I.  Parties:  PLO and 
Israel.  Significance:  Established zones of control (A,B,&C) in West Bank designating civil 
and administrative spheres of Palestinian jurisdiction.  The language used was vague and left 
matters open for interpretation.  Extremists in the PLO and Israel took offense to what they 
saw as excessive territorial concessions.  Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 
1995 by an extremist citing these concessions. 
• Hebron Agreement (1997) (Harms 2008):  Reaffirmation and continuation of 
Oslo II.  Parties:  Israel and Palestinian Authority9 (PA).  Significance: Called for Israel to 
                                                 
9 The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established as result of the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Declaration 
of Principles established during the Oslo Accords.  The Palestinian Authority’s purpose was to provide a 
governing body for the Palestinian refugees.  The Oslo accords gave the PA the responsibility to combat 
terrorism and coordinate security with Israel.  The first Palestinian elections were held on 20 January 1996, 




make further withdrawals from West Bank, provide safe passage route between West Bank 
and Gaza, and open the Gaza airport.  Palestinian Authority was to fight terrorism, provide 
security cooperation, and prevent terrorist “incitement and propaganda.”  Continuing 
settlement construction and terrorist attacks derailed negotiations so no progress was 
achieved. 
• Camp David II (2000) (Harms 2008):  New premier Ehud Barak desired to 
abandon Oslo process for final status settlements, but Palestinians and Israelis were too far 
apart on too many issues.  Barak offered between 60–70% of West Bank, though the areas 
were noncontiguous.  In the end, Arafat rejected the agreements, but the fact that refugees 
and Jerusalem were open to discussion was, according to Gregory Harms, “pathbreaking.”  In 
the end, however, no final status settlements were achieved. 
• Clinton Plan and Taba Statement (23 December 2000) (Harms 2008):  
Parties: Israel, PLO, and U.S.  Highlights of the agreement included:  (1) Palestinian state 
consisting of Gaza and 94-96% of West Bank; (2) principle that Arab areas are Palestinian 
and Jewish areas are Israeli with East Jerusalem as Palestinian capital; (3) settlement of the 
refugee problem.  The Clinton Plan was agreed upon as a declaration of intent and as an 
expression of the “spirit of hope and mutual achievement.” 
• Road Map to Peace (2003) (Harms 2008):  April 30, 2003, the “Quartet”—
U.S., European Union, the UN, and Russia—issued a document that established a three-
phase, performance-based plan for a “comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by 2005.  The distinction of the Road Map is that it calls specifically for “ending 
terror and violence” as a necessary precursor for moving forward with the peace process.  It 
also calls for the rebuilding of the Palestinian Authority to include appointment of a prime 
minister.  The Israelis, according to this document, were to improve the humanitarian 
situation in the occupied territories, “freeze all settlement activity,” and “dismantle settlement 
outposts erected since March 2001.” 
• Track II Diplomacy – Geneva Accord (Harms 2008):  Also known as the 
“Eighth day of Taba” as it represents an effort to complete what was started with the Clinton 




Rabbo (Palestinian Authority).  The Geneva Accord lays out the following:  (1) Two-state 
solution based on the 1967 Green Line10; (2) a corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza; (3) a 
demilitarized Palestinian state; (4) “mutually recognized capitals in the area of Jerusalem 
under their respective sovereignty”; (5) Palestinian sovereignty of the Haram al-Sharif, Israeli 
sovereignty of the Western Wall; and (6) an opportunity for refugees to return to the state of 
Palestine.  The Geneva Accord became popular internationally and within both Israel and 
Palestine, with 53% and 56% approval ratings respectively.  However, the plan received little 
support in Washington and was outright rejected by Ariel Sharon. 
• Disengagement Plan (Harms 2008):  In February 2004, Ariel Sharon 
unilaterally announced his plan to withdraw from Gaza.  Essentially, the plan called for 
removal of all Israeli forces and settlements while maintaining supervisory control of the 
territory from just outside the borders.  The plan received criticism from both sides of the 
political spectrum.  The right criticized it as an unnecessary relent that inhibited the 
settlement movement, and the left saw it as a ploy to freeze the peace process, with one 
Likud Party leader putting it, “Anyone who thinks it is Gaza first is mistaken.  It is Gaza 
only.”  In any case, the withdrawal was executed in August 2005.  Whether it amounts to a 
removal of occupation is still a debated issue. 
• Saudi Proposal (2007) (Harms 2008):  At a 2-day summit in March 2007 held 
in Saudi Arabia, a proposal was unanimously approved by Arab leaders that reiterated the 
2002 Saudi proposal.  The essence of the plan is land-for-peace.  The following is from a 
New York Times column by Thomas Friedman and sums up the proposal (New York Times, 
17 February 2002): 
In return for a total withdraw by Israel to the June 4, 1967, lines, and the establishment of 
a Palestinian state, the 22 members of the Arab league would offer full diplomatic 
relations, normalized trade and security guarantees.  Full withdrawal, in accord with UN 
Resolution 242, for full peace between Israel and the entire Arab world. 
 
(8) The Second Intifada (2000-2003/4). The Second Intifada was 
sparked by inflammatory political gestures by Ariel Sharon that were aimed at then-Prime 
                                                 





Minister Ehud Barak’s policies (Harms 2008).  Sharon was outspoken against land 
concessions and to publicize this he paid a provocative visit to Temple Mount / Haram al-
Sharif in Jerusalem, escorted “by 1,000 Israeli police and soldiers” on 28 September 2000 
(Harms 2008).  The visit was met with Palestinian demonstrators to block the visit and 
conflict broke out resulting in four Palestinian demonstrators being killed (Harms 2008).  The 
following day the intifada erupted with much more force and violence than the previous one, 
taking on “features of all-out warfare” (Harms 2008).  The Second Intifada was inspired—at 
least partly—by Hezbollah’s rise to prominence in Lebanon, as indicated by its perceived 
success in driving Israel out of southern Lebanon earlier in 2000 (Norton 2007).  The rise of 
militant Islam that had evolved over the previous two decades was now being felt directly in 
the Palestine-Israel conflict.  Palestinian protestors replaced “stones, bottles, and burning 
tires” by roadside bombs and automatic weapons, while the Israelis would routinely use tanks 
and combat helicopters to maintain control (Harms 2008).  Numerous terror groups were 
operating in the West Bank and Gaza, including: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Tanzim, al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade (Harms 2008).  These groups “aimed almost exclusively at harming and 
killing Israeli civilians (Harms 2008). 
   In 2000 and 2001, the U.S. and Israel saw leadership changes that 
resulted in a dramatic shift back to hard-line policies.  In the U.S., George W. Bush was 
inaugurated in January 2000, while Ariel Sharon replaced Ehud Barak in February 2001 
(Harms 2008).  The Bush administration initially maintained some distance from the conflict, 
but that would change after the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 (Harms 2008).  Taking a hard-line 
stance against terror, the U.S. and Israel both held that peace negotiations could not proceed 
until terror attacks ceased.  The Palestinians, thoroughly familiar with Sharon’s history11, 
were further incensed with his election (Harms 2008).  Under Sharon, terror attacks against 
Israeli civilians “dramatically increased” with “shopping malls, restaurants, and public buses” 
becoming common sites of suicide attacks (Harms 2008). 
   Sharon responded to the escalation of violence with Operation 
Defensive Shield, launched from March to April of 2002 (Harms 2008).  Israeli forces 
                                                 
11 Ariel Sharon is remembered for his role as Israeli Defense Minister during the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre of 1982, where Palestinians believe he intentionally looked the other way while 150 Phalangist 





reoccupied the territories they had withdrawn from after Oslo and destroyed the “civilian and 
security offices” of the Palestinian Authority (Harms 2008).  The worst of the fighting 
occurred in the Palestinian town of Nablus and the Jenin refugee camps, where 497 
Palestinians were killed, over 2,800 refugee housing units were destroyed, and 878 homes 
were demolished leaving 17,000 people homeless (Harms 2008).   
   Sharon’s next plan to curb the terror threat was a security fence, 
known as “the Wall,” built from the “north end of the West Bank” and roughly tracing the 
border as it heads south (Harms 2008).  Construction of the wall began in June 2002 and, as 
of January 2007, 256 of its projected 436 miles had been completed (Harms 2008).  The 
security fence is seen by many as a forced and permanent way to annex parts of the West 
Bank, and as a result has received harsh condemnation by the international community and 
the UN (Harms 2008).  According to Human Rights Watch in its World Report 2007: 
85 percent of the wall extends into the West Bank…it would mean Israel’s 
annexation of approximately 10 percent of the West Bank, including all 
major settlements there, all of which are illegal under the Geneva 
Convention, as well as some of the most productive Palestinian farmlands 
and key water resources. 
According to Gregory Harms, “the barrier remains a controversial subject and has become 
elemental in the [Palestine-Israel] conflict” (2008). 
(9) 2006: Gaza, Lebanon, and Israel’s 34-Day War with 
Hezbollah. Violence emanating from Gaza continued well after the Disengagement Plan 
of 2005 had been executed (Harms 2008).  On June 24, 2006, Israeli soldiers entered 
Gaza and kidnapped two Palestinians who were believed to be connected with the 
terrorist group Hamas (Harms 2008).  In response to this kidnapping and because of the 
approximately 9,000 Palestinians held under “administrative detention” by Israel, 
Palestinian militants attacked an IDF post “killing two soldiers and abducting a third” 
(Harms 2008).  Israel responded harshly with Operation Summer Rain featuring the 
“bombing of roads, bridges, and water tanks” (Harms 2008).  Additionally, Israeli forces 
seized 74 members of Hamas, “including 23 legislators,” and “buzzed the home of Syrian 
President al-Assad in Damascus” to send a message to Hamas leadership believed to be 




   Just one month later (July 2006), Hezbollah crossed Israel’s border 
and abducted two Israeli soldiers in what appeared to be a pre-planned attack with a 
multitude of objectives (discussed in more detail later) (Harms 2008).  According to Gregory 
Harms, the attack was partly an effort at achieving prisoner swaps for Lebanese in Israeli jails 
and partly an effort to remove pressure from the Palestinians in Gaza “by making Israel fight 
on two fronts” (2008).  In any case, Israel responded to this incursion with swift military 
action, responding with over 7,000 air strikes, 2,500 naval bombardments, killing between 
250–500 Hezbollah fighters, and killing between 800–1,200 Lebanese civilians (Harms 
2008).  Despite this, Hezbollah proved resilient and gained recognition as a formidable 
resistance force, as Harms puts it (2008): 
Its fighters inflicted severe and abundant damage on IDF equipment, 
including the destruction of a tank and a gunboat off the coast of Beirut, 
sustained a month-long conflict with a vastly superior military power, and 
remained intact when the dust settled. 
Hezbollah’s war with Israel transcends the Palestine-Israel conflict and invites analysis of 
many environmental factors and regional conflicts.  It will be discussed in more detail in later 
sections. 
(10) Recent Developments and Trends. The period since the 
Summer of 2006 has been largely transitional in nature.  As a result of Israel’s 
performance in its 2006 war with Hezbollah, Ehud Olmert’s—the current Israeli Prime 
Minister—position was “precarious at best” (Harms 2008).  Following up Sharon’s 
Disengagement Plan of 2005, Olmert announced his “Convergence Plan” in 2006, which 
essentially calls for withdrawal “from a percentage of settlements in the West Bank, 
corresponding to the wall” (Harms 2008).  Many see this as a continuation of policies 
aimed at circumventing negotiations and that aim to create a compartmented Palestinian 
state of Israel’s own design (Harms 2008).  Of recent import in Israeli politics is the issue 
of demographics.  The need for Israel to “realize some form of a Palestinian state” may 
be derived from the recognition that the long term trend will likely result in Israel 
becoming the minority between “the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea” and a 
Palestinian state would be useful in a prospective effort to limit immigration of Israeli 




   Internecine violence within the Palestinian Authority has “added one 
more woe to life in the occupied territories” (Harms 2008).  Hamas and Fatah, in a struggle 
for PA leadership and direction, have engaged in “periodic gunfire and skirmishes” which 
reached a boiling point in 2007 when Hamas forcibly took control of Gaza (Harms 2008).  
Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas “declared a state of emergency” and dissolved 
the coalition government (Harms 2008).  The U.S., EU, and Israel all threw its support 
behind Fatah—the less militant of the two factions—and promised a resumption of aid if 
Fatah led the Palestinian Authority’s coalition government (Harms 2008).  However, some 
Palestinians see the trend toward a Hamas-controlled Gaza and a Fatah-controlled West Bank 
“as ominous” to the Palestinian cause.  As one Palestinian legislator put it, “This is the end of 
the Palestinian state.  If you have two separate systems, there is no way that you can have a 
Palestinian state that is contiguous” (Harms 2008).   
2. Brief History of Iran 
a. Introduction 
  The 1979 Iranian Revolution—also widely known as Khomeini’s 
Revolution—heralded a new era of militant, fundamental Islam and high-stakes confrontation 
with the West.  Iran’s Revolution and its legacy have defined the Middle East for the past 
three decades, and many—if not most—modern Middle East conflicts can be traced directly 
to the great ideological upheaval that has followed since.  Today, Iran is in a direct stand-off 
with the U.S. and the West over its aggressive nuclear program, antagonistic relationship 
with Israel and the U.S., and for its pervasive extension of its revolution, manifested through 
widespread support for Islamic terror organizations.  But in order to understand Iran today, it 
is first necessary to look back at how developments of the 20th century laid the foundation 
for Khomeini and Islamic fundamentalists to seize power in Iran. 
b. Prelude to the Revolution 
  Iran’s political landscape in the early 20th Century can be viewed as a broad 
struggle between nationalistic tendencies and autocratic rule and was greatly influenced by 
the exploitation of colonial powers.  At the end of the previous century, Persia, as it was 




formidable imperial powers, Britain and Russia” (Coughlin 2009).  The Qajar Dynasty, who 
was currently in power, was badly indebted and routinely sold off Iranian interests to support 
itself.  In 1901, the Qajar Dynasty signed over 60 years worth of oil exploration rights to 
British business man William D’Arcy (Coughlin 2009).  This incensed Iranians and 
contributed to growing nationalism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, where 
Iranians sought a Western style constitution and a limit to the Shah’s authority (Farndon 
2007).  The revolution ultimately failed, but it laid the foundation for a deep-seated sense of 
nationalism and reflected a growing repugnance to conceding to foreign powers. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Revolution was the birthplace of the Iranian parliament, 
known as the majlis (Farndon 2007). 
  In 1908, William D’Arcy struck oil in southwest Iran and London bought a 
controlling stake in the Anglico-Iranian Oil Company (Coughlin 2009).  The AIOC came to 
be a national symbol of “humiliation and exploitation by the British” (Farndon 2007).  
During this same period—the years preceding World War I—Persian soil became a key 
strategic asset to the region’s major powers.  The Russians, Ottomans, and British were each 
involved in confrontations in Persian territory, with each seeking to advance its sphere of 
influence for different reasons (Coughlin 2009).    This had a devastating effect on the Iranian 
economy and its people and the government became so weak that some Sheiks were able 
carve out semi-sovereign states within Persia’s boundaries (Coughlin 2009).  The weakness 
of the Qajar Dynasty and continued exploitation by foreign powers combined to pave the way 
for the rise of Reza Khan and the Pahlavi Dynasty.  Reza Khan was an “accomplished 
military officer and British protégé” in command of the elite Cossacks Brigade (Coughlin 
2009).   Khan used his military position to build a strong political base and to reign in rogue 
Sheikdoms and, by 1923, had gained enough power to rival the Shah (Coughlin 2009).  The 
Persian people, including the Mullahs, clamored for leadership that could hold the nation 
together and who seemed strong enough to represent its interests.  It believed it had found it 
in Reza Khan and, as a result, the Majlis and the mullahs combined to force the Qajar 
Dynasty into exile and installed Shah Reza Khan, thus beginning the history of the Pahlavi 
Dynasty who would remain in power until 1979 (Farndon 2007). 
  Reza Khan embarked on an aggressive campaign of secular modernization 




Western judicial concepts, made education compulsory for boys and girls, and outlawed the 
chador (Farndon 2007).  The once-influential Shi’a clergy of Iran was reduced to almost 
nothing (Coughlin 2009).  Even the renaming of the state from Persia to Iran was a sleight to 
Islam, as it was part of a broader effort to re-emphasize Persian culture over Islam (Farndon 
2007).  These pressures on the clergy boiled over in 1936 when demonstrations erupted at the 
Imam Reza Mosque in Mashdad “to protest Khan’s attacks on Shi’ism,” but Khan put the 
clergy in its place by brutally suppressing the protestors, killing between 100 and 400 
(Farndon 2007).  Khan’s iron-fisted rule alienated the clergy (and others), but it was his 
relationship with Nazi Germany ahead of World War II that proved his demise.  Khan 
“admired Hitler’s autocratic style and ultra-nationalism” so he fostered close ties to the 
German dictatorship (Coughlin 2009).  However, the Allied powers of Britain and Russia 
saw Iran as its ‘Bridge to Victory’ and intended to use Iran to ship arms and supplies to 
support the Red Army (Coughlin 2009).  Russia and Britain invaded Iran and forced Khan’s 
abdication, leaving the throne to Khan’s 22 year-old son, Muhammad Reza (Coughlin 2009). 
c. Iran: Road to Revolution—the 1953 Coup 
  Inheriting a war-torn country with a decimated economy, the young Shah 
assumed leadership in a miserably weak position.  Both the clergy and nationalists were 
hungry to reassert influence after decades of oppressive rule.  When the clergy reemerged, it 
had become divided between the traditional quietists and a newly-emerging group, led by 
Ayatollah Abolqassem Kashani, who believed the imposition of Shari’a law should be 
actively pursued, even if that meant involvement in politics (Coughlin 2009).  The young 
Shah was in no position to reign in the clergy and conceded almost all of his father’s 
restrictions, marking the beginning of a trend toward Shi’a political involvement (Coughlin 
2009).  
The nationalist resurgence was made possible by Reza Khan’s removal and 
was fuelled almost entirely by opposition to British exploitation of Iranian oil resources 
(Farndon 2007).  By 1950, “Iranian oil was the prime energy source for much of the Western 
world,” but Iran saw little profit from it (Farndon 2007).  In 1950, Iran received $45 million 
in oil revenue while Britain profited handsomely, raking in $142 million (Farndon 2007).  




influence from his public opposition to the Shah’s weakness in the face of Britain and for 
leading pressure on the AIOC to negotiate a better deal (Farndon 2007).  Mosaddeq managed 
to put together a coalition—the National Front—with broad popular support that included 
both the clergy and Bazaari (merchant class) (Farndon 2007).  The clergy, normally fearful of 
the secular leanings of the nationalists, were united by hatred for the influence of outsiders.  
Mosaddeq tried in vain to negotiate a fairer deal with Britain, but Britain refused to make 
even slight concessions.  Therefore, on 15 March 1951, Mosaddeq introduced, and the majlis 
approved, a measure to seize Iran’s oil rights and it was met with unanimous approval 
(Coughlin 2009).  With this daring political move, Mosaddeq at once attained the prime 
minister-ship, won status as an Iranian nationalist hero, and changed the course of Iran’s 
history.  Mosaddeq’s support base grew so quickly that Mosaddeq became the de facto leader 
of Iran, eclipsing Muhammed Reza Shah (Farndon 2007). 
  The oil takeover provoked the biggest international crisis in Iran’s short 
history as a nation (Coughlin 2009).  Britain saw this as a hostile action, tantamount to a war 
declaration and, accordingly, drew up war plans and imposed an oil embargo to force 
Mosaddeq’s compliance (Coughlin 2009).  Britain attempted to persuade the U.S. to take a 
tough stand against Iran and Mosaddeq.  With Cold War politics as justification, and despite 
Iranians near-universal support for Mosaddeq, Washington decided to throw its support 
behind Britain and the Shah.  After Mosaddeq’s refusal of a 50–50 deal, British intelligence 
services and the CIA colluded with the Shi’a clerics to incite an Iranian coup—codenamed 
Operation Ajax—aimed at replacing Mosaddeq with an American-backed general and then 
reseating the Shah firmly in power (Coughlin 2009).  British and American covert efforts 
were successful in eroding Mosaddeq’s support base and, on 19 August 1953, Mosaddeq was 
forced to flee and was later arrested (Farndon 2007). 
d. The Shah’s White Revolution 
  Iranian nationalists, long weary of foreign influence, saw the 1953 coup as 
one more poignant example of Iran’s exploitation at the hands of foreign colonialists.  That 
Mosaddeq was seen as a national hero for standing up to Britain ensured this event was 
branded in the mind of Iranians.  The Shah, upon his return, knew he lacked broad support 




U.S. was crucial in propping up the Shah’s regime, both financially and politically, which 
fanned resentment among the nationalists, whose support Mosaddeq most enjoyed.  
Americans would quickly forget this coup, but it came to be a galvanizing revolutionary 
message that would be propagated in the years leading up to Khomeini’s Revolution and 
beyond (Farndon 2007). 
  After the 1953 coup, the Shah became a key White House ally central to the 
U.S. effort to contain Russia (Coughlin 2009).  The Shah, and his American backers, began 
to strengthen both internal security services and the Iranian military.  The Americans setup a 
“highly effective intelligence operation which, in 1957, became SAVAK” (Coughlin 2009).  
The U.S. also helped the Shah to increase its armed forces from 120,000 to 200,000 from 
1953-1961 (Coughlin 2009).  When the Kennedy administration arrived in 1961, human 
rights became central to U.S. foreign policy and the Shah was obliged to fall in line 
(Coughlin 2009).  The Shah instituted a series of liberal, populist reforms that came to be 
known as the White Revolution, or the ‘Revolution of the Shah and the People’ (Coughlin 
2009).  The White Revolution was essentially another push at modernity that conformed 
more to Westernized, secular social policy. 
  A central plank of the Shah’s White Revolution, and the one that would prove 
most disastrous, was the land reform program.  The land reform program was designed to 
confiscate land from wealthy landowners and redistribute it to the peasant class.  While 
seemingly laudable, these land reforms had disastrous effects.  In a single stroke, the Shah 
succeeded in alienating two powerful constituencies:  the clergy, who relied on land wealth to 
fund theological education and institutions, and the Bazaari, whose business success 
obviously relied on land wealth (Farndon 2007).  The land reform program also brought back 
National Front sympathies, as the wealthy class became disenfranchised by the Shah’s 
policies (Coughlin 2009).   
  This time period coincided—not by accident—with the rise to prominence of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  Khomeini, inspired by Ayatollah Kashani’s political 
activism, began to become a vocal opponent of the Shah’s reform programs, taking direct 
issue with the liberal policies that allowed women to vote, did not enforce the Chador, and, in 
short, did not conform to his vision of Shari’a Law (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini, prior to this 




had been excluded from the inner circle (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini, however, seized upon 
the Shah’s policies and aligned himself with the National Front, preaching populist messages 
that attacked the Shah.  Throughout the early 1960s, Khomeini spoke and wrote strongly in 
opposition to the Shah.  The Shah reacted by using his police force to suppress Khomeini 
supporters and by conscripting Khomeini loyalists into the Shah’s army (Coughlin 2009). 
  On 3 June 1963, Khomeini used the occasion of Ashura to give the Shah a 
particularly strong condemnation, and the Shah responded by arresting Khomeini on 5 June 
(Coughlin 2009).  The Shah’s police became embroiled with demonstrators and ended up 
killing 28 at the police station where Khomeini was being held, and 200 more demonstrators 
were killed nation-wide (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini was released from prison in early July 
and placed under 24-hour surveillance by SAVAK.  Khomeini, however, emerged stronger 
from his confrontation with the Shah, with many Iranians drawing inspiration from his 
“steadfast refusal to cow to the Shah’s intimidatory tactics” (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini 
continued to berate the Shah and repeatedly called for him to be overthrown.  Khomeini 
seized upon the Shah’s relationship to the U.S. and Israel and successfully positioned the 
U.S. as the new “common enemy” of Iran, unseating the previously held bogeymen of Britain 
and Russia (Coughlin 2009).  The power struggle between the Shah and Khomeini boiled 
over when the Shah directed the majlis to pass a law granting diplomatic immunity to all 
American personnel and their dependents (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini delivered a powerful 
speech where he capitalized on Iranian sensitivities to foreigners by telling the people the 
Shah has subverted Iranians to being “lower than American dogs” because Americans are 
liable for killing their neighbor’s dogs (Coughlin 2009).  The Shah had had enough.  
Khomeini was arrested and exiled to Turkey on 4 November 1963. 
e. Khomeini in Exile 
  Khomeini would remain in Turkey until the summer of 1965.  During his 




militant Islamic groups.  Of these, the most notable was a group called Hezbollah12.  
Hezbollah began a campaign of terror against supporters of the Shah (Coughlin 2009).  
Khomeini, who was already a fairly wealthy landowner, became a millionaire while in 
Turkey owing to widespread support for his campaign against the loathed Shah (Coughlin 
2009).  His confrontation with the Shah and subsequent exile raised Khomeini’s status and 
made him a symbol of the opposition.  Meanwhile, the Shah was conducting a ruthless 
campaign against Khomeini supporters in Iran—to seemingly great success—and, by the 
summer of 1965, he was no longer considered a viable threat and was authorized to move to 
Najaf, Iraq (Coughlin 2009). 
  It was from Najaf—tomb of Imam Ali, the first Iman and the Shi’a founder—
where Khomeini would fully develop his vision for an Islamic Republic.  It was also in Najaf 
where he would forge crucial alliances with Shi’a leaders in Iraq and Lebanon (Coughlin 
2009).  The Iraqi Shi’a, having experienced a history of political turmoil, were disinclined to 
get involved in the Iranian politics (Coughlin 2009).  Therefore, Khomeini focused his efforts 
on resisting the Shah with populist reform messages.  Though the mainstream Iraqi Shi’a 
remained aloof to Khomeini, he managed to build strong relations with more radical Iraqi 
mullahs.  His most important relationship was with Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr, a powerful 
cleric who was head of the Da’wa (the Call) Islamic party and the father of Muqtada al-Sadr, 
who would come to lead Shi’a resistance to U.S. occupation in 2003 (Coughlin 2009).  Baqr 
al-Sadr, like Khomeini, believed in clergy involvement in politics and believed that militancy 
was justified in achieving political objectives.  They based these beliefs on a conservative 
interpretation of Shari’a law.  Baqr al-Sadr and Khomeini would remain close allies and 
friends until Saddam Hussein had Sadr assassinated in 1980 for supporting a Shi’a revolt 
against the Baath regime (Coughlin 2009). 
  Throughout the 1960s, Khomeini laid out his true vision for the 
Islamicization of the Muslim world.  Encouraged, or perhaps emboldened by, Baqr al-Sadr, 
Khomeini commenced on a series of impassioned lectures captured in a thin volume titled 
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According to Coughlin, this Hezbollah was the prototype for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the 




Velayet-e Faqih, or ‘regency of the theologian’ (Farndon 2007).  Traditionally, Shi’a doctrine 
viewed any form of government as profane and inherently fallible and, therefore, believed 
that clergy “shouldn’t stoop to politics” (Farndon 2007).  Khomeini’s Velayet-e Faqih13, 
however, laid out a quite different and very powerful vision that drove the ideology of the 
revolution and its legacy, arguably, still to this day.  According to Khomeini, any form of 
government that is not based on Shari’a law is illegitimate and illegal under Islam (Coughlin 
2009).  Accordingly, it is the duty of the jurist, or Faqih, to rule as the sole source of 
authority as the Supreme Leader, and government structures formed by man should be 
subservient to this jurist (Farndon 2007).  Con Coughlin summarizes the implications of 
Khomeini’s vision in the Velayet-e Faqih (2009): 
Senior clerics who specialized in Islamic Law (feqh) – of which Khomeini 
was one – had the ultimate authority to rule the state, rather than giving 
their blessing to the appointment of a secular ruler such as the Shah.  
But Khomeini, politically shrewd as he was, was sensitive to the inflammatory nature this 
message might have on the populist-minded masses and ensured it remained only in 
“seminaries and theological writing” (Coughlin 2009).  The Velayet-e Faqih was used to 
galvanize hard-line support from radicals, but his message to Iranians and moderates in Iraq 
remained one of populism and plurality, and one squarely focused on the Shah’s illegitimacy, 
his political and economic policies, and his relationship to the U.S. and Israel (Coughlin 
2009). 
f. The Shah’s Last Steps 
  The Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ began to subside after Kennedy’s 
assassination in 1963.  Due in part to an assassination attempt on the Shah in 1965 and the 
murder of his Prime Minister, the Shah’s regime from 1965 until its end in 1979 came to be 
as brutal and repressive as any that had come before (Coughlin 2009).  This period saw an 
ever-increasing disenfranchisement between the Shah and the people of Iran.  The oil boom 
of the 1970s, following the Yom Kippur War, contributed to extravagance and largess on the 
part of the Shah’s regime (Coughlin 2009).  Additionally, the rise of Israel as the region’s 
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superpower after its stunning success in Israeli-Arab Wars of 1967–1973 contributed to the 
Shah becoming closer with the U.S. and Israel for arms and security (Coughlin 2009).  
Together, these events served to drive a deeper wedge between the Shah and his people, with 
Iranians again feeling that the Shah was selling Iran’s interests to foreign powers.  The Shah 
made matters worse by his seemingly disillusioned actions as symbolized by the extravagant 
2500th Year celebration of the Persian Empire the Shah arranged in October 1971 (Coughlin 
2009).  The Shah spent $100m on an elaborate event that Iranians perceived as aimed at 
impressing the outside world.  This perception was exacerbated, and made more insulting, by 
the fact that much of the lucrative work was done by foreign contractors, a great number of 
which came from America (Coughlin 2009). 
  The Shah—and his U.S. supporters—would continue to misstep during the 
1970s.  Aiming to maintain close ties to the U.S., the Shah anticipated pressure to reform his 
human rights record from the newly-arrived Carter administration.  He directed SAVAK to 
ease pressure against dissent, which had the effect of allowing anti-government sentiment to 
spill out into the open (Coughlin 2009).  The Shah, as Coughlin put it, was “stuck between a 
rock and a hard place” (2009).  On one hand, he sought to placate Washington on human 
rights, but, on the other hand, by not suppressing the violence he was almost conceding the 
throne (Coughlin 2009).  To make matters worse, the Carter administration provided little 
guidance.  Carter’s administration showed a fundamental lack of understanding of the 
situation by clumsily propping up the Shah with praise for his human rights efforts while 
Iranians suffered (Coughlin 2009).  The U.S. did not seem to sense the distance that had 
grown between the Shah and his people.   
  Through the summer and fall of 1978, a series of unfortunate events occurred 
that would “finally close off any possibility of a compromise between the government and 
opposition” (Coughlin 2009).  The first was when the Ettela’at, a government controlled 
newspaper, printed a defaming article accusing Khomeini of being a homosexual (Farndon 
2007).  Rioting in Qom broke out immediately and 20 protestors were killed, including 
several mullahs (Coughlin 2009).  This event made Khomeini, as the only active denouncer 
of the Shah, the official symbol of the brewing revolution (Coughlin 2009).  Massive 
demonstrations erupted across Iran resulting in running street battles in Tehran, Qom, and 




Abadan and set it on fire, killing 400 inside, including women and children (Farndon 2007).  
In September, the Shah declared martial law and, on 8 September—which would come to be 
known as Black Friday—hundreds of pro-Khomeini demonstrators were gunned down in 
Jaleh square in southeast Tehran (Coughlin 2009).  This marked the end of the Shah’s bid to 
maintain control.  On 16 January 1979, Reza Shah packed his bags and left the country 
(Farndon 2007).  On 1 February, Khomeini stepped off his Air France flight as the clear 
front-runner to lead the revolution.  For the moment, Iranians celebrated his arrival (Farndon 
2007). 
g. Khomeini’s Power Grab 
Khomeini may have been the front-runner to lead the revolution, but he 
was not anointed as Iran’s ruler right away.  From the chaos and disorder arose hundreds 
of komitehs—or committees—with ideologies ranging from leftist, communist 
interpretations of Islam to the fundamental Shari’a interpretation of Khomeini to the 
National Front (Coughlin 2009).  Recognizing this, Khomeini sought early on to appeal to 
these groups to ensure his leadership position.  His first move was to appoint a nationalist 
prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan—a nationalist leader who was keen to the rule of law 
and respect for human rights (Coughlin 2009).   
To begin administering the new Republic, Khomeini established a 
‘Revolutionary Council’, composed of thoroughly vetted religious revolutionary loyalists, 
whose identity would not be disclosed.  The Revolutionary Council served as Khomeini’s 
key governing body whose function was to supervise Bazargan’s government (Coughlin 
2009).  The Revolutionary Council was to vet candidates, lead the writing of the new 
constitution (to ensure it adhered to Khomeini’s principles), and was tasked with 
developing a militant force capable of protecting the revolution—the precursor to the 
Revolutionary Guards (Coughlin 2009). 
    From the beginning, Khomeini and Mehdi Bazargan struggled on Iran’s 
new direction.  Bazargan sought a more pluralistic, secular constitution that respected 
human rights and the rule of law and wanted normalized relations with the West 




concessions, such as voting rights for all adults—including women—to elect the 
“president, the majlis, and local provincial councils” (Coughlin 2009).  However, 
Khomeini’s Revolutionary Council ensured the principals of Velayet-e Faqih made it into 
the constitution and that the powers of the Supreme Leader were virtually limitless 
(Coughlin 2009).  Bazargan enjoyed a broad base of support from Iranian nationalists and 
some prominent figures of the moderate Shi’a clergy who did not share Khomeini’s 
fundamentalist vision.  Nevertheless, it was not enough to stand up against Khomeini 
loyalists who repeatedly undermined Bazargan’s influence, many of whom successfully 
tied Bazargan to the ‘Great Satan’, for his pragmatic desire to normalize relations with 
the West (Coughlin 2009).  Bazargan tendered his resignation two days after 
demonstrations broke out in Tehran protesting Bazargan’s role as a negotiator in the U.S. 
hostage crisis (Coughlin 2009).   
  The U.S. Embassy hostage crisis broke out spontaneously on 4 November 
1979 when a group of 400–500 students calling themselves ‘student followers of the 
Imam’s line’ (Coughlin 2009) seized the U.S. embassy in response to Washington’s 
acceptance of Shah Muhammed Pahlavi into the U.S. for cancer treatment (stfrancis.edu).  
Many Iranians began to smell a coup of the sort that had occurred in 1953, which still 
burned in the minds of many Iranians (Farndon 2007).  This crisis became a defining 
moment for Iran’s revolution as Khomeini seized the opportunity to strengthen his grip as 
the revolution’s undisputed leader (Coughlin 2009).  United against a common enemy, 
the political infighting and growing opposition to Khomeini’s Velayet-e Faqih would be 
set aside “to take a stand against the ‘Great Satan’” (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini placed a 
loyalist to supervise the student hostage-takers, giving him ownership of the standoff 
with the U.S. and along with it the opportunity to simultaneously humiliate the U.S. and 
demonstrate that he was the leader of Iran’s revolution (Coughlin 2009).   
h. Iran at War:  The Iran-Iraq War and Iranian Civil War 
  Iran was beset by two wars in the early 1980s, a civil war and an 
“imposed” war with its neighbor to the west, Iraq.  The 1980 elections—Iran’s first—




Khomeini’s during his exile, and was a moderate Islamist who was formerly part of the 
National Front (Coughlin 2009).  Though an ally of Khomeini’s, Bani-Sadr actively 
spoke out against the Velayet-e Faqih, and so Khomeini hesitantly endorsed Iran’s first 
democratically elected president (Coughlin 2009).  At the same time, the Revolutionary 
Council’s heavy hands in the 1980 elections ensured the majlis was dominated by the 
clergy, under the newly formed banner of the Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP), of 
which Khomeini was a chief supporter (Coughlin 2009).  It wasn’t apparent yet, but the 
election of a nationalist leader and a clergy-dominated majlis, the 1980 elections had 
paved the way for civil war. 
  During this same year, Iran’s neighbor brought upon Iran what Iranians 
came to call the “Imposed” war (Farndon 2007).  Saddam Hussein executed his own coup 
in July, 1979.  This was at least partially out of concern for a Shi’a uprising threatening 
the Baath regime that seemed to be emanating from Iran (Coughlin 2009).  Hussein and 
Khomeini were long-time enemies.  Khomeini saw Hussein as an infidel—and often said 
so—and Hussein had happily expelled Khomeini, at the Shah’s request, from Najaf in 
1977 (Coughlin 2009).  Hussein had observed the power Khomeini exerted over the Shi’a 
(60% of Iraq’s population) before the revolution, and especially after it.  Coughlin 
describes Saddam’s decision to invade as “calculated opportunism” (2009).  He reasoned 
that with the turmoil and in-fighting present in Iran, resistance would be virtually non-
existent.  Hussein’s main impetus for action was to head off an extension of Khomeini’s 
revolution, but he also wanted to settle an old score.  The humiliating Algiers agreement 
of 1975 had conceded Iraq’s only access to the gulf, vis-à-vis the Shatt al-Arab waterway.  
Hussein intended to reclaim it.  He also intended to occupy parts of the oil-rich portions 
of the Khuzestan province in southwest Iran (Coughlin 2009).   
  Meanwhile, Khomeini and the revolution were vulnerable, suffering from 
deep internal divisions.  His fledgling republic teetered on the brink of civil war and the 
army, largely equipped with American weaponry from the Shah’s era, sorely lacked 
repair parts—the hostage crisis had ended all trade with the U.S.—and was in no 
condition for a fight.  But Khomeini, the opportunist he was, by the end of 1981, had 




common enemy.  Khomeini initially tried to broker peace between Bani-Sadr and IRP, 
who became embroiled in intense political infighting over how the war should be waged.  
Bani-Sadr was responsible for employing the Iranian National Army and the 
Revolutionary Guards, but the IRP jostled for power over control of the IRGC.  With the 
country descending into civil war, Khomeini, in May 1981, broke with Bani-Sadr and 
pushed the IRP-dominated majlis to oust him on grounds of “incompetence” (Coughlin 
2009).  Bani-Sadr, who by now was closely aligned with the leftist Mujahideen-e Khalk-
e-Iran
14
 and various other nationalist groups, continued resistance after his removal from 
the presidency (Coughlin 2009).  Nevertheless, the Mujahideen were outmatched by the 
Revolutionary Guards, whose skills had been honed by combat action against Iraq.  The 
Revolutionary Guards conducted a nation-wide purge of the Mujahideen and Bani-Sadr 
supporters (Coughlin 2009).  By the end of 1981, 2,500 Mujahideen had been executed 
and Bani-Sadr was exiled to Paris (Coughlin 2009).  Ali Khameini, a long-time Khomeini 
loyalist was appointed to replace Bani-Sadr, effectively sealing Khomeini’s triumph over 
moderate, secular opposition.  The internal pressures faded and Khomeini was free to 
focus on Hussein and Iraq.  The clergy were, at last, explicitly in control of the Iranian 
Republic (Coughlin 2009). 
  The Iran–Iraq War would end officially on 20 July 1988 with a UN-
brokered cease fire agreement drawn up in Geneva.  The war, however, had a profound 
impact on Iran militarily, politically, and economically.  It also had a profound impact on 
Khomeini.  In May 1982, Iranian forces broke Iraq’s initial siege on Khorramshahr 
(Coughlin 2009).  With the Iraqi army on their heels, it appeared as if Iran was positioned 
to end the war favorably, and Khomeini was inclined to do so.  However, his new 
president, Ali Khameini, and much of the mullah-dominated majlis, saw an opportunity 
to achieve the grander vision by pressing the attack forward making “Khomeini the ruler 
of Iraq and all of the Muslim world” (Coughlin 2009).  Hesitant at first, Khomeini was 
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group to resist the Shah and, then after grabbing power, sought to expunge the group since its ideology no 




persuaded and, once he was, he applied his usual fanaticism to the task calling for 
nothing short of the unequivocal removal of Saddam Hussein (Coughlin 2009).  
Khomeini began to present himself as the international leader of the Islamic Revolution 
and began publicly assuming the mantle of oppressed Muslims saying, ‘our aim is to rid 
Iraq of its tyrannical leaders and liberate Jerusalem’ (Coughlin 2009). 
  Nevertheless, Iran’s momentum quickly ground to a halt as the war came 
to resemble World War I trench warfare.  The stalemate was broken when the U.S. 
openly entered on Iraq’s side (Coughlin 2009).  The U.S., fearing Iraq may come under 
Khomeini’s control, directly supported Iraq’s war effort with real-time intelligence, 
improved equipment and armament, and assertive Navy action in the gulf (Coughlin 
2009).  By 1988, Iraq was back on the offensive.  They began launching SCUD missiles 
into Tehran and Qom, and the U.S. Navy began destroying oil platforms (Coughlin 2009).  
Reluctantly, and at the strong insistence of his advisors, Khomeini was forced to 
unconditionally accept a humiliating cease-fire arrangement, UN Resolution 598 
(Coughlin 2009). 
  In the course of this eight year war, Iran had lost around three-quarters of 
a million lives (Farndon 2007) and its economy had been brought almost to its knees, 
with inflation running at 40–50% and unemployment over 30% (Coughlin 2009).  
Khomeini, humiliated, came under fire for passing up an opportunity to end the war in a 
position of strength, and the war took a toll on him physically and psychologically.  
Khomeini never appeared in public after the war ended (Coughlin 2009).  Though the war 
devastated Iran, it ended up galvanizing support for his revolution.  As mentioned, this 
war provided Khomeini and revolutionary leaders the opportunity to expunge all 
moderate opposition and consolidate its hold on power at a time when it needed a 
common enemy.  Additionally, it provided additional strain on those who sought to 
normalize relations with the West, since it was U.S. support that ultimately doomed Iran 
to defeat.  Khomeini’s health failed him toward the end of the war, but with 
determination fueled by the humiliation of the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini ensured all the 
pieces were in place to guarantee the survival of his revolutionary vision (Coughlin 




i. After Khomeini (1990s) 
  Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, unlike his predecessor, had not achieved 
the religious stature that the constitution required of a Supreme Leader, at least as 
envisioned by Khomeini.  However, in Khomeini’s final months, recognizing his health 
was failing, he wanted to ensure his legacy would continue, and believed his ally Ali 
Khameini was best suited to carry on his legacy.  Khomeini convened the ‘Assembly of 
Experts’
15
 to revise the constitution to enable Khameini’s succession and ensure he 
enjoyed the same broad powers Khomeini had enjoyed (Coughlin 2009).  As president, 
Ali Khameini had proven to be pragmatic, but his lack of theological credentials created 
in him an insecurity that led him to align with Khomeini’s loyal hard-liners to prove his 
merits (Coughlin 2009).  His first act as Supreme Leader was to strengthen the 
Revolutionary Guards, establishing two new divisions:  The Quds (Jerusalem) Force and 
the Basij
16
 (Coughlin 2009).  His next act was to abolish the Prime Minister post and 
transfer all powers to the president, who was another Khomeini loyalist, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (Coughlin 2009). 
  In the 1990s, Khameini continued carrying forward Khomeini’s vision by 
renewing efforts to export the revolution.  The newly formed Quds Force, established for 
this purpose, became active in nearly every regional conflict.  In August 1990, when 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the U.S. responded fiercely to dismember Hussein’s 
army.  With the Baath regime weakened, a U.S.-supported Shi’a uprising developed in 
southern Iraq aimed at overthrowing Hussein and the Baathist rulers.  The Quds force 
leaped into action establishing links with Shi’a militants and training the Badr Corps 
(Coughlin 2009).  The U.S., however, fearing an Iran-influenced Shi’a regime to replace 
the Baath party, pulled support for the uprising and Hussein brutally suppressed the  
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body that is elected but whose candidates must pass vetting by a group largely appointed by the Supreme 
Leader” (2008). 
16 The Basij Resistance Force is the ‘People’s’ militia (Wehrey et al. 2010), currently estimated 
between 90,000 and 1 million strong (Wehrey et al. 2010).  With broad popular support, the group was 
formed in the early 1980s to protect Iran from external enemies and internal enemies of the revolution 




opposition (Coughlin 2009).  While the U.S. was out, the Quds Force remained, ensuring 
it maintained close ties to Iraqi Shi’a and continued training the Badr Corps (Coughlin 
2009). 
  Iran and the Quds Force extended influence to other regions as well, 
especially in the Palestine-Israel conflict.  From Iran’s perspective, resolving the 
Palestine-Israel conflict runs counter to its objective of exporting the revolution.  
Settlement of this issue would legitimize Israel, undermining the revolution’s key 
galvanizing message, and would strain its link with Lebanese Hezbollah, since any peace 
would have to include Syria (Coughlin 2009).  Iran established Hezbollah in the 1980s as 
a resistance force to Israel and Western colonialists and, through Hezbollah, continues to 
have a relationship with Lebanon, particularly in the south.  Following the Lebanese Civil 
War in 1991, Iran donated millions through its ‘Foundation of the Oppressed’
17
 to help 
the Lebanese in Shi’a dominated areas rebuild their lives (Coughlin 2009).  According to 
Coughlin, southern Lebanon came to look like a “mini-Tehran” after the war, with 
revolutionary flags flying and posters of Ayatollah Khomeini everywhere (2009).  Iran’s 
support of Hezbollah continues to this day with an estimated 80% of Hezbollah’s funding 
ultimately coming from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, channeled through charities 
such as the one mentioned above (Coughlin 2009).  Iran also became close with Hamas in 
the 1990s.  In December 1992, Israel expelled 400 Palestinian militants to southern 
Lebanon, most of which were members of Hamas (Coughlin 2009).  This inevitably 
brought the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah together which, in turn, laid the 
foundation for a relationship with Tehran.  In 1993, Khameini received a delegation of 
Hamas leadership and pledged an annual contribution of $34 million per year (Coughlin 
2009). 
i. Iran—Recent History 
  In 1997, Khameini allowed the moderate candidate Muhammad Khatami to 
enter the presidential elections, a move mostly designed to placate the political left (Farndon 
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2007).  To everyone’s surprise, Khatami won the election with an overwhelming 70% of the 
vote, fending off a powerful hard-liner propaganda machine and obvious vote rigging 
(Farndon 2007).  This represented an acceleration of a moderate trend already occurring in 
Iran that owed largely to a stand-off with the U.S. after the Khobar Towers18 attack in 1996 
(Coughlin 2009).  Fearing possibility of forced regime change from the U.S., Iran’s hard 
liners had assumed a calm demeanor.  Iran’s tendency toward moderation, encapsulated by 
Khatami’s presidential election, came to be known as the ‘Tehran Spring’ (Farndon 2007).   
  Moderation was short-lived, however, as the conservative hard-liners would 
fight back.  Khameini saw Khatami’s liberalization programs as a challenge to the 
revolution’s legacy and, in 1999, sponsored an “assassination campaign” against 
“dissidents,” but mostly aimed at Khatami supporters (Coughlin 2009).  In response, Khatami 
purged the intelligence services, which “resulted in an estimated 80% of them losing their 
jobs” (Coughlin 2009).  But, Khameini halted Khatami’s purge resulting in the largest 
student protests since the revolution, with running street battles between student supporters of 
Khatami and the clergy-supporting militant group Hezbollah (Coughlin 2009).  The student 
protests wanted Khatami to lead a liberal revolution but Khatami, under pressure from the 
IRGC, backed down and, as a result, over 1400 students were arrested, effectively ending the 
campaign for a liberal regime (Coughlin 2009).  In 2001, Khatami was again elected, but his 
position had been so weakened by events of 1999 that he no longer held the authority to bring 
the change he had promised, and the public faith in him and the reform movement faded.  
When the 2004 elections came around, the Guardian Council—successor to Khomeini’s 
Revolutionary Council, excluded over 2,000 reformist candidates and extensively rigged the 
elections.  Most Iranians became disenfranchised and refused to participate.  As a result, in 
2005, the hard-liners once again swept into power, with the election of the ultra-conservative 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Farndon 2007). 
  A devoted supporter of Khomeini and long-time IRGC member, 
Ahmadinejad is a hard-line conservative whose whole professional life was spent supporting 
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in intelligence estimates released in the wake of the 9/11, where Iran’s role in training and financing Saudi 




the revolution (Coughlin 2009).  The 2005 elections, where he won power, were contested 
only by Hashemi Rafsanjani, another revolutionary hard-liner.  But, Ahmadinejad was 
Khameini’s preferred candidate and the votes were rigged, with some districts reporting more 
votes for Ahmadinejad than there were people in the district (Coughlin 2009).  Ahmadinejad 
has proven to be an enigmatic character who has managed to capture the world’s attention.  
He is flagrantly “anti-Zionist,” openly calling for extermination of the Jewish state.  He has 
been openly belligerent, particularly to the West, by re-igniting and accelerating Iran’s 
nuclear program (more on this in ‘Nuclear Iran’).  Seeking to rekindle the values of 
Khomeini’s Revolution, in his language, Ahmadinejad uses similar techniques to rally the 
“poor and dispossessed” against the evils of colonial powers, namely the U.S. and Israel, and 
even speaks to the Apocalypse, using the return of the Twelfth Imam to galvanize his 
supporters (Coughlin 2009). 
j. Iran and the U.S. Global War on Terror 
   A series of terror attacks culminating in the 9/11 attacks of 2001 has had 
profound impacts on both the U.S. and Iran, and the relationship between them.  With U.S. 
sights set squarely on the Taliban in Afghanistan, Washington recognized a need to work 
with Iran to achieve its objectives there.  However, a series of intelligence estimates revealed, 
in great detail, the level of involvement Iran had had in recent terror attacks, especially its 
role in the Khobar Tower attacks of 1996 (Coughlin 2009).  Among other things, the report 
showed the relationship between Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Saudi Hezbollah, Lebanese 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the PLO (Coughlin 2009).  To make matters worse, the Second 
Intifada erupted in September 2000, which had Khameini calling for the “destruction of 
Israel” and the U.S. Department of State branding Iran as ‘the most active state supporter of 
terror’ and ‘the most aggressive nation currently pursuing nuclear weapons’ (Coughlin 2009).  
Iran appeared to the U.S. as a rogue state that was being run by fanatics.  Despite all this, 
however, the U.S. needed Iran’s support, and Iran provided both diplomatic and logistic 
support for the American campaign (Coughlin 2009).  The U.S. and Iran seemed to have an 
opportunity to thaw relations, but things would turn for the worse in 2002. 
  The Bush administration was considering broadening the Global War on 




of weapons of mass destruction.  Bush, in an effort to hint at this without explicitly declaring 
war on Iraq, included three nations in his famous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech (BBC 2009).  This 
speech carried as an indictment of Iran as a rogue nation who stood opposite the U.S. in its 
growing war on terror, and in Iran the speech was “condemned by conservatives and 
reformers alike” (BBC 2009).   According to Coughlin, the ‘Axis of Evil’ speech “effectively 
ended any chance of a constructive dialogue between Tehran and Washington” (2009). 
  Tehran was more than happy to see the end of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, 
as it accomplished within weeks what Iran could not do for itself in the Iran-Iraq War.  But 
Iran had to move with caution, after all, it had fought a devastating war against Iraq and its 
relationship with Iraq’s Shi’a was not a foregone conclusion (Coughlin 2009).  Once Hussein 
was toppled, the Quds Force immediately deployed into Iraq to ensure “Tehran was fully 
informed about ongoing political developments” (Coughlin 2009).  Once in place, Tehran’s 
forward deployed force supported Iraq’s Shia population, both pro-Iran and pro-West 
factions, and just about any other group that served to resist the U.S. occupation (Coughlin 
2009).  By 2004, Iran was supporting Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, SCIRI19, Da’wa, the 
Badr Corps, and al-Zarqawi (a Sunni fundamentalist who the Shi’a hated).  As one observant 
Iraqi Shi’a stated: “It is impossible to oppose Iran because they are paying all the pro-Iran 
parties, and they are paying all the anti-Iranian parties” (Coughlin 2009).  As one Western 
intelligence official put it, this was “all part of a strategy by Iran’s hard-liners to do what they 
did in Lebanon—drive coalition troops out of Iraq” (Coughlin 2009).  Iran, by 2005, had “as 
many as 30,000 Iraqis on Tehran’s payroll” and were paying up to $800 for anyone would 
carry out attacks against the U.S. or leading Iraqis (Coughlin 2009).  Despite Iran’s efforts to 
influence the Iraqi Shi’a and bring them under the revolutionary fold, many have struggled to 
remain independent of Tehran.  According to Barbara Slavin in Mullahs, Money, and 
Militias, “some Iraqi leaders hope to restore Najaf as a center for religious instruction, in part 
to blunt Iranian influence in Iraq” (2008). 
  In 2006, war fever was raging in both Washington and Tehran.  The U.S. 
Department of State released a finding that Iran was an ‘active’ sponsor in “Iraq, Lebanon, 
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West Bank, and Gaza” and was housing Al Qaeda fugitives from the war in Afghanistan 
(Coughlin 2009).  Complicating matters, Lebanese Hezbollah had just provoked a war with 
Israel with a carefully planned ambush resulting in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers.  
With Iraq in chaos, the perceived success of Hezbollah against Israel, and the U.S. Iraq Study 
Group recommending a withdrawal from Iraq, Iran was in its strongest position since 
Khomeini’s Revolution (Coughlin 2009). 
  Direct military confrontation with Iran was averted, but in 2007 the U.S. 
revisited its strategy.  For its increasingly belligerent nuclear program and its ‘proxy war’ 
against the U.S. in Iraq (and, by now, Afghanistan20), the U.S. slapped even stronger 
sanctions on Iran, leading to oil-rationing protests which were brutally suppressed (Coughlin 
2009).  The U.S. also began a ‘surge’ strategy in Iraq to gain control over the situation, 
sending 30,000 more troops.  This strategy appears to have been effective in bringing back 
stability and order, but as General David Patreaus would testify to the U.S. senate in 2008, 
Iranian-backed militias continued to pose ‘the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a 
democratic Iraq’ (Coughlin 2009). 
k. Iran: The Islamic Republic—The Nuclear Issue 
Iran’s nuclear history dates back to the 1950s where, ironically, the U.S. 
first encouraged the Shah to begin a nuclear program, with the goal of “23 power stations 
by the year 2000” (Farndon 2007).  By 1967, Iran was running its first nuclear reactor at 
the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), supplied by the U.S., and in 1968 signed 
on to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (Farndon 2007).  Iran’s nuclear program 
stalled, however, with the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini, who saw the Shah’s nuclear 
program as an extension of his relationship with the U.S. (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini 
changed course in the early 1980s when he saw his enemy, Saddam Hussein, using 
weapons of mass destruction, urging “his senior officials to revive Iran’s nuclear program 
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with a view to developing atomic weapons” (Coughlin 2009).  The following section is a 
timeline, with brief commentary, that traces the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program: 
• 1970s: Nuclear development work placed under the Atomic Energy Agency 
of Iran (AEOI).  Program was subject to regular inspections by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “under an agreement the Shah 
had signed in 1974” (Coughlin 2009). 
• 1981: Regime allocates $800 million to IRGC for “atom bomb program” 
(Coughlin 2009).  While AEOI would be the public face of Iran’s nuclear 
program, the IRGC would control the clandestine component (Coughlin 
2009). 
• 1983:  IRGC establishes a “special unit devoted to nuclear research” located 
in Tehran (Coughlin 2009).  This was the initiation of the “clandestine” 
component of Iran’s nuclear program (Coughlin 2009). 
• 1984: New nuclear research laboratory built at Isfahan (Coughlin 2009). 
• 1985: Hashemi Rafsanjani “negotiated a deal with China to provide training, 
expertise, and materials…and Chinese installed the first of four training 
reactors at Isfahan in 1985” (Coughlin 2009).  Other deals were negotiated 
with North Korea (uranium exploration), the Soviet Union, and Pakistan 
(Coughlin 2009).  Iran conducted experiments in uranium conversion and fuel 
production and acquired a blueprint for a centrifuge (Coughlin 2009). 
• 1987: Iran succeeded in negotiating deal with Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. 
Abdul Qadeer Khan who later provided blueprints for design of P2 
centrifuges, which can be used to enrich weapons grade uranium (Coughlin 
2009). 
• 1990:  Iran completes deal with Russia to supply reactors for Bushehr 
(Farndon 2007). 
• 1991:   Iran completes deal with China “to supply converters to make 
uranium hexafluoride—the precursor for uranium fuel” (Farndon 178-179). 
• 2002: The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) disclosed that Iran 
had constructed a gas centrifuge plant at Natanz, which could be used to 
enrich uranium, and a heavy-water production facility at Arak, which could 
be used to extract plutonium (Coughlin 2009). 
• 2002:   Russians begin construction of first nuclear reactor at Bushehr despite 




• 2003:   UN inspectors confirmed what the NCRI had disclosed in 2002 and 
learned that the reactors had been in development since the mid-1980s 
(Farndon 2007).  In May, IAEA became aware of a nuclear research center in 
Lavizan and requested authorization to inspect it, but Iran ordered the entire 
site to be demolished (Coughlin 2009). 
• 2004: IAEA inspectors finally able to inspect Lavizan, but entire site had 
been turned to wasteland, including the removal of all trees from the 
surrounding park land (Coughlin 2009).  Iran rebuked by IAEA for failure to 
fully cooperate with inquiry (BBC 2009). 
• 2005:   Iran says it has resumed uranium enrichment at its Natanz facility and 
insists it is for peaceful purposes.  The IAEA finds Iran in violation of the 
NPT (BBC 2009). 
• 2006:   January – Ahmadinejad orders Iran’s nuclear scientists to remove 
IAEA’s seals at Natanz to enable them to resume work on assembling 
centrifuges needed for uranium enrichment (Coughlin 2009). 
• 2006: February – IAEA votes to report Iran’s activities to the UN Security 
Council (BBC 2009). 
• 2006:   April – Ahmadinejad proclaims on Iranian TV that Iran had joined the 
‘nuclear club’ and will ‘continue on our path until we achieve production of 
industrial-scale uranium’ (Coughlin 2009).  Iran had announced that it had 
successfully enriched small amounts of uranium (BBC 2009), which the 
IAEA confirmed (Coughlin 2009). 
• 2006:   August – UN Security Council deadline for Iran to halt nuclear 
activity passes (31 August).  IAEA confirms that Tehran failed to suspend the 
program (BBC 2009).  
• 2006: December – UN Security Council passes UN Resolution 1737 
imposing trade sanctions on Iran (BBC 2009).  The sanctions were relatively 
mild but served as a “shot across the bow.”  The measures included: (1) ban 
on sale of any material that could be used for its nuclear or missile program; 
(2) travel restrictions on 12 Iranians thought to be connected to the program; 
and (3) asset freeze of companies and banks believed to be involved in the 
nuclear and missile programs (Coughlin 2009).  Iran condemns the resolution 
and vows to accelerate its program (BBC 2009). 
• 2007:  February – IAEA says Iran failed to meet a deadline to cease uranium 
enrichment, opening it to the possibility of new sanctions (BBC 2009). 
• 2007: April – Ahmadinejad claims Iran enriching uranium on an ‘industrial 
scale’ (BBC 2009).  This is a watershed moment in Iran’s nuclear history.  At 





cycle” (2009).  It could now mine uranium from its indigenous mines, convert 
it to UF6 at Isfahan, and then enrich the UF6 at Natanz “for either commercial 
or military use” (Coughlin 2009). 
• 2007: May – IAEA says Iran could develop a nuclear weapon in 3 to 8 years 
if it so chooses (BBC 2009). 
• 2007: September – Israel bombs a secret nuclear installation in Syria.  
Israelis suspected that Iran had encouraged Syria to embark upon its own 
nuclear program in the event Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities 
(Coughlin 2009).  Earlier in the year, Ehud Olmert “ordered his military 
chiefs to ensure Israel had the capability to carry out unilateral air strikes 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities if the need arose” (Coughlin 2009).  
• 2007: October – U.S. announces sweeping new sanctions against Iran.  This 
represents the toughest stance since it first imposed sanctions over 30 years 
ago (BBC 2009).  Washington imposed sanctions on Bank Melli, Bank Mellat 
and Bank Saderat and branded the Revolutionary Guards a proliferator of 
weapons of mass destruction (Reuters 2009). 
• 2008: July – Iran test fires a new version of the Shahab-3 long-range missile 
that Iran claims is capable of hitting targets inside Israel (BBC 2009). 
• 2008: September – UN Security Council unanimously votes to reaffirm 
demands that Iran stop enriching uranium.  However, no new sanctions were 
imposed since Russia said it would not support them (BBC 2009). 
• 2009: October – Five permanent UN Security Council members plus 
Germany offer proposal to enrich uranium abroad.  Iran rejects offer (BBC 
2009). 
• 2009: November – IAEA passes resolution condemning Iran’s 
establishment of another secret enrichment site (Qom).  Iran, in defiance, 
announces its plans to create 10 more uranium enrichment sites, 5 to begin 
immediately and 5 to begin within the next two years (Leyne 2009). 
• 2009: December – Iran claims successful test launch of Sajiil-2 missile with 
range of 2000 km that “could reach targets in Israel and U.S. bases in the 
gulf” according to a report on state-run TV.  The U.S. dismisses that this test 
adds any capability to Iran’s arsenal (CNN 2009). 
3. Brief History of Lebanon 
a. Introduction 
Lebanon has come to symbolize the joust for regional power and influence 




region’s stakeholders.  Lebanon’s Civil War has had enduring impacts on the region and 
its consequences and aftermath still shape the region today.  Lebanon’s history tells many 
stories: Iran’s projection of its revolution and statist ambitions, Syria’s quest for influence 
and suzerainty over Lebanon, and the Palestinian struggle for a homeland.  From the 
perspective of the U.S. and Israel, Lebanon is a breeding ground for conflict and a 
springboard for provocation toward “Zionists” and “elite” Western colonialists.   
b. Lebanon’s Civil War (1975–1990) 
The attempted assassination of Pierre Gemayal, founder of the Phalangist 
Party, is considered the official spark that ignited the Lebanese Civil War, but the seeds 
were sown decades earlier when the French carved out a “generous chunk of Syria” and 
established ‘Greater Lebanon’ (Norton 2007).  The 1943 National Pact that granted 
Lebanese independence from colonial France established a confessional21 political system 
to represent 17 official confessions (Norton 2007).  By this pact, Maronite Christians 
received the privileged position, carrying a 6 to 5 edge in parliament, and the presidency.  
The Prime Minister would be Sunni, the second most powerful stake, and the Shi’a were 
awarded Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, the least favorable position among the 
three major blocs (BBC 2009).   
A confluence of social factors would highlight the weakness of the 1943 
Lebanese compromise.  First, birth rates of the Shi’a outpaced those of the Sunni, whose 
birth rates outpaced those of the Maronite Christians (Norton 2007).  Shifting 
demographics and an inflexible political system explain a significant portion of 
Lebanon’s plight.  The second important social occurrence involved the Palestinians.  
The 1948 War and the Jordanian Civil War of 1970–71 forced massive migration of 
Palestinian refugees, along with the PLO, into Lebanon (Norton 2007).  The Palestinian 
migration pushed Shi’a farmers from the countryside into Beirut.  This placed an even 
heavier burden on an already weak government and threw the population even further out 
                                                 
21 A confessional political system, or confessional democracy, is one in that assures each religious 
sect a share in parliamentary, government, and civil services which is proportionate to that groups 




of balance with the confessional structure.  The PLO proved to be particularly 
troublesome, challenging the government and establishing a “state within a state in Beirut 
and South Lebanon” (Norton 2007).   
The early years of the war (1975–1982) were characterized by internecine 
violence, terror, and relentless patterns of attack and retaliate.  The Lebanese Army 
quickly deteriorated into factional militias and the Lebanese government, without an 
army to wield, was powerless.  The primary parties to the Civil War were the Lebanese 
Front (LF), a confederation of Maronite militias and their sympathizers representing the 
current government, and the opposition Lebanese Nationalist Movement, a loose 
confederation of Palestinian guerrillas and militant factions seeking new political order 
(U.S. Dept of State 2009).  The first attempt at peace, the Riyadh conference in 1976, 
introduced Syria as a central player in Lebanon with establishment of the Arab Deterrent 
Force (ADF).  Ostensibly, this was a joint Arab peacekeeping force.  However, Syria 
provided 27,000 of the 30,000 troops in the ADF (U.S. Dept of State 2009).  Syria 
remained as an occupation force until 2005, and still plays a central role in Lebanese 
politics through Hezbollah. 
Israel first occupied Lebanon in 1978 with the Litani Operation to push 
Palestinian guerrillas north of the Litani River.  UN Resolution 425 called for Israel’s 
unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile security zone in southern Lebanon 
(Migdalovitz 2005).  Israel would invade Lebanon again on June 6, 1982, in response to a 
suspected assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London (Harms 2008).  
Israel besieged Beirut for three months and then entered Beirut after the assassination of 
Bashir Gemayal, a Christian politician viewed favorably by Israel.  Subsequently, 150 
Phalangist militia men massacred between 800 and 2000 unarmed Palestinians in the 
Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, without any intervention by the Israeli forces 
(Harms 2008).  The Sabra and Shatila refugee massacres led to Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s resignation and became branded in the minds of Palestinians and their 
supporters (BBC 2009).  In late 1982, fighting ceased and talks commenced, led by the 




17 accord provided a brief reprieve to fighting in Lebanon and established a “security 
zone,” but Israel remained, in some capacity, as an occupying force until its unilateral 
withdrawal in 2000 (BBC 2009). 
  In the 1980s, when it became clear Israel would remain in Lebanon, 
resistance to Israel’s occupation and to Israel’s supporters (i.e., the Western nations, 
especially the U.S.) steadily grew.  “A variety of groups across the political spectrum began 
to organize attacks against the Israeli occupation forces” (Norton 2007).  The disdain for 
Israel’s occupation was accelerated by the al-Nabatiya incident of 1983, when a lost Israeli 
patrol stumbled into an Ashura celebration.  The emotion and confusion of the moment 
turned to chaos and catastrophe when the patrol leader attempted to disperse the crowd, 
killing and wounding several Shi’a (Norton 2007).  Augustus Norton recounts this incident in 
detail and considers this a probable turning point in the rising tide of resistance to Israel 
(2007). 
  Chaos reigned in Lebanon throughout the 1980s, with a relentless attack-
respond pattern of violence where bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings became 
commonplace.  Much of the violence has been attributed to Shi’a militant groups—working 
on behalf of Iran and Syria- and Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Norton 2007).  But these 
weren’t the only nations whose ambitions played out in Lebanon.  According to Augustus 
Norton, a slew of nations were operating, including:  Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
the Soviet Union, Israel, France, and the U.S. (2007).  This decade saw countless terror 
attacks and kidnappings,22 much of which were aimed at driving out Western forces such as 
the U.S. and France and, of course, Israel.   
  The Lebanese Civil War came to an end in 1990 with the signing of a Charter 
of National Reconciliation, known as the Taif Accords (U.S. Dept of State 2009).  While no 
fundamental changes were made to the confessional system, the Taif Accords attempted to 
balance power between the Christian and Muslim blocs.  The number of parliamentary seats 
was expanded from 99 to 128, and divided equally between Christians and Muslims (U.S. 
                                                 
22 There are literally too many to mention, but a few notables are: 1) U.S. Embassy and Marine and 
French Barracks bombings in Beirut (1983).  2) TWA flight 847 hijacking (1984).  3) Kuwait Airways 
flight 422 (1988).  Iran and Mughniyah suspected on all of these (Baer 2008).  4) Tyre, Lebanon car 
bombing of Israeli checkpoint, 1987 (Norton 80).  Other notables include Iraqi embassy bombing in 1980, 
Iraqi Da’wa claimed credit (Norton 72), Lebanese hostage crisis (1984), American Embassy in Kuwait 




Dept of State 2009).  Additionally, the agreement gave some presidential powers to the 
council of ministers in an attempt to balance power (U.S. Dept of State 2009).  The accord 
also called for the disarming of all Lebanese militias, which was completed by May 1991.  
Importantly, the accord did not require Hezbollah to disarm (BBC 2009). 
c. After the Civil War (1990–2006) 
   The 1990s in Lebanon were calmer than the previous 15 years.  However, 
formidable challenges remained, especially in the political arena.  In 1992, Lebanon held its 
first elections in 18 years.  Unfortunately, Syria’s heavy influence in Lebanon prevented 
legitimate elections.  As a transition step, parliamentary appointments by Syria filled 40 seats 
to restore functioning to the government since only about two-thirds of its members survived 
to see the end of the civil war (Norton 2007).  Augustus Norton writes about Syria’s severe 
influence in Lebanon’s elections: 
The appointments coincided with the consolidation of Syria’s grip on 
Lebanon, which was formalized in May 1991 by the Treaty of 
Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination.  The treaty legitimated a 
heavy Syrian hand, particularly in defense and security realms. 
Norton 2007 
As a result, the 1992 elections were not seen to be representative of Lebanon’s electorate.  
Many districts had extremely low voter turnout, especially among Christian districts.  
Christians were boycotting Syria’s under-handed involvement in the elections (U.S. Dept of 
State 2009). 
  Conflict with Israel continued into the 1990s.  Israel’s primary adversary in 
Lebanon had become the militant Shi’a group, Hezbollah (Hezbollah’s emergence as a force 
in Lebanon is discussed in more detail later).  Israel launched Operation Accountability in 
1993 to reduce the threat from Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a hard-liner terrorist group of the PLO’s right wing 
(BBC 2009).  The result of Operation Accountability was a modus vivendi23 between Israel 
and Hezbollah where Israel agreed not to attack civilians in Southern Lebanon and Hezbollah 
                                                 
23 A modus Vivendi is a temporary agreement pertaining to rules of behavior that are upheld pending 




agreed to focus its actions on the security zone (Norton 2007).  This agreement was breached 
by both parties in 1996, when Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, 
justifying action by claiming Israelis had killed Lebanese civilians (Norton 2007).  Israel 
responded fiercely with Operation Grapes of Wrath aimed at undermining Hezbollah’s 
support base in the South and to put pressure on Syria to rein in the organization (Norton 
2007).  The plan backfired badly due, largely, to the Qana incident, where Israel artillery was 
seen as responsible for the deaths of 106 civilians (Norton 2007).  Augustus Norton reveals 
the consequences of the Qana massacre 
No incident in recent memory has inspired more hatred for the Jewish 
state than the Qana attack.  Close to the UN base, a memorial cemetery 
has been created where the victims are buried, and the site has become a 
popular memorial for many Lebanese to visit. 
Norton 2007 
  One of Ehud Barak’s campaign promises in his candidacy for Prime Minister 
was to remove all Israeli troops from Lebanon, “either in conjunction with bilateral 
negotiations with Syria or unilaterally” (Norton 2007).  But, territorial disputes derailed 
negotiations with Syria and so, on 5 March 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted for unilateral 
withdrawal to be completed no later than July 2000 (BBC 2009).  Israeli troops pulled out 
ahead of schedule and, by 24 May, all Israeli troops had left Lebanon (BBC 2009).  In 
Lebanon, this was a time of celebration and Hezbollah rode a wave of adulation and 
goodwill.  The Second Intifada followed in September 2000 inspired—at least partly—by the 
perceived success of Hezbollah in driving out Israel (Norton 2007).  Hezbollah flags flew in 
Palestinian camps in Gaza and the West Bank and Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, 
was viewed as a liberator and hero (Norton 2007). 
d. 34-Day War: Preamble and Aftermath (2000-present) 
  Following Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, southern Lebanon’s border with 
Israel, the “Blue Line,”24 saw “harassing fire, aggressive patrolling, and heated rhetoric” 
between Israel and Hezbollah (Norton 2007).  Hezbollah’s fame as liberators would peak and 
give way to internal criticism and pressure for Hezbollah to disarm as Lebanon’s other 
                                                 




militias had done (Norton 2007).  At this same time, there was a growing desire in Lebanon 
to be rid of Syrian influence.  Political conflict erupted when Rafik Hariri—former Prime 
Minister of Lebanon, seen by many as the de facto leader of the pro-West, anti-Syrian 
coalition—was assassinated on February 14, 2005, an act most have attributed to Syrian 
hands (BBC 2009).  The Cedar Revolution followed and Lebanon became polarized over the 
issue of Syrian influence in Lebanon.  Hezbollah, seen by many as a tool of Syria, was tightly 
linked to the pro-Syrian coalition and led the March 8th Coalition as a response to the Cedar 
Revolution (Butters 2009).   
  For Israel’s part, the U.S. invasion in Iraq and the pressure it placed on U.S.-
allied Sunni governments provided a tail-wind for Israel’s desire to rid Lebanon of Hezbollah 
(Norton 2007).  The Bush administration25 shared the Israeli goal of disarming Hezbollah, 
who the U.S. considered a terrorist organization (Coughlin 2009).  When Israel invaded in 
2006, Israel promised the Bush administration a “quick and decisive result” that would 
assuredly result in the disarming of Hezbollah (Norton 2007).   
  Hezbollah and Israel each miscalculated its adversary.  Neither side would 
emerge as clear winners, though both sides would claim victory.  Hezbollah underestimated 
the international and Arab support that would stand tacitly behind a strong Israeli offensive, 
and Israel miscalculated the strength and tenacity of Hezbollah’s resistance.  Both sides paid 
tremendous costs for their miscalculation, but, strategically, Israel—and the U.S.—would 
find themselves in weaker positions after the invasion.  Hezbollah’s strong military response, 
and its competence in reconstruction, strengthened its solidarity with Sunni Muslims and 
Palestinians, while undermining the Sunni Arab governments that supported the U.S. and 
Israel (Norton 2007).  However, Hezbollah also paid a heavy price.  The Israeli Defense 
Force inflicted severe damage on Lebanon at a cost of around $4B (Norton 2007), killed 
250–500 Hezbollah fighters, and severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure (Harms 2008).  
Critics of Hezbollah attribute this cost to Hezbollah’s reckless provocation of Israel, and 
amplified their calls for Hezbollah to disarm (Norton 2007).  The result of this war was that 
Lebanon’s pro-West and pro-Syrian factions became even more polarized over the  
                                                 
25 At this time, the U.S. and the Bush administration are deadlocked with Iran over Iran’s increasingly 
aggressive nuclear program and its widespread support for terror groups, especially in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The U.S. perspective is that Iran is waging a proxy war against the U.S. in Iraq and suspect 




role of Hezbollah and Syria.  The net effect appears to have been to justify Hezbollah as a 
necessary resistance force, a role that has since been legitimized by the Doha agreements and 
the Lebanese parliament (McCreary 2009). 
  The period after the war has been a time of power struggles and jockeying for 
influence within the political sphere of Lebanon.  The power struggle has been primarily 
between pro-West elements, led by Christians, Sunnis and Druze, and pro-Syrian factions, 
led by Hezbollah and Amal.  Lebanon’s government entered into its first diplomatic ties with 
Syria in over 40 years, which is seen as evidence of Syria’s continuing influence and the 
changing nature of that relationship since the Cedar Revolution (BBC 2009).  The Hezbollah-
led coalition has also seen its position strengthened, albeit more politically, with the power of 
veto and the legalization of its “resistance” militia.  However, in 2009, the pro-West March 
14th coalition of Saad Hariri won 71 of 128 parliament seats (BBC 2009).  The March 8th 
Coalition, led by Hezbollah, had a strong showing but accepted the victory by its opponent.  
This is an important sign of easing tension between pro-West and pro-Syrian elements in 
Lebanon (BBC 2009).  This election was hailed by the U.S. and the international community 
as an important step, and is significant in that it is the first election in decades not eclipsed by 
sectarian violence and overt corruption (BBC 2009). 
e. Emergence of Shi’a Politicization 
  The rise of sectarianism from the Lebanese Civil War, the Palestinian 
Movement, and Iranian Revolution converged to lead to the emergence of the Shi’a as a 
political force in Lebanon.  According to Lebanese sociologist Salim Nasr, there were 
four important factors that led to rising sectarianism (Norton 2007).  First, the Lebanese 
Civil War forced a significant displacement of people and resulted in segmented patterns 
of living (Norton 2007).  Second, growing economic difficulty, income equality, and 
corruption abetted sectarianism by shrinking the middle class and increasing dependence 
on social welfare services (Norton 2007).  Third, the chaos, deprivation, and widespread 
corruption brought on by constant wars and strife led to Syrian domination, which in turn 
facilitated the emergence of religious leadership citing divine wisdom against corruption 




ascendancy of the Shi’a in Iraq resulting from U.S. invasion, and violent Sunni 
extremism—contributed to a strong sense of Shi’a identity (Norton 2007). 
  Another important factor in the development of Shi’a politicization were 
the links established between Iranian revolutionaries and Shi’a leaders in Lebanon.  By 
the early 1970s, the radical Shi’a cleric Musa al-Sadr had come to be the leader of 
Lebanon’s Shi’a and founder of Amal, the first Shi’a political party in Lebanon 
(Coughlin 2009).  Sadr was Iranian by birth and had studied in Qom and moved to 
Lebanon in 1959 (Coughlin 2009).  Sadr became a staunch supporter of Ayatollah 
Khomeini
26
 and his revolutionary ideals so much so that when he ‘mysteriously 
disappeared’
27
 on a flight to Libya in 1978, it was widely believed that the Shah’s 
SAVAK had assassinated him (Coughlin 2009).  Khomeini’s Revolution, with Sadr’s 
strong endorsements, would lay the ideological framework for the development of radical 
Shi’ism in southern Lebanon based on resistance to Israel and support for Palestinians 
(Coughlin 2009). 
f. The Rise of Hezbollah   
  Originally founded in 1982, Hezbollah did not become a cohesive 
organization until the mid-1980s.  In 1982, Shi’a Muslims were on a path of political 
emulation of the Iranian revolution and were very much divided over the Palestinian issue 
(Norton 2007).  From this perspective, many Shi’a were supportive of Israel insofar as Israel 
checked Palestinian influence.  However, that would change after the Israeli invasion of 
                                                 
26 Khomeini became close with the Sadr clan while exiled to Najaf.  He also became close friends 
with Mostafa Chamran before he joined Sadr in Lebanon.  Chamran was a founding member of the IRGC 
(Coughlin 135). 
27 Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance is an enigma.  Not everyone agrees with Coughlin’s characterization.  
Barbara Slavin, in an interview with Augustus Norton, reveals that many believe Ghadhafi carried out the 
execution “at Khomeini’s behest” to remove his moderate influence from the revolution (2008).  All seem 





1982, and particularly the al-Nabatiya28 incident.  As Ehud Barak stated in July 2006, 
referring to the Israeli invasion and occupation of 1982, “When we entered Lebanon there 
was no Hezbollah….It was our presence that created Hezbollah” (Norton 2007).  While the 
story may be more complex than this, Barak recognized how Israel’s presence was an 
important factor that allowed a pro-Palestinian, Shi’a faction to emerge and grow.  
g. The Rise of Hezbollah and Iran 
As mentioned already, Khomeini’s relationship with leaders in Lebanon 
laid the ideological foundation for militant Shi’ism in southern Lebanon.  In the early 
1980s, however, Iran directly sponsored Hezbollah’s emergence (Norton 2007).  There is 
some debate about the nature and extent of Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah.  
According to Robert Baer, Hezbollah has always been and continues to be primarily a 
proxy tool of the Iranians (2008).  In his book, The Devil We Know, Baer argues that 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) arrived in Lebanon to drive Israel and the 
West from Lebanon and establish its influence there (2008).  In so doing, Iran discovered 
strong Lebanese Nationalism and an “endless pool of street and guerrilla fighters” (Baer 
2008).  Iran, according to Baer, seized this opportunity and, through its IRGC, sponsored 
and masterminded the emergence of Hezbollah (Baer 2008).  Iran, via its proxy in 
Lebanon, sought to drive out the West, cultivate resistance to Israel, and even hijack the 
Palestinian cause.  In October 2000, Ayatollah Khameini stated that “Lebanon is Iran’s 
greatest foreign policy success.  We will repeat it Dar al-Islam (meaning all across the 
Islamic world) until all of Islam is liberated,” revealing what Baer calls Iran’s blueprint 
for empire (2008).  Other authors, such as Augustus Norton, recognize Iran’s direct role 
in the origins of Hezbollah and its continued financial and ideological support, but 
believe that Hezbollah has developed its own, independent sources of money, power, and 
influence.  While strongly supported by Iran ideologically, financially, and as its main 
                                                 
28 The Al-Nabatiya incident of 1983 is considered a turning point in the resistance to Israel’s 
occupation of Lebanon.  A lost Israeli patrol wandered into an Ashura celebration and attempted to disperse 
the crowd.  The situation got out of hand and “as the crowd threw stones, the Israelis responded with rifles 
and grenades” killing several Shia.  The incident is intrinsic to a commonly shared narrative among 





provider of weapons, Hezbollah has become a force in its own right.  Barbara Slavin also 
supports Norton’s view, “the Lebanese group Hezbollah, are not mere proxies and appear 
to have considerable tactical autonomy and influence on Iranian policies” (2008).  In any 
case, it is clear that Hezbollah has a close and important relationship with Iran29. 
Hezbollah’s founding charter, a 1985 Program Document, shows the 
organization’s close ties with Iran and its original founding purpose, which is to resist 
U.S. imperial influence and the U.S. “spearhead,” Israel (Norton 2007).  Ayatollah 
Khomeini stressed America as the reason for all Middle East catastrophes and 
“legitimates” the right to defend Islam (Norton 2007).  Hezbollah’s ultimate objective 
then, according to its original charter, is to “destroy Israel and liberate Palestine,” and to 
see to the “final departure of “America, France, and their allies” (Norton 2007).  Israel 
does not have the right to exist according to Hezbollah’s founding charter.  Hezbollah 
faithfully adhered to this charter throughout the 1980s, as evidenced by the 
uncompromising violence it brought to its enemies. 
h. Lebanon: Hezbollah and Syria 
Syria shares responsibility for Hezbollah’s emergence. Augustus Norton 
succinctly characterizes Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah (2007): 
The new militant Shi’a party was a fortuitous instrument for preserving 
Syria’s interests: supporting Hezbollah allowed Syria to maintain its 
alliance with Iran, gain the means for striking indirectly at both Israel and 
the U.S., and keep its Lebanese allies, including Amal, in line. 
Norton characterizes Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah as one of “convenience” that hinges 
on Hezbollah continuing to represent Syria’s interests, and that Hezbollah understands this as 
the basis for its strategic alliance (Norton 2007).  Hezbollah has and continues to lead the 
pro-Syrian camp in Lebanon.  Indeed, most recent developments in Lebanese politics have 
centered on the relationship of Syria to Lebanon and, therefore, Syria to Hezbollah (BBC 
2009). 
                                                 
29 According to Con Coughlin, Iran funds as much as 80% of Lebanese Hezbollah’s operations 




i. Hezbollah After Lebanon’s Civil War  
  Hezbollah seemed to mature along with its Iranian sponsors throughout the 
1990s, when it began to consider the possibility of achieving objectives through political 
means.  In 1992, after the Civil War was over, Hezbollah convened a council of 12 members 
to consider its way forward, asking: Should Hezbollah continue militant resistance or 
participate in the confessional government it grew up denouncing?  Because the Lebanese 
confessional government was non-Islamic, Hezbollah leadership had to resolve three key 
questions (Norton 2007): 
1. Was participation in a “non-Islamic” government legitimate? 
2. Should ideology bend to practical interests? 
3. Would Hezbollah, by participating, be co-opted into a secular 
system, thereby departing from its principles and vision? 
To answer these questions, the council sought guidance from Iranian Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khameini (Norton 2007).  Khameini advised Hezbollah to participate in the 
confessional government and continue militant resistance, except with a new focus toward 
supporting the Palestinian cause (Norton 2007).  So, with backing from Khameini, the panel 
decided (10 to 2) to participate in the political process (Norton 2007).       
  Hezbollah has evolved into “a Janus-faced” organization deriving legitimacy 
and power simultaneously from its fierce resistance to Israel, on the one hand, and 
participation in the confessional political system it grew up denouncing, on the other (Norton 
2007).  Hezbollah’s political capital originally derived from perceived battlefield successes, 
but increasingly comes from its competence and incorruptibility in providing for the general 
welfare and social services in Shia dominated areas of Lebanon (Norton 2007).  Hezbollah 
“offers an array of social services to its constituents,” including “construction companies, 
schools, hospitals, and dispensaries” (Norton 2007).  Hezbollah’s closeness to Iran is evident 
through its social services program, where a significant portion of its funding comes through 
what were originally Iranian organizations (Norton 2007).  After the 34-day war in 2006, 
Hezbollah distributed $1,000 to many Lebanese families who had been affected by the war, 
money that was funneled from Iran through its ‘Foundation for the Oppressed’ (Coughlin 





where some European nations have drawn a distinction between Hezbollah’s political 
organization, agreeing to diplomatic engagement of Hezbollah’s political leadership (Black 
2009). 
  Hezbollah’s political participation gives it access to government resources 
and a “public podium,” which it can leverage for its own benefit and on behalf of Lebanese 
Shi’a (Norton 2007).  But political involvement also imposes limitations (Norton 2007).  
Increasingly, Hezbollah finds its actions driven and constrained by the will of its 
constituency.  Its political support is primarily defined by the nature and strength of its 
relationship with Syria, the existence and capability of its militia, and the extent to which it 
can provide adequate social and welfare services to Shia dominated areas.  In 1997, Al 
Tufayli30 organized rallies advancing a populist message—known as the ‘Revolt of the 
Hungry’—that “implicitly criticized Hezbollah for failing its needy constituents…in the 
suburbs of Beirut,” prompting well-founded concern in Hezbollah leadership (Norton 2007).  
Also, as mentioned earlier, Hezbollah’s belligerence leading into the 34-day war in 2006 was 
partly—if not largely—motivated by the weakness and insecurity it was feeling domestically 
in a post-Israel Lebanon (Norton 2007).  In the years between Israel’s 2000 withdrawal and 
the 2006 invasion, Hezbollah came under fire by many in Lebanon for the presence of a 
“resistance” militia, especially after the Syrian withdrawal of 2005 (Norton 2007).    The 
ambush on Israeli soil that resulted in two Israeli soldiers being kidnapped and three killed on 
July 12, 2006 was a demonstration of—and justification for—its militant capability and 
status as Lebanon’s “resistance” force (Norton 2007).   
  More recently, Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon’s affairs has become codified in 
Lebanese law.   As leaders of the “Opposition,” aka March 8th coalition, Hezbollah has 
demonstrated on numerous occasions its ability to impede powers of the Lebanese 
government (Norton 2007).  In May 2008, the Lebanese government sought to dismiss the 
pro-Hezbollah head of security at the airport and investigate a “secret fiber-optic phone 
network” that Hezbollah maintained was integral to its security operations (Norton 2007).  
Hezbollah responded fiercely by blocking the roads to the airport and seizing west Beirut.  
                                                 
30 Tufayli famously opposed Hezbollah’s decision to become involved in politics.  He was one of two 
dissenting member of the “council of 12” that had voted in favor of Hezbollah engaging as a political party.  





The government relented, rescinding its decision to investigate (Norton 2007).   Furthermore, 
in the Doha Agreement of 21 May 2008, the “Opposition” (i.e., Hezbollah) won veto powers 
in the unity government (Norton 2007).  On 2 December 2009, the Lebanese cabinet voted on 
a policy measure that would permit "Lebanon, its government, its people, its army and its 
resistance" to liberate all Lebanese territory (McCreary 2009).  The term “resistance” is well 
understood to mean Hezbollah so this policy, in effect, legitimizes Hezbollah’s use of force 
against Israel and justifies its militia (McCreary 2009).   
With its increased political role, Hezbollah seems to recognize its political 
responsibilities.  In recent years, Hezbollah has often exhibited pragmatism and a willingness 
to compromise to achieve political objectives.  Hezbollah now appears to be partially 
constrained by the will of its constituency and the desire to be seen as more than a terrorist 
organization.  It could be argued that its behavior leading into its 2006 war was domestically 
motivated, as are its efforts to respond to the social ills of the Lebanese.  In any case, 
Hezbollah is now an organization far removed from the one-dimensional, ideological terror 
organization of the early 1980s. 
4. History of the U.S. in the Middle East 
a. Introduction 
  American involvement in the Middle East emerged between World Wars I 
and II and has since centered on two key interests: secure and reliable access to Middle 
Eastern oil and security from global threats.  World War II loosened Great Britain’s grip on 
the Middle East and led to the gradual erosion of the Pax Britannica and its gradual 
replacement by the Pax Americana.  This change did not occur all at once and was hotly 
contested by the British who sought desperately to maintain control of its imperial holdings.  
On the other hand the Russians, riding momentum from World War II, had a history of 
involvement in the Middle East and sought to “advance its ambitions into Eastern Europe and 
a share of control of the Black Sea straits” (Gardner 2009).  A global competition emerged 
between the rising powers of the U.S. and Russia—the Cold War—characterized by a half-
century rivalry for control of the world’s strategic oil reserves and some of its most important 
trade routes.  U.S. policy throughout the 20th century was shaped by the Cold War and 




U.S.’ current role in the Middle East and its continuing efforts to shape the Middle East to 
ensure access to its oil reserves and trade routes while maintaining national security, at home 
and abroad.    
b. Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
  In 1947, the Soviet Union’s actions concerned the U.S. and the Truman 
administration.  Russia was attempting to coerce Turkey into bilateral talks aimed at 
recovering territory that had been lost in World War I and was seen as supporting 
Communist-led guerrillas involved in a civil war in Greece against British-supported forces 
(Gardner 2009).  Additionally, Russia, desiring to strong-arm oil concessions from Iran, was 
in violation of the Tehran Declaration31 of 1943 by maintaining troops in northern Iran 
beyond the conclusion of the war (Gardner 2009).  Russia’s inroads into Greece, Turkey, and 
Iran became the first Cold War crisis as Truman and the West became alarmed at Soviet 
expansionism (Gardner 2009).  Truman, in a letter to his Secretary of State, said, “There isn’t 
a doubt in my mind that Russia intends to invade Turkey and seize the Black Sea 
straits…another war is in the making” (Gardner 2009). 
  Against this backdrop, Truman sought $500 million in military and economic 
aid to support Greece and Turkey against Soviet aggression (Gardner 2009).  He asked 
congress for this aid in a famous speech on March 12, 1947, laying out his vision for what 
would come to be known as the Truman Doctrine (Gardner 2009).  The purpose was to halt 
Soviet expansion and influence in the Middle East and Western Europe.  But the long-term 
implications of this speech was the “U.S. taking a firm position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
along a line running from Stettin on the Baltic down through Germany and Austria to 
Trieste” (Gardner 2009).  Truman’s speech portrayed the communist threat “as so urgent 
there was no time to lose” (Gardner 2009).  It was perceived as a direct challenge to the 
                                                 
31 In 1943, allied leaders met in Tehran to discuss the possibility of opening a second front.  The most 
enduring result, however, was the Tehran Declaration where the “Big Three” (U.S., Russia, Great Britain) 
pledged to honor all commitments to Iran’s independence and to provide economic aid for postwar 
reconstruction.  The Declaration, achieved by Roosevelt, made the U.S. a direct stakeholder in Iran and 
placed it on equal footing with Russia and Britain.  It would be the basis for U.S. efforts to get Russia out 
after the war and would serve as Iran’s justification for its behavior on the grounds that it had been “failed” 




Soviet Union and “elevated imperial rivalries [between the U.S. and the Soviet Union] to a 
higher level of statecraft” where principle32 was paramount to statecraft (Gardner 2009).     
  The consequences of the Truman Doctrine and its implementation in the 20th 
century are profound.  With its announcement, along with the Marshall Plan the same year, 
terms such as “containment” and “domino theory” became the general rubric that would 
shape American policy from that point forward (Gardner 2009).  The idea, as the U.S. 
Minister to Egypt put it, was an “American system …based on intent to help backward 
countries to help themselves …to lay the foundation for self dependence” (Gardner 2009).  
The U.S. would project its power, through military basing, naval projection, economic and 
military aid, and, if necessary, direct intervention in order to “create a system of Cold War 
protectorates” that would make up the “Free World” and contain the Soviet advance (Gardner 
2009).  Truman Doctrine laid the foundation for direct and pervasive political involvement in 
the Middle East and, indeed, throughout the world so long as it could be tied, first, to Soviet 
Communism or, later, “international communism” and, finally, after the Cold War, to “vital 
national security interests” (Gardner 2009).  It would be broadened to justify involvement in 
Iran’s oil crisis (1951-1953) and Egypt’s Revolution (Gardner 2009).  President Kennedy 
broadened the doctrine into “full-blown counterinsurgency theory” in 1961, adding rationales 
for interventions, such as “non-overt aggression, intimidation, and diplomatic blackmail” to 
the already existing “resistance to subversive forces” supplied by Truman (Gardner 2009).  
The basis for the “Imperial Presidency,” the foundations of Truman Doctrine would evolve 
from Truman’s Cold War containment to George W. Bush’s democratization of the Middle 
East, in an unbroken line of ideological expansion (Gardner 2009).  
c. U.S. and Israel: Creation of a Zionist State 
  As the Truman Doctrine was being born in the late 1940s, another issue was 
coming to a head in the Middle East: the question of a Zionist state in Palestine.  Great 
Britain, as Palestine’s mandatory power, had made a string of promises, beginning with the 
Balfour Declaration of 1917, to Zionists regarding the creation of a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine (Gardner 2009).  However, these promises soon came into conflict with Britain’s 
                                                 
32 The original draft of the speech included a candid appeal to the strategic importance of Middle 
Eastern oil.  Truman opted to have it removed to appeal to a more idealistic nature in the public, fearing 




desperate efforts to save its imperial enclaves, causing Britain to slowly begin backing away 
from its promises.  London feared “large-scale Jewish immigration would wreck its relations 
in the Middle East,” thus making it difficult to maintain its bases in Libya, Palestine, and 
control of the Suez Canal (Garnder 57–58).  On the other hand, the U.S., driven by a surge in 
popular opinion following revelation of the atrocities of the Holocaust, became largely 
favorable to the idea of Jewish immigration, and Truman “began advocating 100,000 
refugees to Palestine” (Gardner 2009).   
  Truman’s newfound support for Zionist immigration caused strain all around.  
Great Britain was frustrated with the U.S. for what it saw as an effort to supplant the British 
Empire in the Middle East.  On the other hand, the U.S. thought Britain was trying to draw it 
into “joint responsibility for the Palestine question” (Gardner 2009).  American diplomats 
voiced concern that support for Zionism would lead to “a wave of revolutionary fervor that 
could cause the Middle East to fall under the sway of Russia (Gardner 2009).  U.S.-Saudi 
Arabia relations also became strained.  Roosevelt had a standing promise to King Ibn Saud 
that the U.S. would respect “self determination” for Middle Eastern nations (Gardner 2009).  
King Saud saw this as a renege on Roosevelt’s promises and warned ‘serious consequences’ 
for American policy (Gardner 2009).  But Truman stood-fast, acknowledging that support of 
a Jewish homeland would “command the support of American public opinion” and insisted 
upon 100,000 Jews in Palestine (Gardner 2009). 
  Frustrated, the British threw up its hands in 1947 and “tossed the question to 
the UN” (Gardner 2009).  The UN advanced a partition plan that was disagreeable to 
everyone.  Finally, on May 15, 1948, Britain abruptly ended its mandate on the grounds it 
was no longer economically sustainable (Gardner 2009).  The same day the British mandate 
ended, Truman extended de facto recognition to Israel—fearing the Soviet Union would beat 
him to the punch—and offered the first “of almost constant loans and grants that have 
become a given” (Gardner 2009).  In a letter to Israeli president Chaim Weizman, Truman 
confirmed he would “oppose any territorial changes in the November 29, 194733 resolution,  
 
                                                 
33 November 29, 1947, is the date the UN Partition Plan was adopted by the UN Special Committee 
on Palestine (UNSCOP).  The U.S., the most aggressive proponent of the plan, officially recognized these 




which are not acceptable to Israel” (Gardner 2009).  The U.S., in supporting the creation of 
Israel, was beginning an alliance that would “thereafter define the American approach to the 
Arab world” (Gardner 2009). 
  Despite the establishment of Israel and the 1947–48 wars, the Arab world still 
had not united.  Instead, it led to a “series of upheavals,” brought on by a young generation 
“nurtured on the injustice of Zionist dispossession of Arab land with the assistance of 
Western powers” (Gardner 2009).  However, the CIA warned “that the Israelis had won the 
first battle, but the Arab-Israeli war promised to be a long one,” stating that “Arab supply 
lines were insufficient to support a full-scale conflict, but they can be expected to support 
guerrilla activities indefinitely” and that “with boycotts and blockades, Israel’s security will 
be continuously threatened…and its existence will be entirely dependent on the continuing 
good will of some outside power” (Gardner 2009).  Robert McClintock, Office of UN 
Affairs, recognized the potential threat from “fanatical and overwrought people” who might 
injure U.S. strategic interests by taking “reprisals against oil investments and rescinding air 
base rights” (Gardner 2009). 
  In its first official effort to protect its interests and Israel, the U.S. entered into 
a tripartite declaration with France and Great Britain in May 1950 in which each promised 
not to supply arms to any country unless that country “promised not to undertake any act of 
aggression against any other state in the Middle East” (Gardner 2009).  The declaration goes 
on to pledge that any state “preparing to violate existing frontiers and armistice lines” was 
subject to “immediate action both within and outside the UN to prevent such violations” 
(Gardner 2009).  This declaration clearly served to protect the nations in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, especially Israel.  Additionally, it was an advance on the Truman Doctrine as it 
formalized the role of the Western powers—meaning mainly the U.S.—as having “the right 
to determine questions of war and peace in the Middle East” (Gardner 2009).  Washington 
had “created a protectorate and made itself the nation of last resort for all sort of grievances” 
(Gardner 2009). 
d. U.S. and  the Iranian Oil Crisis 
  In 1941, Britain and Russia invaded Iran ostensibly to halt pro-German 




lines that had historically marked their spheres of influence, Russia in the north and Britain in 
the south (Gardner 2009).  Iran appealed to the U.S. for support but the U.S. “excused [the 
occupation] for the common good” in light of the threat faced with Nazi Germany (Gardner 
2009), but Roosevelt disavowed “any designs on the territorial integrity of Iran” stating that 
all nations should have equal access to Iranian oil (Gardner 2009).  Britain owned a 
controlling stake in the Anglico-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which had been authorized to 
“safeguard the Royal Navy’s fuel supply” (Gardner 2009).  Russia too sought inroads on 
Iran’s oil; all three major players were quietly positioning for a postwar world. 
  In light of the damage wrought by World War II, Iran had come to expect 
some form of reparations for its cooperation with the Allies.  After all, post-war 
reconstruction assistance had been codified in the Tehran Declaration of 1943 when the “Big 
Three” met in Tehran during the war (Gardner 2009).  Shah Reza Pahlavi began to lobby in 
Washington for reconstruction aid under the U.S. Lend-Lease34 program complaining he’d 
been “left out of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan35 and was not even afforded a treaty 
such as the newly-formed NATO (Gardner 2009).  The U.S. politely shrugged, citing other 
more pressing matters, thus, according to Lloyd Gardner, beginning “an unsatisfactory thirty-
year dialogue” with Iran (2009).  The result was that when the Shah returned home to Iran 
empty-handed, “lack of American aid” began to supplant “British intrigue” as the “whipping 
boy of Iranian politics” leaving many Iranians feeling like they were left to face the Soviet 
Union alone (Gardner 2009). This caused some in Washington to fear that Iran might 
consequently turn to the Soviet Union for support (Gardner 2009). 
  This was the backdrop when the majlis began to reconsider the terms of the 
long-standing AIOC concession (Gardner 2009).  The concession had been under negotiation 
since 1939, but a supplemental agreement was stalled on “the key issue of Iranian access to 
the books” (Gardner 2009).  Facing the Shah when he returned from Washington was two 
                                                 
34 Lend-Lease was the system by which the U.S. aided its World War II allies with war materials and 
other raw materials.  This was a mechanism to circumvent existing U.S. law, which required the allies to 
pay “cash-and-carry” for U.S. arms and materials (Encyclopedia Britannica).  Lend-lease would be 
broadened to other nations, especially in the Middle East, to justify foreign aid and became a central plank 
to U.S. global ambitions after World War II (Gardner). 
35 The Marshall Plan (1947) was a U.S.-sponsored program designed to rehabilitate the economies of 
17 western and southern European countries after World War II in order to create stable conditions for 
democracy to survive.  The U.S. feared that poverty, unemployment, and dislocation after World War II 




key opponents of the Nationalist Front party, Mohammed Mossadeq and Ayatollah Kashani, 
both holding seats in the parliament (Gardner 2009).  But Britain’s AIOC and the Iranian 
majlis were dug in on their positions.  The U.S. pleaded with Britain for flexibility since 
“profits were far from disappearing” and that they “could not go on thinking Middle Eastern 
countries were unaware of arrangements being negotiated elsewhere,” referring at least partly 
to ARAMCO’s36 deal with Saudi Arabia, an already sore spot with the British (Gardner 
2009).  In the end, neither side would budge. 
  The developing crisis pushed the U.S. toward bringing Iran into the Truman 
Doctrine protectorate over fears that if Iran fell to the Soviet Union, they would have enough 
oil to conduct World War III (Gardner 2009).  Truman compared the situation with that of 
Greece, “if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and take over the whole Middle East.  
There’s no telling what they’ll do if we don’t put up a fight now” (Gardner 2009).  From the 
U.S. perspective, the world’s strategic oil was at stake.  Washington blamed British 
ineptitude and inflexibility for allowing this crisis to occur, however, meeting the demands of 
the majlis could set a precedent for other oil-bearing nations to follow that would disrupt 
world oil supplies (Gardner 2009).  According to American oil executives, fully conceding to 
Iranian nationalists over AIOC would jeopardize “all American investment overseas” and, in 
their opinion, losing Iran completely would be preferable to a too-favorable deal for Iran 
(Gardner 2009).   
  In May of 1951, the majlis acted to nationalize Iranian oil (Gardner 2009).  
The U.S. made one last effort with the Shah to stop nationalization, but discovered a Shah 
who, while opposed to nationalization, was “broken and dejected” fearing loss of his throne 
and maybe his life if he opposed Mossadeq and nationalization (Gardner 2009).  Under 
pressure, the Shah immediately moved to appoint Mossadeq as the Prime Minister to save his 
throne (Gardner 2009).  The British responded harshly to nationalization by undertaking 
                                                 
36 ARAMCO was founded by the Standard Oil Co. of California (Chevron) in 1933, when the 
government of Saudi Arabia granted it a concession. Other U.S. companies joined after oil was found near 
Dhahran in 1938. In 1950, ARAMCO opened a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea port 
of Sidon, Lebanon (Encyclopedia Britannica).  ARAMCO was America’s opening bid to become a major 
economic stakeholder in the Middle East.  ARAMCO became a major point of contention between the U.S. 
and Great Britain since the U.S. arrangement with Saudi Arabia was comparatively favorable to existing 
deals held by other countries (i.e. AIOC in Iran).  Additionally, the U.S. Government subsidized 
ARAMCO, making oil exploration comparatively more favorable outside the U.S., encouraging U.S. oil 





“every effort to insure Iran couldn’t sell its oil,” even threatening military action to increase 
pressure on Iran’s economy (Gardner 2009).  In July 1951, the British closed down its oil 
facilities at Abadan appearing ready to wait out Mossadeq and the Iranian nationalists, 
hoping the pressure would force a new government (Gardner 2009). 
  The Soviet specter loomed large as the U.S. wrestled with the ongoing crisis.  
With the British threatening military action and enforcing an oil embargo and Mossadeq and 
Iranian nationalists settled into their positions, U.S. policy makers slowly began to identify 
Mossadeq and his Nationalist movement—with its apparent links to the Tudeh Party—as the 
problem that needed fixing (Gardner 2009).  On 21 September 1951, the Psychological 
Strategy Board released a statement saying that “there is limited agreement that Mossadeq 
will have to be replaced before chances for an oil agreement can improve” (Gardner 2009).  
Mossadeq, with his economy under severe duress, appealed to Washington for aid.  His 
arguments were received well by Truman and the American public, as he cited years of 
exploitation and ill-treatment at British hands (Gardner 2009).  But, in the end, the U.S. 
offered no aid to Mossadeq and the Iranians.  Truman told Mossadeq if he wanted revenue, 
he should complete a deal with the British (Gardner 2009). 
  Dwight Eisenhower and State Secretary John Foster Dulles entered the White 
House in 1952.  They too feared a power vacuum in Iran might be created that would be 
filled by the Soviet Union (Gardner 2009).  By now, the British, Mossadeq, and some inside 
the U.S., knowing how to elicit action from Washington, were all invoking images of a 
communist takeover of Iran and increasingly tying Mossadeq to the leftist Tudeh Party 
(Gardner 2009).  On 4 April 1953, Eisenhower authorized $1 million to be used “in any way 
that would bring about fall of Mossadeq” (Gardner 2009).  By the end of August 1953, 
Mossadeq was under house arrest and the Shah was safely returned to his throne (Gardner 
2009). 
  U.S. involvement in the 1953 coup has had significant consequences, many of 
which are still present today.  In the immediate aftermath, the U.S. took the lead stake with 
respect to Iranian oil, restricting the British to a minority position (Gardner 2009).  In the 
longer term, the U.S. was wed to the Shah, having made a significant investment in his 
success (Gardner 2009).  The U.S. often had to pay for the Shah’s loyalty and the Shah knew 




ever for American military products” and heavily influenced U.S. foreign policy (Gardner 
2009).  The Shah’s rule was one of a “hollow crown,” as Gardner would put it, where his 
only real power lay in his knowledge of how to exploit American fears to maintain control of 
his country (Gardner 2009).  The affair would eventually come to a disastrous end in 1979, 
when the fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini led his Islamic Revolution against the Shah, an event, 
according to Gardner, which was an “almost inevitable result of the 1951-1953 oil crisis” 
(2009).  
e. U.S. and Egypt: Egyptian Revolution, Suez Crisis, and Nasserism 
  As oil nationalization heated up in Iran (~1950), the winds of nationalism 
were blowing elsewhere in the Middle East.  Egypt, like Iran, also had a long and 
complicated history with Great Britain, centered on control of the Suez Canal.  From the time 
of its construction, in 1869, the Suez Canal’s value as the lifeline to India had been 
paramount in British strategic thinking (Gardner 2009).  During World War I, London 
declared Egypt a protectorate state and, in 1936, imposed a treaty on Cairo authorizing 
“10,000 troops, 400 pilots, and support personnel for 20 years” to be based at Suez (Gardner 
2009).  From Britain’s original occupation in 1882, Egyptian nationalism developed, as it had 
done elsewhere, in opposition to imperial exploitation. 
  By 1950, Egypt and Israel posed a vexing problem for U.S. policy makers.  
The Suez Canal, and the base that secured it, took on new importance as the Suez had 
become “the main transit route for Middle Eastern oil” (Gardner 2009).  The Arab-Israeli 
wars of 1947-48, the creation of the state of Israel, and the rising tide of nationalism opposing 
Britain had Egypt on the brink of revolution and, from the U.S. perspective, endangered 
security of the Suez and highlighted the Egypt-Israel-Palestinian impasse (Gardner 2009).  
The U.S. identified Egypt as a critical player in resolving both of these issues and sought 
Egypt’s leadership in the U.S.-proposed Middle Eastern Defense Organization37 (MEDO).  
But from Egypt’s point of view, Israel posed too many problems.  Egypt believed the “open 
                                                 
37 The Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO) was a U.S.-proposed NATO-like security pact 
intended to provide for the defense of the Suez Canal, provide military security for the petroleum producing 
regions, and to the northern tier countries of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.  Truman and his Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson were committed to MEDO but Egypt’s resistance and the lukewarm reaction of other Arab 
states made realization of MEDO impossible.  It was dropped after Truman but elements of MEDO were 




door” immigration policy espoused by David Ben-Gurion—and supported by the U.S.—
would inevitably lead to Jewish expansion and the annexation of additional Arab land 
(Gardner 2009).  Furthermore, by recognizing Israel, Egypt was essentially limiting Arab 
ambitions by allowing a “new outpost of Western imperialism,” which was, of course, 
unpopular with Egyptian nationalists (Gardner 2009).  On the other hand, the Israelis argued 
that the Palestinians formed a “fifth column” of those who sought its destruction and by 
giving the Palestinians the little land it had it would “be committing economic suicide” 
(Gardner 2009).  Ben-Gurion, aware that the U.S. was considering Egypt as the center of its 
Middle East defense strategy, began to assert Israel’s suitability for this purpose claiming 
Israel would be “the decisive factor in a successful defense of the Middle East” (Gardner 
2009).  The U.S., ever-mindful of the Soviets, was concerned about the possibility of an arms 
race between Egypt and Israel that might spread throughout the Middle East (Gardner 2009). 
  Nationalistic tensions set aflame by 1952.  On 25 January, a fight erupted 
between the British garrison at the Suez base and Egyptian auxiliary police, resulting in 41 
police dead and another 72 injured (Gardner 2009).  Demonstrations in Cairo followed and 
symbols of British power and prestige were destroyed and many civilians killed (Gardner 
2009).  The British responded harshly the following day—Black Saturday—sending 
additional troops from its Suez base to end the rioting (Gardner 2009).  The British appealed 
to Washington for help in putting down violence in Egypt, but the U.S. rejected on the 
grounds that it wouldn’t help the situation (Gardner 2009).  On 23 July 1952, a group of 
senior Egyptian army officers mounted a successful revolt.  King Farouk, the Egyptian ruler, 
appealed to both London and Washington for help but neither “would lift a finger,” 
concerned they would jeopardize the Suez by propping him up (Gardner 2009).  Egypt’s 
revolution left power in the hands of the Egyptian military and General Naguib, supported by 
a strongman named Gamul Abdel Nasser (Gardner 2009).  The new Egyptian regime, 
purporting to be a pro-West regime, immediately appealed to Washington for aid, but it 
would come with strings:  the U.S. wanted a testament of Egypt’s “Cold War orientation,” for 
starters, by publicly supporting the U.S. in Korea (Gardner 2009).  In the longer term, the 
U.S. hinged further aid on Egypt taking a leading role in MEDO, long-term arrangements to 





  John Foster Dulles and Egypt’s Naguib (Eisenhower had taken office by this 
point) got off to a promising start, but Dulles aptly recognized that “the Israel factor, and 
association of the U.S. in the minds of the people with the French and British colonial 
imperialist policies, are millstones around our neck” (Gardner 2009).  Dulles, trying to apply 
an even-handed approach, “all but promised arms to Egypt,” which angered the British 
(Gardner 2009).  Israel was also concerned over a “perceived policy shift” understanding that 
arms to Egypt would certainly end up turned on Israelis.  But Naguib was deposed in 1954 
and replaced by Gamel Abdul Nasser, who the U.S. hoped would continue cooperation with 
the U.S. (Gardner 2009). 
  Initially, Nasser seemed to portend a continuation of the goodwill General 
Naguib had established with the U.S., but he quickly proved to be “less amenable” than his 
predecessor, particularly regarding the role of the British at Suez (Gardner 2009).  Britain’s 
sponsoring of the Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955 did not help matters.  The Baghdad 
Pact was an alliance between Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan that was backed by Britain—
meaning it was at least tacitly supported by the U.S.—that had the effect of strengthening 
Iraq as a rival for Arab leadership (Gardner 2009).  For the U.S., the Baghdad Pact was 
important in that it created a “Northern Tier” to defend against a Soviet advance and had the 
additional benefit of containing Arab nationalism, but the U.S. was unwilling to sign on 
account of its effects on other Arab nations, such as Egypt (Gardner 2009).  Nasser, unhappy 
with the diminishment of his position, set to work to construct his own “Pan-Arab Pact” 
viewing Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan as potential members (Gardner 2009).  Meanwhile, 
he continued to seek U.S. aid, but Nasser would not accept the strings that were attached, 
especially peace with Israel.  Thus, in 1955, after an Israeli Gaza raid began to focus attention 
on Nasser’s failure to attain arms, Nasser vowed to organize the Middle East’s defense 
“without any assistance from the West” (Gardner 2009).  Then, to the world’s shock, on 27 
September, 1955, Egypt announced an Egyptian-Russian arms deal totaling around $200 
million, including 200 MiG-15s, 50 Ilyushin bombers, 60 Half-Tracks, and 275 T-34 tanks 
(Gardner 2009).  The French responded immediately transferring Mystere IV fighters from 




f. Suez Crisis (1956) 
  The U.S. had become frustrated with Nasser’s open defiance of the West and 
acceptance of Russian aid and sought to isolate him from the rest of the Arab world (Gardner 
2009).  The turning point in U.S.-Egypt relations came when the U.S. backed away from a 
loan to finance the Aswan Dam, a major domestic priority for Nasser (Gardner 2009).  The 
U.S. felt secure that the Russians could not afford to support Egypt on such an undertaking 
and that Nasser would eventually come crawling back (Gardner 2009).  But Nasser 
responded with scathing attacks against the U.S. on 24 July 1956, followed immediately by 
an announcement by the Russians that they were offering to finance the dam (Gardner 2009).  
Two days later, on 26 July 1956, Nasser announced he did not need U.S. aid, because the 
“sons of Egypt were rising up to direct the canal company.”  Nasser had nationalized the 
Suez Canal (Gardner 2009). 
  The wheels of war immediately began to turn in London.  The British were 
now determined to be done with Nasser, a goal not unwelcome by France, Israel, and the 
U.S. (Gardner 2009).  Israel wanted Nasser gone due to the frequent border disputes it 
continued to have with Egypt.  The U.S., on the other hand, had a more reserved view.  The 
U.S. wanted Nasser gone but “didn’t want the political consequences of a direct assault on 
Egypt’s right to nationalize the canal company” and feared opening a door for the Russians to 
move aggressively into the Middle East (Gardner 2009).  The U.S. knew the British were 
planning for war, but saw Britain as using the Arab-Israeli conflict to advance their aims 
(Gardner 2009).  Nonetheless, backed by Britain and France, Israel launched an attack on 
Egypt on 29 October 1956.  The plan called for an Israeli invasion into Sinai, then Britain 
and France would issue an ultimatum to cease fighting and put boots on the ground to 
“enforce” the ultimatum, ensuring the belligerents retreated a certain distance from the canal 
(Gardner 2009).  The plan was essentially a ruse to justify air strikes on Egyptian airfields, 
get troops on the ground, and, ultimately, unseat Nasser (Gardner 2009).  But what it turned 




furious, saying, “if we do not fulfill our word38 Russia is likely to enter the situation in the 
Middle East.”  The U.S. threatened to drop U.S. support for the British currency (Gardner 
2009).  Meanwhile, the Russians threatened to launch ICBMs against Great Britain and 
France (Gardner 2009).  Russia and the U.S. sponsored a UN resolution demanding 
immediate cease-fire.   
  The consequences of the Suez debacle are many.  The Russians were able to 
pass as “defenders of the Egyptian revolution” even while they were in the middle of 
suppressing Hungarian freedom fighters (Gardner 2009).  For the British, Suez was officially 
the end of serious influence in the Middle East, “no Arab leader can be Great Britain’s friend 
and Nasser’s enemy” (Gardner 2009).  Britain’s loss was Nasser’s gain as he became the hero 
who’d successfully stood up to the British.  With its chief sponsor weakened, the importance 
of the Baghdad Pact evaporated, reducing Iraq as an Arab rival to Nasser and Egypt (Gardner 
2009).  For Israel, a strengthened Nasser was surely a loss.  The U.S., at least for a time, was 
rewarded as “champions of the right” for standing up against British imperialism (Gardner 
2009).  Saudi Arabia also began to move closer to the U.S., fearing Nasser’s rising power 
(Gardner 2009).  In the longer run, however, the hostility provoked between Israel and 
Nasser proved to be the most enduring effect. 
g. 1956–1967 
  The interim period between the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Six-Day War in 
1967 saw a continuation of difficulties.  Nasser still troubled Washington by remaining 
recalcitrant on the issue of peace with Israel and continuing to propagate anti-American 
messages (Gardner 2009).  This period also saw a bloody revolution in Iraq in July 1958 that 
toppled Iraq’s pro-Western Prime Minister, bringing to power the decidedly anti-Western 
Abdul Karim Qassem (Gardner 2009).  Qassem roiled Washington and pro-West elements 
within the Middle East with a series of worrisome moves.  Qassem pulled Iraq from the 
Baghdad Pact, threatened Kuwait’s independence, purged all Westerners, and challenged the 
                                                 
38 The “word” Eisenhower means to fulfill is the promise made in the tripartite declaration of May 
1950 between the U.S., Britain, and France, in which each promised to intervene if any nation in the 
Middle East was attacked.  The pact was designed to ensure Israel’s safety but applied to all Middle Eastern 
countries to position the U.S. as bearer of the mantle of Middle East peace, with the intent to keep the 




Iraqi Petrol Company39 (IPC), which “mounted real threats to American interests” (Gardner 
2009).  Qassem’s challenge of the IPC eventually became his undoing, however.  Qassem, 
recognizing that the American-led IPC was only using about 1.5% of its available area for 
exploration, wanted to reclaim 60% of the total for Iraq (Gardner 2009).  After negotiations 
broke down in 1961, Qassem passed Law 80 essentially nationalizing all of the IPC-owned 
land except that which had already been explored (Gardner 2009).   
By 1963, Washington had had enough of Qassem and planned a covert coup 
using Saddam Hussein and anti-Communist Baathists as the means (Gardner 2009).  The 
coup occurred on 3 February 1963, and the Baath Party followed it up with “a house to house 
hunt for communists” that resulted in 8,000 Iraqis killed (Gardner 2009).  This began a string 
of events that would eventually result in Saddam Hussein’s rise to power (by a coup) and 
then his overthrow by the U.S. in 2003.  In the short run, however, the Iraqi Baathists would 
again give Nasser an Arab rival.  In the longer term, the Baath Party would prove hostile to 
Israel, a menace to its own people, and a threat to U.S. interests by championing pan-
Arabism and demanding “Arab control over Arab resources”  (Gardner 2009). 
h. 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
  Nasser’s support of Yemeni rebels against Riyadh-backed pro-Government 
forces in the 1963 Yemini Civil War, along with his role in setting up the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, finally “confirmed in the minds of U.S. policy makers that Nasser’s 
role was never going to be a constructive one (Gardner 2009).  In 1967, Egypt closed the 
straits of Tiran, blocking Israel’s access “to the Red Sea and beyond,” and Israel immediately 
began to make its case to Washington against Egypt: “Egypt, backed by Russia, is looking to 
roll up the whole Middle East” (Gardner 2009).  Israel was advocating more military and 
economic assistance, but more importantly, was looking for assurances from Washington that 
Suez would not be repeated should it respond militarily (Gardner 2009).  Lyndon Johnson, 
now in the Whitehouse, was mired in Vietnam and was hesitant to be seen as directly 
                                                 
39 Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) was established in 1928 from the remains of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company and was composed mostly of American and European oil companies.  The IPC offered Iraqis a 
20% share in the properties it developed, but it never fulfilled this promise (Gardner 2009).  This fact, 
along with accusations of manipulated production quotas and disputes over the laggard development of 





involved, but did seem to provide the necessary reassurance (Gardner 2009).  With tacit U.S. 
support, Israel waited for the spark, which was provided when Syria permitted “PLO raiders 
to strike out of Gaza” (Gardner 2009).  The Six-Day War ensued and the U.S. would not 
intervene until all Israeli objectives had been achieved (Gardner 2009). 
  On the eve of the war, the thinking in the White House was that, if Nasser 
were removed, a “potentially new phase” could be opened in the Middle East attended by 
“economic development, regional collaboration, and acceptance of Israel” (Gardner 2009).  
On the other hand, it was recognized that the result of a war could end up with the 
“crystallization of a bloc unified only by hostility to Israel,” thus requiring the U.S. to 
“maintain Israel as a kind of Hong Kong enclave in the region” (Gardner 2009).  Johnson 
believed that it was possible that, by triumph of Israeli arms, that the door could be opened to 
moderate Arab leadership (Gardner 2009). 
  Israel did triumph and Nasser was removed, but it did not bring widespread 
resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that Johnson had hoped.  However, the 1967 war did 
have many other significant consequences.  Nasser was replaced (by Anwar Sadat) and a 
lasting peace was achieved between Egypt and Israel and between Egypt and the U.S. that 
exist to this day (Harms 2008).  The war also further cemented the U.S.-Israel alliance and 
Israel’s role as a power in the Middle East (Harms 2008).  Soviet rivalry in the Middle East 
was effectively ended as Russia’s ties to Egypt were severed, its only serious ally in the 
region.  It also demonstrated the “inferiority of Russian-supplied arms” (Gardner 2009).  
From this point forward, the U.S. was the sole superpower in the Middle East. 
i. Summary of Recent U.S. History 
  U.S. history in the Middle East—from World War I through the 1967 Six-
Day War—saw the U.S. replace the old European colonial powers of Great Britain and 
France, forge an unalterable connection with the young state of Israel, and triumph in the 
region over its Cold War archrival.  U.S. history since the 1967 war, with respect to the U.S.’ 
role, policies, and objectives, has gone largely unchanged.  The U.S. still seeks secure oil 
supply lines and national security by exerting political, military, and economic influence on 





threat to American interests in the Middle East.  The Soviet threat has faded and, in its place, 
has emerged militant Islamic fundamentalism, a result that continues to define the nature of 
America’s relationship with the Middle East. 
  The year 1979 is considered a “watershed” period in U.S.-Middle East 
relations (Shuster 2004).  The Iranian Revolution, as discussed earlier in this chapter, brought 
about a drastic change in Iranian leadership that has consistently opposed U.S. interests.  The 
same year, the U.S. “funded, armed, and organized” Soviet opposition in Afghanistan, which 
would later have consequences as Osama Bin Laden, a veteran of the Afghan War, would 
“turn his hostility toward the U.S.” and mastermind a series of terrorist attacks (Shuster 
2004).  These terrorist attacks would result in the ongoing war with the Taliban and 
worldwide hunt for Al-Qaeda and its operatives, including Bin Laden.  The U.S., in the Iran–
Iraq War, would stand with Iraq against Iran and then, in 1991, against Iraq for its invasion of 
Kuwait.  In 2003, as part of the Global War on Terror, the U.S. would invade Iraq again, but 
this time to ouster its one-time hireling Saddam Hussein and undertake the first step in the 
“democratization of the Middle East” (Pressman 2006).   Foreign policy in recent years40, 
since 9/11, revolves around combating terrorism through application of force aimed at 
democratizing the Middle East, and thereby undermining support for terrorists (Pressman 
2006).  This policy sits on the same fundamental assumptions (i.e., domino thesis) as did the 
Cold War containment policies of the Truman Doctrine, essentially making it the latest in an 
unbroken line of expansions of the Truman Doctrine since 1947.   
C. MODELING APPROACHES 
Political decision making is of great importance and a wide variety of analytic 
techniques have been developed to better understand them.  Many traditional techniques are 
based on qualitative approaches that often seek to understand—or predict—decision making 
by gaining a thorough understanding of the political system, the actors within it, and how 
behavioral norms of decision makers ought to occur under a given set of circumstances.  
Increasingly, however, advanced mathematical and computer science techniques are being 
applied to enable understanding of complex political systems, the decision-making dynamics 
they present, and to better understand what drives decisions of actors within these systems.  
                                                 




This section briefly discusses a few of these modeling and analysis techniques, focusing 
particularly on those that address key requirements of this thesis:  1) modeling a complex 
political system, 2) analysis of political decision making, and 3) aiding forecast of political 
decisions. 
1. Systems Analysis 
Elisabeth Pate-Cornell et al. Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist Threats: A 
Systems Analysis Approach to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures provides some 
useful insights into a variety of techniques commonly used to analyze decision making in 
complex systems (2002).  Pate-Cornell et al. uses a combination of Systems Analysis, 
Decision Theory, Applied Probability, and Game Theory to model the dynamics between 
U.S. policy makers and a given set of terrorists groups who might have interest in 
executing a terrorist attack against the U.S. (2002).  The ultimate goal of her research is 
to help “set priorities among threats and among countermeasures” (Pate-Cornell et al. 
2002) in an effort to aid U.S. policy makers. 
 Pate-Cornell et al. uses Systems Analysis to structure an “over-arching model,” 
envisioned as a “system of systems” where model components can themselves be 
modeled as a system at an arbitrary level of detail (2002).  This approach allows the 
modeler to specify the scope of the analysis and to define relationships within and 
between elements of the system under consideration.  According to Pate-Cornell et al., 
the Systems Analysis approach is useful to “bring together the mass of information” and 
provides a framework to understand “effects of interdependencies among networks and 
systems” (2002).   
2. Decision Analysis 
 For inputs, the Pate-Cornell et al. uses well-established utility theory concepts to rank 
order preferences and transform “expert opinion” into quantifiable data that has numerical 




prescriptively41 and U.S. decisions are modeled descriptively42 (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).  
Each actor’s decisions are modeled using influence diagrams and the decisions to be 
analyzed are predetermined based on a set of prescribed feasible actions (Pate-Cornell et al. 
2002).  The goal for the U.S. is to minimize the consequences of a potential terrorist attack 
while the goal for the terrorists is to maximize damage to U.S. interests.  The objective 
function for each actor is modeled as a linear summation of its interests, but the model allows 
for the relaxation of this assumption (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).  Uncertainty is modeled 
through various random variables and arises from several sources.  First, there is uncertainty 
with respect to the terrorists: identity, intent, and means (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).  Second, 
there is uncertainty about event outcomes given a terror group, the terror group’s intent, and 
its means.  Finally, there is uncertainty about how each actor perceives the uncertainty 
contained in the other actor’s situation—that is, what a given actor believes the other actor 
believes (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).       
 The model is a “two-sided” model to account for the fact that “both sides act in 
response to their beliefs about the intentions and capabilities of the other side” (Pate-Cornell 
et al. 2002).  This multiplayer dynamic is modeled by considering the system from two 
perspectives: the terrorists and the U.S.  Each side is modeled as its own influence diagram 
where all sources of information about its opponent are modeled as chance variables that 
reflect its beliefs about the decisions the other will make.  Each diagram has a unique utility 
function developed based on the preferences of that actor (terrorists or U.S.).  In the case of 
the terrorists, the utility depends on the amount of damage that is inflicted and the symbolism 
of the attack (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).  The U.S. value is to minimize its “disutility,” which 
amounts to minimizing the damage and symbolism of the attack (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).  
 The model is conceptualized as a dynamic game that plays out over a finite period of 
time.  This “dynamic and game-theoretic” component is intended to capture the changes that 
occur over time as the two sides interact within the framework of the model (Pate-Cornell et 
al. 2002).  To achieve these changes, the model requires updating of “moves and 
countermoves, changes in strategy and means, lessons learned about the effectiveness of 
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(Dillon n.d.). 
42 A descriptive model of decision making describes what the decision maker actually does or has 




different tactics and strategies, evolution of organizations, emergence of new groups, or a 
new structure of existing groups and networks” (Pate-Cornell et al. 2002).  Pate-Cornell 
prescribes these update steps for model maintainers when running the model (Pate-Cornell et 
al. 2002): 
• Model structure (new nodes that translate into new nodes and new links). 
• Possible realizations of each variable. 
• Probabilities of the different realizations. 
• The objective function of the perpetrators (i.e., terror groups). 
The model advanced by Pate-Cornell et al. seeks to aid in forecasting by providing a 
decision support tool to the user to that serves as a “reality check” to traditional analysis 
based on expert opinion (2002).  The approach used has the benefit of integrating data from 
multiple sources to wash out biases and to place the alternatives in quantitative terms for 
easier comparison.  By requiring the user to participate in updating the model over time, this 
approach has the added benefit that users of the model are factored in throughout the process.  
This approach is flexible and seems to effectively integrate quantitative and qualitative forms 
of analysis. 
Most important decision situations require an analysis of two or more “players” 
whose decisions must account not only for uncertainty in chance events, but also for 
uncertainty in the decisions of actions taken by others, since other players’ decisions will 
affect the outcome.  To adjudicate decisions, Game Theory (and Decision Theory in general) 
requires certain key assumptions.  First, the decision maker must be rational under 
uncertainty by satisfying the rationality axioms (refer to James N. Webb’s Game Theory: 
Decisions, Interaction, and Evolution (2007)).  If an actor is rational, then a utility function 
can be defined and optimal payoffs for current and future decisions can be calculated using 
expectation (Webb 2007).  So another important assumption is that each decision maker must 
calculate his (and all other actors’) expected utility based on rational self interest where each 
actor chooses the optimal decision—by maximizing expected utility—in all remaining 
decisions (Webb 2007).  In many cases these assumptions seem to hold, but as Pate-Cornell 
et al. states people “often show circularities in preference” and “do not account for 




analysis models also require inputs about uncertainty that are often not known with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy.  Analysts must make an assessment of prior probabilities, 
usually relying on a combination of intuition, experience, and past frequencies of 
occurrences.  However, because of the complexity of variables involved, “one can seldom 
rely on historical frequencies alone” (Jolson 1).   
3. Forecasting (Prediction) Aids 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is perhaps the most well-known political decision 
forecasting analyst.  Mesquita’s models are not publicly available for complete review, but in 
a series of published books, he has revealed his general concepts and methodology.  
According to Mesquita, the general steps he uses to model decision forecasting are (2009): 
1. Identify every individual or group with a meaningful interest in trying to 
influence the outcome. 
2. Estimate as accurately as possible what each player says they want. 
3. Approximate how important the issue is to the player (salience). 
4. Approximate, relative to all other players, how influential each player can be 
in persuading other players to change their position (influence). 
Using this basic setup, Mesquita models the decision-making landscape in considerable 
detail, including any entity or individual thought to be able to influence the situation.  
Because Mesquita’s model is not publicly available, it is unclear what method he uses to 
represent the system being modeled.  In any case, Mesquita, while controversial to some, has 
built a reputation for accuracy.  In a declassified study, the CIA found that Mesquita’s model 
predicted future events with double the accuracy of its CIA analysts (New York Times, 12 
December 2009). 
Decision and Game Theory are parametric approaches toward forecasting decision 
making under uncertainty.  But there exist nonparametric approaches as well.  One such 
approach is the Delphi Method, developed by the Rand Corporation in 1969 (Dalkey 1969).  
The Delphi Method uses the concept of “group knowledge” or “group opinion” to flush out 
uncertainty (Dalkey 1969).   It does this by seeking to address the vast space of information 
that lies between fact (assertions supported by clear and convincing evidence) and 




(assertions where evidence is unclear or mixed) and this is where the Delphi method uses the 
“n heads are better than one” principle to aggregate information to form more reliable 
knowledge (Dalkey 1969).  The idea is that there is at least as much credible information 
present with n opinion as there is with one opinion.  On the other hand, the same can be said 
about misinformation.  So the technique for gathering the information from “n heads” must 
be carefully considered (Dalkey 1969).   
The process for information gathering is as follows: 1) anonymous response, 2) 
iteration and controlled feedback, and 3) statistical group response (Dalkey 1969).  
Anonymous response allows experts to provide opinions freely and removes the effects of 
dominant individuals.  Iteration and controlled feedback allows the experts to review the 
(anonymous) answers of the group and update their response (Dalkey 1969).  Research 
suggests that after iteration, the group opinion converges toward the correct answer (the first 
round median) and dispersion of error becomes smaller (Dalkey 1969).  Statistical 
aggregation, the third and final step, of the group response ensures that all information 
gathered from the group is contained in the final presentation. 
On judgments of value, the Delphi Method results are less clear.  According to Rand, 
the Delphi Method appears to work well for estimating factual information but has far less 
power when estimating value judgments (Dalkey 1969).  This is clearly a limitation in the 
context of decision analysis since most decisions worthy of study require, at least implicitly, 
judgments of value as well as judgments of fact.  Additionally, the Delphi Method is an 
experimental design rather than a modeling process.  In this sense, it does not allow for 
structuring the decision space or the system under analysis.  Nonetheless, the Delphi Method 
has useful applications in decision analysis for its ability to provide a framework for 
estimating uncertainty. 
Another technique that is growing in popularity focuses explicitly on the prediction 
of future events.  Prediction markets are exchanges that are established to facilitate the 
exchange of futures contracts where “payoffs are tied to the outcome of future events” that 
someone has an interest in predicting (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 109).  Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
show how prediction markets have proven able to approximate probability distributions on 




in these prediction exchanges “reflect the assessments of (unbiased) profit motive” (Wolfer 
and Zitzewitz 118).  Wolfewitz sums up the power of prediction markets: 
The power of prediction markets derives from the fact that they provide 
incentives for truthful revelation, provide incentives for research and 
information discovery, and the market provides an algorithm for 
aggregating opinions. 
Like the Delphi Method, prediction markets do not directly address analysis of decision 
making or attempt to understand the nature of relationships within a decision-making system.  
However, in both cases, there are some obvious circumstances where the decision-making of 
an entity or an individual can be easily inferred from the probability assessment of the future 
event.  A case in point is the probability distribution placed on Hillary Clinton being the 
Democratic nominee in 2008.  Though she publicly denied she would run for nomination, 
market sentiment suggested that she was likely to win the nomination.  The market had 
implicitly made a prediction that she would in fact make the decision to run (which proved 
accurate) and further concluded she was most likely to win (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 118-119). 
 Prediction markets are known to have many important limitations.  Aside from the 
difficulty in developing and implementing them, they operate in aggregate and provide few 
insights into the mechanics of a decision-making system.  From a prediction of highly 
aggregated information, it is unlikely that an analyst could easily untangle questions of 
correlation and causation to get at the factors driving the decisions or outcomes.  Prediction 
markets also appear to perform poorly when probabilities are very small or are very near 
perfect certainty due to well-known human estimation biases (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 117).  
Despite these limitations, however, prediction markets are increasingly becoming a useful 































III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter develops the conceptual framework for two models designed to 
answer the subject questions.  Recall, the research questions are: 
• How would Lebanese Hezbollah respond to an Israeli strike against Iranian 
nuclear facilities? 
• Under what conditions would Lebanese Hezbollah retaliate for the death of 
Imad Mughniyah? 
Additionally, for each question, a conceptual model is developed that fully articulates the 
required relationships to model the system under analysis.  Finally, the actual 
implementation of each model is presented.  Genie does not implement temporal 
influence diagrams nor does it implement multi-agent influence diagrams, each of which 
is a required capability for the subject questions.  For both models, a Java application was 
developed to provide an interface between the decision analysis software Genie v2.0, 
Java, and Microsoft Excel.  This approach makes possible the implementation of 
temporal and multi-agent behavior.  Genie is used to construct the models and to input 
the data.  Microsoft Excel is used to read in arguments necessary to run the application.  
Java is used to link these programs and exploit the capabilities Genie does offer.  The 
application uses jSmile (Java API for Genie) and jExcel (Java API for excel).  This 
application is hereafter referred to as STANA (STakeholder ANalysis Application).  
There are differences between the conceptual models and the implemented models.  
Wherever these differences exist, it results from the underdevelopment of the application 
used to execute the models. 
This chapter presents a variety of figures and diagrams.  Each model is attended 
by a significant number of probability and utility tables, only a small number of which 
are shown.  Should the reader be interested in viewing the notional data in for all 




called STANA.zip.  This file contains the programs and files necessary for model 
execution and a sample scenario for each model, complete with the probability tables 
used in this analysis. 
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL MODEL 
 This thesis analyzes two separate but related questions so two separate models are 
developed.  The first model addresses the question:  How would Lebanese Hezbollah 
respond to an Israeli strike on Iranian Nuclear facilities?  This model is referred to as the 
“LH-IS” model.  The second question is:  Under what conditions would Lebanese 
Hezbollah retaliate for the death of Imad Mughniyah?  This model is referred to as the 
“LH-Mughniyah.”  Both models have similar structure.  As such, a single, generalized 
model is developed.  Towards the end of this section, the two models are developed 
within the general framework, at which time the specificities of each model are 
discussed.  Much of the data for this analysis is an interpretation of facts by this author 
based on the historical review and discussions with Unified Combatant Command 
personnel. 
1. Model Elements 
a. Stakeholders   
The first step in building the general model is to identify key stakeholders.  
From Chapter I, a stakeholder is defined as any entity that plays a key role in the outcome 
of a military or political situation.  By this broad definition, an unwieldy number of 
stakeholders might be justifiable.  However, to manage model complexity, only the most 
pertinent stakeholders are considered.  Within this set of stakeholders, they are further 
sub-divided into Primary and Secondary stakeholders.   Primary stakeholders are those 
whose influence in the system is so critical that it is felt their decisions must be explicitly 
modeled to achieve valid results.  Secondary stakeholders, on the other hand, are 
decision-makers whose influence is important enough to include, but whose influence is 
not deemed central, thus permitting representation as a random variable.  The following 




• Lebanese Hezbollah (LH).  LH is the central decision-maker to be 
analyzed.  LH has a history of confrontation with Israel and is considered a terrorist 
organization by the U.S.  Iran and Syria each have interests in LH, who is often believed 
to be a tool by which these actors exercise regional influence.  Conversely, LH is 
supported politically, militarily, and economically by Iran and Syria and so their decision 
making is believed to factor in the positions of these two actors. 
• Israel (IS).  LH's interests are defined in terms of its relationship with 
Israel.  As a result, Israel's decisions and its reaction to LH decisions are of central import 
to this model.  Israel is a long-time ally of the U.S. and long-time opponent of Syria and 
Iran.  Israel is likely to consider the position of each of these three actors when it takes its 
decisions. 
• Islamic Republic of Iran (IR).  Iran was integral to LH’s emergence and 
it is generally believed that Iran continues to play a central role in LH’s decisions.  Iran is 
believed to be the most important source of funding for LH operations and seems to have 
continuing influence in many of Lebanon’s Shi’a dominated areas.  Iran is certain to be 
influential to LH decision making, but it will also influence Israeli decision-making under 
many circumstances (i.e., threat of attack).  Finally, given the standoff between Iran and 
the U.S. over nuclear weapons, Iran and the U.S. decisions have mutual dependencies, 
and may even be viewed as a separate but related strategic game. 
• The United States (U.S.).  The U.S. has been a key ally of Israel 
throughout Israel's history.  It is believed that any decision taken by Israel will 
necessarily be a factor in U.S. decision making.  The U.S. is the premier power broker in 
the Middle East.  Any decisions taken by the U.S. will have influence on all other actors 
in the region, even if only indirectly. 
• Syria (SY).  Though Syria officially withdrew its troops in 2005, Syria 
has territorial and political interests in Lebanon and is generally viewed as exercising 
considerable influence in Lebanon.  Israel and Syria have a long history of conflict and 




related to the U.S. as it potentially stands to gain economically should it engage 
diplomatically with the U.S.  On the other hand, as a key logistics link between Iran and 
LH, and given the regional influence of Iran, Syria is not likely to be eager to openly 
embrace the West. 
b. Stakeholder Interests 
Each stakeholder has interests.  An interest could be any issue or concern 
where the actor feels that it has some stake in the outcome.  An interest could be defined 
in terms of the stakeholder, such as LH’s desire to maintain its own militia capability, or 
could be defined in terms of another actor, such as Israel’s desire for Iran NOT to have 
nuclear weapons.  What is important for this definition is that the issue is salient to the 
stakeholder and the stakeholder possesses both capability and intent to take decisions to 
influence its outcome.  The list below briefly describes the interests for the two primary 
stakeholders. 
Lebanese Hezbollah 
• Relevance and Influence.  LH’s terminal interest is to exist as a relevant 
and influential organization whose primary goal is to represent the Shi’a and pro-Syria 
political constituencies.  It also seems to place value in extending its influence to broadly 
represent the Lebanese population.  To the extent that LH maintains a strong militia, 
protects the Shia, and provides credible deterrence against Israel, it seems likely it will 
remain relevant and influential in Lebanon. 
• External Support.  LH currently benefits from strong support outside of 
Lebanon via Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Diaspora.  LH’s actions will determine the 
extent to which this support continues, strengthens, or degrades.  Should LH lose these 
external supporters, it will become more and more likely that LH could become less 
relevant as Lebanon’s resistance force and will lose domestic political influence within 
Lebanon.  So it is in LH’s interests to maintain strong relationships with these external 




• Protecting Shia.  One of two fundamental pillars of LH’s organizational 
charter, LH’s ability to provide protection to the Shia population in Lebanon has always 
been and remains a core source of its power and influence (Norton 2007).  The term 
‘Protect’ is meant to encompass both safety and welfare of Shia. 
•  Strengthening Militia.  As a non-state actor, LH does not have unlimited 
access to government resources and instruments of national power.  Its primary 
instrument of influence has been its military capability.  LH has significant interests in 
maintaining a strong militia capability to enable it to achieve all of its other goals and 
interests.  LH has shown considerable determination in maintaining its militia against 
both internal and external pressure to disarm. 
• Resisting Israel.  LH’s status as the bearer of the ideological mantle of 
resistance is a source of relevance, influence, and credibility.  Presumably, LH’s 
resistance status would be seen as strengthening or weakening in proportion to its ability 
to credibly deter Israel, foster a sense of insecurity in Israel, foment anti-Israel sentiments 
at-home and abroad, etc.  This interest may imply that LH needs Israel for its own 
relevance.  It may also imply that LH’s relevance could degrade over time if peace 
persisted between Israel and Lebanon. 
Israel 
• Improving Security.  Since the birth of Israel, its chief concern has been to 
achieve a secure existence.  Security, as it is meant here, implies that potential 
adversaries lack either the capability or the intent to bring harm to Israel and its interests.  
For Israel to have a secure existence, actors of means must not have malicious intent, and 
actors of malicious intent must not have the capability to threaten Israel or impede the 
quality of life of its citizens (i.e., economic hardship, etc).  Even actors who do not have 
significant military capability can present a threat by advocating terror, fomenting 
violence against Israel, or harnessing international opinion in a manner that runs against 




• Regional Stability.  Instability in the Middle East always carries with it the 
potential for the rise of radical elements trumpeting populist messages.  These populist 
messages are often anti-Israeli in nature so that the change that results from political 
instability is generally not in Israel’s best interest.  Political turmoil and instability also 
provides the opportunity for the rise of violent extremists who often gain prominence at 
Israel’s expense and who often carry out acts of terror against Israel, its government 
and/or its citizens.  In most situations, Israel does not benefit from the sudden change that 
comes from an unstable region.  However, there are other conceivable scenarios where 
Israel may not desire stability.   For instance, a stable region under a rival power—e.g., 
Iran—could be counter to Israel’s interests, possibly inducing Israel to instigate 
instability—e.g., an attack on Iran or a key partner.  Regional stability then is a context-
specific variable and Israel’s ordering of preferences should account for this. 
• Political Survival.  Since Israel transfers power through an election 
process, Israeli decision makers must account for the political ramifications of their 
decisions.  This interest is necessary to represent the vulnerability inherent in the “will of 
the people” for a democratic nation.   
The realization of an interest is some value (from a discrete set of values) that 
an interest variable may take on.  For clarity in reference, the set of possible realizations 
of a variable is termed a factor of that variable.  For instance, LH could have an interest 
variable called Relevance.  The possible factors of which could be ‘LH Relevance 
Improving’ and ‘LH Relevance Degrading’.  Notice the ‘ing’ suffix for each factor.  This 
characterization is used to ascribe a concept of direction to each interest.  The main 
reason for this is to ensure validity of all interests over the desired time horizon.  By 
prohibiting an interest from actually being achieved, it guarantees the integrity of the 
model.  Suppose Iran had an interest in being a nuclear-armed nation and its interest 
factors were ‘Uranium Enriched’ and ‘Uranium Not Enriched’.  This factor description 
causes Iran’s nuclear interest to become fixed and changes the nature of the model adding 
unnecessary complexity.  To avoid this issue, all interest factors will be considered as 




c. Objective Function 
Since each stakeholder has multiple interests (or multiple objectives), 
careful treatment of the objective function is required.  The easiest approach to the 
objective function is to use an Additive Linear Utility (ALU) function, summing across 
all weighted interests and then maximizing that function.  However, this approach is 
undesirable because it assumes linearity in relationships between interests.  In reality, 
stakeholders tend to be willing to make trade-offs between certain interests considering 
the overall combinations and not just the sum of individual variables.  Often, though not 
always, this leads to preference ordering that is non-linear.  Figure 1 shows the interests 
of LH on a factor tree where each level of the tree corresponds to a single LH interest.  
The branch at each interest shows the two relevant factors for that interest.  A leaf (red 
text) is interpreted as the combination of all interests up-root of that leaf.  The leaf with 
the red box around it is the combination of these interest factors: Protecting the Shia, 
Strengthening Militia, Resisting Israel, Defending Lebanon, and Failing to Control 
Lebanon.  The green number below the red text reflects U.S. beliefs about LH’s 





Figure 1. LH Factor Tree of Interests developed in coordination with Unified 
Combatant Command. 
  As can be seen from Figure 1, there are areas where preferences are non-
linear.  For instance, LH has interest in being considered the “Defenders of Lebanon” 
(Defending LB), but would be willing to sacrifice that interest for control of Lebanon 
through the political process (Controlling LB).  Likewise, failure to protect its core 
supporters in the Shia population (Failing to Protect Shia) is the worst-case scenario for 
LH regardless of what other interests it achieves. This occurs because LH’s most 
fundamental duty as an organization is to protect the Shi’a population in Lebanon.  If LH 
does not succeed in this area, the realization of any other combination of interests has no 
effect on the utility values assigned to that branch of the factor tree.  A simple summation 
would miss this important distinction.  In scenarios like this where an interest factor 





combinations are not represented.  The main value of using the factor tree is it allows the 
analyst the ability to consider interests as conditional dependencies instead of considering 
each as its own independent entity. 
d. Stakeholder Actions 
   Each primary stakeholder has a set of feasible actions that it can take.  The 
stakeholder will take decisions that optimize its own expected utility based on its own 
interests.  To the extent the primary stakeholders’ interests are opposed, the actors will be 
in conflict.  Conversely, to the extent that two actors’ interests are aligned, they may have 
the opportunity for cooperation to achieve shared goals.  Appendix A provides a 
complete description of the set of actions for LH and Israel, as developed in coordination 
with Unified Combatant Command. 
Primary stakeholder decisions are the main focus of this thesis research.  
They are modeled explicitly in the LH-IS model so the user can analyze each decision by 
each stakeholder in each time period.  In the influence diagram, decisions are represented 
by square nodes.  Each node represents a type of action for that stakeholder, such as 
‘Military’ or ‘Diplomacy.’  Within each decision node, there must be at least two 
choices—such as ‘attack’ or ‘no attack’—but there may be an arbitrary number.   Figure 
2 shows a single decision node for LH along with two other nodes.  The arrows 
emanating from the decision node indicates that the chance node depends 
probabilistically on the action taken.  An arrow entering the decision node reflects 
temporal information.  Specifically, the stakeholder has knowledge of the outcome of the 






Figure 2. Interaction of chance and decision nodes. 
e. Actions Criteria   
Depending on context and level of model resolution, the combination of 
feasible actions can be overwhelming.  To attempt to capture every possible action in 
every possible circumstance will lead to a model so complex that it either becomes 
infeasible or produces results that are too uncertain to be credible.  On the other extreme, 
by not capturing the essence of the decision space, the model can become so simplistic 
that it fails to meaningfully represent the problem.  The goal is to define stakeholder 
actions in a way that strikes the right balance between these extremes, where the essence 
of the decision space is captured and actions of negligible consequence are removed.  The 
following criteria provide a framework to aid in selection of appropriate actions: 
• Feasibility.  The action must be one that the decision maker has the means 
to carry out with a reasonable probability of success. 
• Relevant.  An action must have a meaningful impact in the context of the 





o Consequence.  The action is judged to have the potential to 
meaningfully affect one or more interests of one or more stakeholders. 
o Unique.  An action is unique if the action’s results are not 
duplicated by any other action.  Two actions can differ in what they affect and by how (or 
how much) they affect.  If two candidate actions impact the same variables to the same 
degree, they are not unique. 
• Time Relevance.  Finally, all of the above criteria must be viewed and 
judged both feasible and relevant over the time horizon for analysis.  Some decisions may 
be feasible and relevant over a long period of time (long-term strategic decisions) but 
may fail one or both of these criteria when considered over the model’s time horizon.  
For instance, Israel could decide it wanted to rebrand its global image.  To do this is a 
long, complex process that would take some years to accomplish and probably many 
more to evaluate its outcome.  This action would be feasible but irrelevant in the time 
horizon of interest.  There is one distinction to be made here.  In some cases, an action 
may become infeasible due to the way the circumstances in the model scenario evolve.  
These cases do not violate time relevance.  It is reasonable that the context of a situation 












2. Influence Diagram Representation of the General Model 
 
 
Figure 3. General Model Structure. 
This general structure articulates the relationships between model components.  
The model components form the architectural framework for both models and are 
presented below.  Black arrows in Figure 3 show dependencies that occur in the current 
time period.  For instance, a stakeholder takes his action with knowledge of forecast.  The 
red, dotted arrows represent a temporal dependency.  For example, the red, dotted arrow 
emanating from Actions(t) to Forecast(t) means that Forecast(t=t+1) depends 
probabilistically on the Actions(t=t). 
• Forecast (t).  The decision-making process for the stakeholder begins with 
his forecast of what his opponent has recently done.  It can also account for the forecast 
of what the stakeholder believes his opponent will do in the future.  This forecast node 




uncertainty not explicitly represented by a chance node.  This is for conceptualization, 
but is not been implemented in either of the presented models. 
• Actions (t).  Each time step, each stakeholder will take an action from a set 
of actions (see Appendix A for full listing) based on his experience.  Experience, as it is 
defined here, is the result of the forecast (a function of past opponent decisions) and past 
realization of chance.  Given his experience, a decision maker will select the action that 
maximizes his expected utility.  The concept of experience implies learning.  However, it 
has not been implemented in either of the presented models. 
• Chance (t).  Chance refers to the uncertainty that is present in the system.  
A good forecast and the optimal action can sometimes lead to a poor outcome.  Chance is 
conditioned by the actions of both stakeholders.  Notice that there are two separate 
Chance(t) nodes.  This is because the uncertainty in the system differs for each 
stakeholder.   
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODELS 
 This section presents the conceptual development of the LH-IS model, 
implementation of the LH-IS model, and setup and implementation of the LH-Mughniyah 
model.  The conceptual model is the blueprint, and the implemented models are the result 
of the efforts completed during this thesis to fulfill that blueprint.  The gap between the 
conceptual model and the implemented models is pointed out during this section.  
Additionally, the LH-IS and LH-Mughniyah models are nearly identical in their basic 
structure.  So the conceptual model is developed only for the LH-IS model, but its 
concepts should be understood to apply to both models.   
1. Conceptual Model 
Keeping the general model framework in mind, the full version of the LH-IS 
model is developed.  As a reminder, the LH-IS model is developed specifically to answer 
this question: How would an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities affect LH decision 




This question is approached by developing the general model by adding a more 
realistic representation of the chance component in order to calibrate a model that 
plausibly represents the current decision-making system.  Once established, a “shock 
event” is introduced into the model to represent the occurrence of an Israeli strike.  This 
allows model users to gain insight into the change that occurs between the pre-strike 
system and the post-strike system.  Figure 4 shows the full influence diagram 
representation of the LH-IS model. 
 




a. Military Decision Component 
Military decisions require special treatment because of the nature of 
uncertainty that characterizes military action.  When an actor chooses to take a military 
action, there is a high degree of uncertainty relating to the nature and degree of effects 
that result.  Both the nature and degree of effect of a military action depend on whether or 
not the action was successful.  Success here is defined in terms of the extent to which a 
military action achieves desired ends, irrespective of whether the action was successfully 
executed.   
The problem for decision makers is that they have no way of knowing the 
true probability of success for a given operation.  They must rely upon intelligence and 
forecasts from military experts.  This is the Military Forecast(t) node, which provides a 
probabilistic forecast of success.  The forecast is imperfect, but it can be assumed there is 
some knowledge of the uncertainty of the forecast.  For instance, it may be known that in 
the past when a military operation was successful, success was predicted, say, 80% of the 
time.  Mathematically, this is: 
P(Forecast Success | Military Success will occur) = 0.90   (1) 
P(Forecast Success | Military Failure will occur) = 0.30  (2)   
 If a decision maker is able to make the probability assessments in (1) and 
(2), then using Bayes Theorem, the decision maker can make an inference regarding the 
true underlying probability, given the intelligence signal received.  Figure 5 shows a 
simplified diagram of this component with only one chance variable involved.  The full 
version of the model contains influences on multiple chance variables and the interest 
nodes (refer to figure 4).  It should be noted that this Military Forecast(t) component has 





Figure 5. Military Decision Component of the Conceptual Model. 
The diagram in Figure 5 is an influence diagram representation of the 
Military Decision Component.  Figure 6 shows the same component in its corresponding 
decision tree form.   
 




Reading from left to right: the Military Forecast depends probabilistically 
on the inferred prior probability of success, given forecast of success or failure, 
calculated using Bayes Theorem. The action is taken with full knowledge of the Military 
Forecast.  The probability of Lebanese Popular Opinion being favorable or unfavorable to 
LH depends on the action that LH takes. 
b. Diaspora Component 
The Lebanese Diaspora component contains Lebanese Diaspora, LH 
actions, and the Lebanese population.  According to Unified Combatant Command, the 
Lebanese Diaspora provides financial and political support to LH in two ways.  First, LH 
receives direct funding and political support through charitable organizations and pass-
through entities established for this purpose, as indicated by the solid black arrow from 
the Diaspora to LH actions.  Second, Diaspora support flows into the Lebanese 
population, who subsequently allocate a portion of those resources to political entities of 
their choice.  To the extent that the population supports and approves of LH’s actions, 
presumably a degree of that support will then be allocated to support LH operations.  This 
relationship is represented by the solid black arrow from Diasp Support(t) to LB Popular 
Support combined with the dotted red arrow from LB Popular Support to Actions(t).  To 
complete the component, the level of Diaspora support is conditioned by recent LH 
actions.  This is represented by the dashed red arrow from Actions(t) to Diasp Support(t). 
 
 




c. Uncertainty and Actions   
Actions by LH and Israel influence the way chance occurs in the system.  
There are two basic forms of chance represented in this system.  The first is endogenous.  
That is, uncertainty that is primarily inherent within and between the two primary 
stakeholders.   This uncertainty is represented by Popular Opinion Lebanon/Israel (t).  
This captures the fundamental link between these two decision-makers and their 
constituencies, on which they rely to maintain power and influence within either Lebanon 
or Israel.  The second type of uncertainty is exogenous and is meant to represent the 
uncertainty associated with how secondary stakeholders (e.g., U.S. and Iran) influence 
and are influenced by the decisions of LH and Israel.   
 




d. Uncertainty With Respect to LH   
Figure 8(a) shows how popular opinion in both Lebanon and Israel 
depends on actions taken by LH.  Additionally, LH takes future actions with information 
about the population stance in the previous time period.  Figure 8(a) also shows that U.S. 
and Iranian support depends on LH actions.  In the case of Iran, there is a mutual 
dependency.  Iran’s position (as read from its probability distribution) impacts how LH 
views its decisions.  In turn, how LH reacts to Iran’s position (by the actions they take) 
impacts the level of Iranian support. 
e. Uncertainty With Respect to Israel  
Figure 8(b) shows how popular opinion in Israel and Lebanon depend on 
actions taken by LH.  Additionally, Israel takes future actions with information about the 
population stance in the previous time period.  It also shows that Iranian and U.S. support 
depend on Israel’s actions.  In the case of the U.S., there is a mutual dependency.  As in 
LH’s case, the U.S. position impacts how Israel views its decisions and, in turn, U.S. 
support depends on the decisions Israel takes. 
f. Combined Uncertainty Model   
Combining the two uncertainty models adds a contextual dimension to the 
uncertainty.  The Israeli population at a given time has either a favorable or unfavorable 
view of its leadership.  If Israeli leaders take decisions that the population approves of, 
naturally that support will either improve or degrade.  But the population’s reading (and 
approval or disapproval) of Israeli decisions will surely be influenced by its view of LH’s 
actions as well.  For instance, if LH chooses to assassinate (and is successful) an Israeli 
leader and Israel’s action is to cooperate diplomatically with LH and its partners, it is 
likely that popular support for Israeli leadership will begin to decline.  The same dynamic 
exists with the external actors of Iran and the U.S.  If Israel chooses to cooperate 
diplomatically with LH, the U.S. might become very supportive of Israel.  But if LH is 





even if Israel became aggressive.  On the other hand, Israel becoming aggressive without 
provocation might induce the U.S. to become less supportive.  This dynamic is modeled 
mathematically as: 
 
 P(Strong Population Support | LH Action, IS Action)  (3) 
2. LH-IS Model Implementation 
Section 1 developed the conceptual version of the model.  This section presents 
the implementation of this model using the Genie v2.0 user interface. 
 
Figure 9. The LH-IS model implemented in the Genie v2.0 user interface. 
Figure 9 displays a screenshot of the LH-IS model implemented in the Genie v2.0 
user interface.  Using Genie, everything about the model can be changed to include 






There are limitations with the current Java application that runs the model, however.  
Appendix B is a user’s guide for STANA that describes how to setup and run the 
program.  It also points out model limitations. 
The model is set in Genie on a temporal plate.  This allows for the specification of 
“normal” (non-temporal) and temporal arcs.  Temporal plates in Genie do no support 
temporal influence diagrams.  However, specifying them using this Genie feature allows 
STANA to read the diagram as a temporal diagram and exploit that information.  The 
multi-agent version of the program supports only Genie diagrams set inside temporal 
plates.  The single player version (not addressed in this thesis, but included in the 
software) allows non-temporal diagrams. 
The following paragraphs discuss each component of the implemented model, 
primarily addressing areas where the implemented model appears different from the 
conceptual model. 
a. Decision Component   
Each stakeholder has one decision with two available choices: attack or 
cooperate.  STANA is not currently equipped to handle multiple decisions, or more than 
two choices within a decision node. 
LH and Israel decisions are taken sequentially.  In this case, LH moves 
first and then Israel.  The turn sequence is shown by the arrows between the decision 
nodes.  The black dotted arrow means that Israel takes its decision with knowledge of 
LH’s decision.  The light blue dotted arrow indicates that LH takes its decision in time 
t+1 knowing Israel’s decision at time t.  This sequence repeats for the number of time 
steps specified by the model user (time steps entered at the top center of the temporal 
plate). 
LH and Israel’s decision nodes influence a “results” node.  The results 
node has three outcomes: success, failure, and cooperation.  Success and failure outcomes 
represent probabilities associated with military action (e.g., the attack decision).  The 
third outcome is a probability associated with the cooperative action.  As modeled, if LH 




1 that the result is a cooperative action.  This, of course, does not necessarily have to be 
the case.  Users could certainly model the probability of success or failure for a 
diplomatic-type action. 
b. Uncertainty Component   
The uncertainty component in the implemented Genie diagram functions 
exactly as it was intended in the conceptual model.  In the conceptual model, there was a 
single chance node that represented the U.S., Iran, the Diaspora, Lebanese Population, 
and the Israeli Population.  In Figure 9, however, the popular opinion nodes have each 
been broken down into subcomponents.  For example, the Diaspora now has an opinion 
of LH and an opinion of Israel.  The final value of interest is the Diaspora’s opinion of 
LH, which is described as a function of its opinion of Israel, its opinion of LH, and how it 
felt about each stakeholder in the previous time period.  While this adds nodes to the 
model, the functionality of the nodes remains the same.  The additional break down of 
these nodes simply provides a more tractable way to enter data into Genie, since it 
doesn’t require the user to consider as many conditional dependencies.  Figure 10 shows 
a sample of each of the Diaspora opinion nodes.  Were these two nodes combined as they 
were in the conceptual model, all possible combinations would be enumerated in a single 












Figure 10. Example of probability table in Genie v2.0, using Diaspora as an 
example. 
c. Interests Component   
LH has a variety of interests, as has been discussed.  However, during 
modeling it became clear that some interests are terminal, meaning that they seem to be 
the most basic needs.  Other interests appear to be more accurately represented as 
objectives to achieve the terminal interests.  With this idea in mind, the primary 
stakeholders’ interests became a probability sub-model that attempts to capture these 
interdependencies.  Figure 11 is a replica of the original diagram, but highlights the 
interest components for the two primary stakeholders.  Note the interdependencies within 
a stakeholder’s set of interests and interdependencies between the two stakeholders.  For 





Figure 11. LH-IS Genie implementation focusing on stakeholder interests. 
3. LH-Mughniyah Model Setup 
The LH-Mughniyah model conforms to the conceptual model presented for the 
LH-IS model.  This section focuses on problem setup for the LH-Mughniyah model.  
This model differs from the LH-IS model mainly in the sense that it seeks an 
understanding of conditions that would induce a given decision, where the LH-IS model 




that the the LH Mughniyah model is developed to gain insight on this question:  Under 
what conditions would LH retaliate for the death of Imad Mughniyah? 
a. Background   
Imad Mughniyah, a leading terror operative of LH through the 1980s and 
1990s, was assassinated in February 2008.  Though it has not been confirmed, LH 
believes this assassination was conducted by Israeli operatives working in Damascus 
where the assassination occurred.  LH leadership has vowed revenge for this 
assassination, but two years have passed and still no retaliation attempt has occurred.  So, 
the question for this model is centered on gaining insights as to why the avowed 
retaliation attempt has not occurred, which may shed light on the circumstances that 
would prompt LH to fulfill its promise. 
  To analyze this question fully, it is first necessary to define exactly what is 
meant by ‘retaliation’ and what kind of actions should be perceived as retaliation.  
Retaliation, according to Merriam-Webster, is to return like for like; especially, to get 
revenge.  To break this down further in the context of LH’s political situation, the 
following assumptions are made as to what constitutes retaliation: 
• Like-for-like.  This implies that whatever potential retaliatory act LH 
takes, it must be perceived to atone for the injury inflicted on LH as a result of 
Mughniyah’s assassination.  The act itself could be of almost any nature (i.e., 
assassination of Israeli leader, high acts of international terror, etc.).  The importance 
though is that the act must be able to be interpreted by both the Israelis and the Lebanese 
as having “settled the score.”  This point distinguishes retaliation from general armed 
aggression that is typical of relations between LH and Israel  
• Revenge.  Revenge implies that the relevant observers within Lebanon and 
Israel must believe LH perpetrated the attack.  The fact that an Israeli leader is 
assassinated or an Israeli high value target is attacked does not necessarily constitute 
revenge by LH, particularly if it is determined conclusively that LH is not the perpetrator 




that LH either directly affected the attack or masterminded and instigated its execution.  
This does not mean that LH agents actually have to carry out the attack.  It could 
certainly be executed by a proxy terror group or individual acting under LH direction, 
support, financing, etc. 
Having established what it means to retaliate, it is necessary next to define 
LH’s interests in the context of this question.  Earlier in this chapter, a series of interests 
were defined that reflected LH’s strategic interests.  The LH Mughniyah model, however, 
is narrower in scope.  As a result, LH interests are also defined more narrowly to be 
consistent with model context.  Interests for this model are defined as: 
• Retaliating for Mughniyah’s Assassination.  LH has vowed to take 
revenge for Mughniyah’s assassination.  They have an interest in keeping this promise. 
• Relevance as Lebanon’s Resistance Force.  LH must remain relevant as 
the Lebanese resistance force against Israel.  If LH becomes irrelevant, it loses support 
for an independent militia, may become marginalized as a political organization, and 
could potentially lose its position as the voice of the Lebanese Shia. 
• Political Influence inside Lebanon.  LH is not the only organization inside 
Lebanon that advocates on behalf of Shia or anti-Western sentiments, and it is especially 
not the only organization that advocates on behalf of the Lebanese population in general.  
However, it has become the official resistance force, largely due to the political clout that 
it has been able to obtain over the past few decades.  LH is currently the leader of the pro-
Syrian political faction and is considered the voice of opposition to Israel and the West.  
Should LH be marginalized as a political organization, it loses the ability to achieve its 
more strategic objectives because of lack of popular support.  So it is in LH’s interest to 
seek political influence within the Lebanese political process to serve the Shia and anti-
Western causes. 
• External Support.  LH currently benefits from strong support outside of 
Lebanon via Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese diaspora.  LH’s actions will determine the 




external supporters, it will become more and more likely that LH could become less 
relevant as Lebanon’s resistance force and will lose domestic political influence within 
Lebanon.  So it is in LH’s interests to maintain strong relationships with these external 
actors and organizations. 
Considering LH’s political interests, there are a number of reasons why 
LH would desire and benefit from fulfilling its promise of revenge for Mughniyah’s 
death.  There are also many reasons why delay or abstention would make sense.  The next 
section addresses the reasons for and against a retaliatory attack, in each case relating 
these reasons to LH’s domestic political interests. 
b. Reasons LH Might Decide to Retaliate 
 LH has vowed and clearly desires to retaliate in-kind for Mughniyah’s 
death.  Below are believed to be the reasons they desire to do so.  It should be noted that 
these desires are likely to increase or decrease based on how secure LH feels in its base 
of support.  It may be more likely to want to show strength and resolve if it feels it is 
being viewed as weak, which could be measured by an eroding base of support.  
Conversely, if LH’s support base is growing, it is likely that LH would not feel 
compelled to demonstrate strength and resolve sensing that peace and stability are more 
highly valued. 
• Demonstration of strength.  Since it is generally agreed within the Shia 
population (and perhaps Lebanon in general) that Israel assassinated a high-level LH 
operative, no response by LH might be perceived as weakness.  Weakness in that LH 
could be afraid to provoke Israel or weakness in the sense that it lacks the capability to 
respond.  This could possibly result in a lack of faith in LH as an organization, making 
them seem less relevant as a resistance force, reduce their political influence, and reduce 
external support. 
• Demonstration of Resolve.  Since LH leaders have vowed to respond, they 
may lose credibility by not doing what they have vowed to do.  This imposes a cost to LH 




c. Reasons LH Might Consider Delaying or Cancelling Retaliation 
LH faces a number of risks when considering a retaliatory attack against 
Israel.  Since retaliation implies a response-in-kind type of action, the response would 
surely be perceived as a terror-related action.  This means that a retaliatory attack taken 
by LH would entail both internal and external political risks.  These risks form the 
reasons that LH may desire to delay retaliation, or forego it altogether. 
• Internal Political Risk 
1) Domestic Political Influence.  As stated above, LH may be viewed as 
weak by not retaliating.  On the other hand, resorting to terror runs the risk of reducing 
political support for LH within Lebanon, especially among non-Shia. 
2) Israeli Retaliation.  Conducting acts of terror would surely increase 
international support for an aggressive response by Israel, who could potentially use the 
political cover to occupy parts of Southern Lebanon.  At best LH could receive internal 
pressure to disarm and forfeit political influence.  At worst, a severe Israeli response 
could destabilize LH’s position in Lebanon or even threaten its survival. 
3) Lack of Opportunity.  The opportunity for an appropriate respond-in-kind 
retaliation just may not have occurred to this point.  Israel has a robust intelligence 
service that is not easily circumvented.  Any retaliation attempt inside Israel would 
require an opportunity where, with a carefully planned operation, success would almost 
be assured.  Were LH to attempt to retaliate, fail, and be implicated for the attempt, it 
could be disastrously embarrassing.  LH would likely lose credibility, appear 
incompetent, and undermine its position in Lebanon.   
• External Political Risk 
1) Iran.  Iran has shown over the past two decades the ability to limit LH 
desires to conduct terror attacks.  At present, Iran is under tremendous pressure from the 
international community to discontinue its nuclear program.  Because of the international 




the potential for the international community to become supportive of pre-emptive Israeli 
action against Iran or, worse for Iran, invite direct military confrontation with the U.S.  If 
this is the case, Iran may attempt to constrain LH from using terror and violence to 
achieve any ends, including a retaliatory terror-type attack against Israel. 
2) Syria.  Syria also has interests in this matter for similar reasons.  Any LH 
terror action that justified Israeli retaliation means that Syria becomes a potential pre-
emption target for Israel.  A severe provocation by LH could lead to simultaneous attacks 
against Iran to reduce their nuclear capabilities and pre-emptive strikes against Syria to 
prevent them from entering a conflict.  Additionally, a confrontation with Israel runs a 
high risk that Syria remains isolated in the international community, as they are now.  As 
such, Syria has good reasons to discourage LH from resorting to terror-type actions. 
3) Diaspora.  The Diaspora’s opinion of LH could be degraded if LH were 
perceived internationally to have induced a backlash against the Lebanese population (by 
the war and strife that could follow).  On the other hand, there are elements of the 
Diaspora that would likely punish LH for being weak in the face of Israel, by not seeking 
the revenge that LH has promised. 
For LH to retaliate then, they must weigh the value of the decisions (as 
judged by its impact to their interests) against perceived internal and external risk.  
Essentially, LH must balance their desire for retaliation (strength and resolve) against the 
risks (internal and external) and make a calculation as to whether or not it serves its 
interests.  Below are two hypothetical cases believed to mark the boundaries of the 
decision space. 
d. Boundary Cases 
  LH must balance the cost of inaction against the cost of attacking.  In 
general, the cost of waiting results from the possible erosion of support that could occur 
over time if LH is perceived too weak to attack Israel or too irresolute.  On the other 
hand, LH faces internal and external risks should it decide to carry out an attack.  Internal 




Israel, what Israel will do in response, and whether LH has an opportunity to execute the 
attack successfully.  External risks arise from the level of support LH can expect to 
receive from regional actors such as Iran and Syria, how the Diaspora’s support could be 
affected, and the extent to which the U.S. could become involved. 
(1) Attack Case.  In this case, LH perceives the cost of 
attacking as very low relative to the cost of waiting. 
• Iran and Syria support LH action.  Iran and Syria (for any number 
of reasons) have given LH a blank check to operate against Israel as they see fit.  This 
means that LH feels they can count on political and military cover provided by these 
actors. 
• Diaspora strongly supportive of LH, strongly opposed to Israel.  
International support is not favorable to Israel (perhaps due to issues related to 
Palestinians).  The diaspora seems to increase its support to LH when LH takes 
aggressive action against Israel. 
• U.S. only passively supportive of Israel.  LH believes the U.S. has 
distanced itself somewhat from Israel and that because of potential direct conflict with 
Iran, the U.S. will not underwrite a full-scale military response by Israel.  LH knows 
Israel is likely to respond, but believes they will be constrained in that response. 
• Domestic Political Influence.  Due to perceived inaction by LH, 
Lebanese could begin to see LH as failing to show strength against Israel.  LH could 
sense they are losing their status as Lebanon’s resistance and could come under fire for 
maintaining an independent militia, such as was the case preceding the 30-day war of 
2006.  LH could feel compelled to consolidate its base of support by showing strength 
against Israel or by provoking it. 
• Israeli Retaliation.  LH judges this risk as acceptable since the U.S. 
does not seem poised to intervene and both Iran and Syria are judged to be prepared to 




• Opportunity.  An opportunity presents itself that will allow LH to 
retaliate while maintaining plausible deniability in the investigations that would surely 
follow.  Though plausible deniability exists, observers on the ground in Israel and 
Lebanon will be reasonably sure that LH was behind the attack.  LH will be able to exact 
revenge but with acceptable risk. 
In the ‘Attack’ case, LH could demonstrate strength and resolve 
while improving their credibility as a resistance force, strengthening their political 
position, and maintaining strong ties with their external supporters.  The ‘Wait’ case 
presents the theoretical worst case scenario for an LH retaliatory action. 
(2) Wait Case.  In this case, LH perceives the cost of attacking 
to outweigh the cost of waiting. 
• Iran and Syria opposed to LH terror actions.  Iran does not want to 
be seen as a sponsor of terrorist activity since it is within striking distance of achieving its 
nuclear ambitions.  Syria is not interested in sparking a regional war, preferring to pursue 
economic engagement with the U.S. and the West.  Both actors strongly advocate against 
LH aggression, and may even be inclined to publicly condemn LH’s use of terror. 
• Diaspora values peace and stability.  While the diaspora remains 
supportive of LH and Lebanon in general, LH judges that any act that jeopardized peace 
and stability within Lebanon would be punished by a lessening of diaspora support.  LH 
may still feel it can count on hard-line supporters, but generally view the diaspora as 
valuing peace in Lebanon over revenge against Israel. 
• U.S. actively supporting Israel.  The U.S. and Israel tied closely 
together and LH judges that any provocation would result in the U.S. providing as much 




• Domestic Political Influence.  LH enjoys the benefit of broad 
popular support and judge that support is based on continued stability.  LH judges that 
any action that changed the current state would result in a popular backlash that would 
undermine its political influence. 
• Israeli Retaliation.  Without political and military cover from Iran 
and Syria, and given the U.S. is not likely to constrain Israel, LH expects a full-scale 
conventional military response from Israel, which might even threaten LH’s survival. 
• Opportunity.  LH cannot be sure that they can successfully execute 
a terror attack without being condemned by the international community.  Since they do 
not have support of Iran and Syria and it seems that international opinion and opinion 
within Lebanon both strongly favor continued peace and stability.  If LH were to be 
implicated as an instigator of conflict, they could risk their current political position 
within Lebanon. 
This case is a theoretical worst case for a retaliatory attack.  For 
one, LH has a lessened need to show strength and resolve because they enjoy broad 
support and aggression might seem too risky.  Externally, the atmosphere does not seem 
to give LH reasonably assurance that Israel’s response would be constrained, and they 
risk involving their external supporters in direct conflict with the U.S. 
4. LH-Mughniyah Model Implementation 
The last section developed the conceptual framework necessary to model the LH 
Mughniyah question.  The two cases at the end of the last section marked the extremes of 
the scenario space.  The section that follows takes these ideas and builds a model to allow 
the analyst to vary the parameters and explore the space between these extremes to help 
gain insights into Lebanese decision making and the conditions that would induce LH 





Figure 12. LH-Mughniyah model implemented in Genie v2.0. 
 The LH-Mughniyah model shares a nearly identical structure to the LH-IS model 
presented earlier.  There are, however, some differences and they are addressed in the 
following section.  The chance variables of the Diaspora, Lebanese population, Israeli 
population, and the external actors all behave the same as in the previous model, so they 
will not be revisited. 
a. Decision Component 
  The decision setup is slightly different in this model.  This model is 




chance node called ‘Retaliate?’.  This node has three outcomes:  ‘Succeed’, ‘Fail’, or ‘No 
Attempt’.  Success here is defined narrowly.  In this context, it means they succeeded in a 
manner where the Lebanon and Israel know LH did it, but they maintain a degree of 
plausible deniability (to the international community) in order to keep the likelihood of a 
full-scale Israeli response relatively constrained.  Failure here means that LH has failed 
and they are caught and are known to have failed.  Since obvious failure might call into 
question LH’s competence and credibility, it may have a cost that is worth exploring.  
Finally, the third outcome is ‘No Attempt’.  This outcome is the result of a decision to 
wait, or the result of an attempt that has failed but the public is unaware of the failure.   
Israel’s decision in this case is more abstract.  Given LH’s decision, Israel 
has a choice to approach its response aggressively or passively.  Aggressive response is 
meant to include a range of violence from limited military response to full-scale military 
response.  A passive response is generally intended to mean something less than overt 
military action.  However, it does not preclude lower level border skirmishes or covert 
operations aimed specifically at LH operatives or leaders.  The intent with the passive 
response is that the Israelis and Lebanese would view Israel’s response as intentionally 
constrained. 
An ‘Opportunity’ chance node has also been introduced into the model.  
The intent of this node is to consider whether LH could be induced into an attack if a 
good opportunity arose.  In reality, the opportunity would be read by LH before the 
decision was taken.  This component should use a forecast component similar to that 
discussed earlier in the LH-IS model.  However, for the same reason it was not 
implemented in that model, it is not implemented here either.  This is an admitted 
shortfall of the model as it currently stands.  
b. Interests Component   
This model has a narrower scope than the LH-IS model and the interest 
structure has been narrowed accordingly.  As Figure 12 shows, LH and Israel each have 




meaning as they did in the LH-IS model.  However, several interest variables have been 
removed.  For LH, the following nodes are removed: Militia, Resistance Status, and 
Protecting Shia.  It is judged that LH’s militia and its ability to protect the Shia are not at 
stake in consideration of a retaliation strike.  However, resistance status may still be at 
stake.  But, since this model has a simpler structure, this model factors resistance status 
into the ‘Relevance and Political Influence’ interest node.  In the case of Israel, the only 
interest variable that is removed is the regional stability node.  Again, it is judged that 


















IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter displays results from one of the models developed in Chapter III.  
Due to the similarity between the two model structures, only the LH-IS model results are 
displayed in this chapter.  It should be noted, however, that the approach for using the 
LH-Mughniyah model will be exactly the same.  The main purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how these models can be used to help users gain insight into the subject 
questions and similar stakeholder analysis questions.   
The approach taken is to calibrate the LH-IS model by developing a plausible 
“Base Case,” which is intended to reflect the current state of the system as accurately as 
possible.  The base case is developed under the assumption that both LH and Israel will 
continue to be non-aggressive now and into the future.  Once the base case is established, 
scenarios are considered that induce one or both of the stakeholders to choose some 
sequence of actions, at least one of which includes an aggressive act.  As with many 
modeling approaches, the value of what is presented here does not lie in the strict 
interpretation of the numerical output nor does it lie in the projected sequence of 
decisions.  The real value lies in the process of developing the model and defining and 
understanding the relationships between variables that lead to the changes in output from 
one scenario to the next.  To demonstrate this, the base case is modified to show two 
simple scenarios.  The analysis of these two scenarios, in conjunction with the base case 
focuses on the different inputs and any differences in outputs that result.  This thesis does 
not attempt an exhaustive enumeration of all possible combinations of model parameters, 
though this is a possibility for future work.  Additionally, all data used to arrive at these 
results is notional and based on this author’s best guess based on historical and 
geopolitical analysis and time spent talking to Unified Combatant Command subject 
matter experts.  The data does not reflect the opinions of Unified Combatant Command, 




 STANA is general enough to handle any competitive decision-making problem 
(subject to model limitations), simply by the way the user constructs the model in the 
Genie v2.0 user interface.  The last section of this chapter is dedicated to discussing the 
capabilities and limitations of the models presented. 
 All scenarios are run for five time steps, though STANA is capable of longer 
time horizons.  Since these models represent sequential games, it should be noted that the 
results will differ should the turn order be reversed.  There appears to be a second 
mover’s advantage to this model, as will be seen in the higher expected utilities for the 
second player in each case.  Finally, where sensitivity analysis is concerned, it is 
conducted from the point of view of LH only, though the model has the flexibility to 
allow the user to select which player is the focus of sensitivity analysis. 
B. LH-IS RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 The first scenario is the “base case.”  This is the author’s best rendition of the 
current situation between these two stakeholders.  Figure 13(a) and 13(b) shows model 
output for the base case.  Figure 13(a) shows output when LH is first mover and 13(b) is 
the output when Israel is the first mover.   
 





Figure 13(b). Eclipse output, Israel first mover. 
 In an infinite horizon game where LH moves first, LH always chooses 
cooperation over conflict.  As the artificial timeline imposed by this model nears, the 
dynamics change and Israel decides to make a switch to conflict since it will not pay the 
penalty for provocation (this game has a 1-step temporal delay, the cost of conflict would 
not show up until t=5).  Ignoring end of game effects, however, the base case is calibrated 
to ensure both players have reason to be constrained from conflict.  The two cases that 
follow will be adaptations of this base case. 
 Also notice in Figure 13(b) that when Israel moves first, conflict will ensue.  This 
also results from the end of game effect.  The way the model is constructed, it is in LH’s 
best interest to have the Lebanese have a hostile opinion of Israel.  If LH moves last, it 
will find the sequence that leads Israel to attacking until the last time period, where LH 
will then switch to diplomacy gaining itself a repeatedly hostile Israel and then taking a 
sudden switch to being the “nice guy” in the last time period. 
 From running the base case with alternating first movers, it can be seen that there 
is a distinct second mover’s advantage to this model.  This is apparent from the expected 
utility differences, but also makes intuitive sense when considering model logic.  Since 
backward induction solves these games, the second mover has the first choice due to the 




implemented with first order temporal dependency means that the last two periods of the 
game may behave differently than the rest.  This is important to keep in mind when 
reading the output of these models. 
 
Figure 14. Base Case Tornado Diagram. 
 STANA is also equipped with the ability to automatically generate sensitivity 
analysis data.  Essentially, it varies the probability tables between a “low” value and a 
“high” value.  The low and high values are designated by the user when running the 
program.  The user selects a number between 0 and 1 and the first outcome in each node 
is varied by this amount (the program ensures number remain between 0 and 1, regardless 
of what the user inputs).  This automation provides the user the ability to quickly get a 
sense of which variables are driving the model (as in Figure 14), but has some 
limitations.  When the program adjusts the variables, it does not account for the direction.  




the case of “IS Opin LH,” for instance, when the program shifts the value to its “low” 
estimate, it is actually forcing Lebanon’s opinion of Israel lower, which is beneficial for 
LH’s utility value.  So, in this case, the “low” parameter estimate gives a higher final 
utility, thus the blue bar appears above the red.  There is also a limitation that resides in 
the fact that some probabilities are already near 0 or 1.  So, in some cases, varying a 
parameter up or down may seem to have very little effect.  From Figure 14, it is difficult 
to tell which variables are negligible from those that sit on the boundary near 0 or 1.  
Usually, when the parameter starts near 0 or 1, its bar will lie almost completely to one 
side of the baseline. 
 The sensitivity analysis of the base case, from LH’s point of view, shows that 
LH’s interests are the key drivers of the model.  This is not surprising, but should be held 
as a reminder to users that these variables must be carefully considered when employing 
the model.  It is also clear that regional actors, the Diaspora, and Lebanese opinion 
significantly influence LH’s utility value.  Finally, LH’s value appears to be somewhat 
sensitive to Israel’s actions and its interests.  Of course, as the probability tables are 
adjusted, many of these effects will change.  However, in most cases, it is likely that the 
interests of the player in question will always be at or near the top of the tornado diagram. 
1. Scenario 1: High Risk, High Reward 
a. Setup 
  Adjusting from the base case, the first scenario probes the hypothetical 
case where the Lebanese and the Lebanese Diaspora reward LH for aggression if it 
succeeds and punishes it severely if it fails.  The intent of this case is to consider what 
impact, if any, does LH’s military capability (e.g., its success rate) have on its decision 
whether or not to be aggressive.  Some other interesting possibilities for this case might 
be whether either Iran or the U.S., as external actors, will play a more significant role in 





  Figure 15(a) and 15(b) shows a total of four cases under this scenario.  
The case displayed in Figure 15(a) is the case where LH has a high risk-high reward of 
attacking AND their probability of success is very high.  The diagram on the left has LH 
as first mover, and on the right has Israel as first mover.  Figure 15(b) shows the same 
scenario, except LH’s probability of success is very low. 
 
Figure 15(a). High Risk-High Reward, High Probability of Success for LH. 
  When LH has a high probability of success, they appear very prone to 
attacking Israel.  If LH moves first, it can successfully provoke Israel into aggression and 
maintain a state of conflict.  Again, this shows the fact that the model is setup to reward 
LH for provoking Israel into a state of hostility.  On the other hand, if Israel moves first, 
Israel attempts cooperation and resists provocation, at least for a while.  It is not entirely 
clear why Israel is less inclined to be provoked into conflict when it moves first, 
however, it is quite possible that they do not enjoy the political benefits of being the 





Figure 15(b). High Risk-High Reward, Low Probability of Success for LH. 
  When LH’s probability of success is low, they seem less inclined to 
provoke when they are first movers (though this does not hold throughout).  When Israel 
moves first, it again appears that they have no interest in being the instigators of conflict, 
but can be induced by LH aggression.  It is likely that the U.S. is constraining Israel from 
instigating, but the Israeli population overrides this constraint once LH attacks, though it 




c.  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Figure 16. High Risk-High Reward, low probability of success for LH. 
  The first four variables remain ordered the same.  Below that, there is 
some reordering that has occurred.  In the base case, how the Diaspora and the Lebanese 
felt about Israel was consequential.  In this case, however, these opinions were fixed at 
extreme values (near the 0, 1 boundaries) and so changing them has a much smaller effect 
on the model.  The same can be seen with “LH Results.”  The range has narrowed 
because the probabilities were fixed near the boundaries.  Generally speaking, though, the 




2. Scenario 2: Israeli Strike on Iran 
a. Setup 
  The final scenario for analysis explores the possibility of a shock to the 
system.  In this scenario, Israel is set up to conduct a strike against Iran in the first time 
period.  All probability tables are updated for Regional Actors (of which Iran is the main 
consideration) and opinions of the Lebanese and their Diaspora to reflect a hostile 
attitude toward Israel and to punish LH for engaging in diplomacy if Israel strikes Iran.  
This effect lasts until time period 2, when the scenario returns to normal.  To force 
Israel’s decision in the first time period, a deterministic node is added called ‘Strike Iran’.  
‘Strike Iran’ is set to ‘yes’ for the first time period and switches to ‘no’ in the second time 
period and remains that way throughout the game.  Figure 17 shows the updated diagram. 
 






Figure 18. Output for Israel Strikes Iran nuclear facilities. 
The scenarios represented by the above figures show one way in which a 
shock can be introduced into the system.  The shock in this case was an Israeli strike 
against Iran and was set to occur in the first time period.  However, this need not be the 
case.  By changing the temporal order of the shock node, it could be introduced at any 
point in the scenario.  The self-dependency is used to make the event a one-time 
occurrence.  Without this self-dependency, the shock would repeat in every time period 
and the behavior resulting from the event would occur in perpetuity.  This is usually not 
desired, though in some cases it may be. 
As might be expected, LH becomes militant under this scenario from the 
very beginning (when the shock is introduced).  Interestingly, if Israel conducts the first 
move, LH tends to maintain its aggression for a longer period of time.  In either case, 




c.  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Figure 19.  Tornado Diagram for Israeli strike against Iran. 
  Overall, the key drivers of the model remain the same.  There are some 
lower level changes, however.  For one, Israel’s interest of “Secure Existence” makes the 
list (meaning it has at least some effect on the outcome of LH’s value).  This was not true 
in the last case.  Additionally, Israel’s interest of “Regional Stability” has moved up the 
list relative to several other variables.  “IS Results” has also overtaken “LH Results.”  
One interpretation of these facts may lie in the fact that LH’s decisions have become 
almost pre-determined by the way the model was formulated.  That is, LH is so 
incentivized to attack that it does not change its decision easily, so the model is relatively 
less sensitive to these variables.  On the other hand, Israel’s decision making may not be 
as clear cut.  Israel’s probability of success of an attack, for instance, could drive its 





C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
1.  Insights From the Model 
 It is apparent from this analysis that a deep understanding of stakeholder interests 
is necessary to model the system correctly.  In the case of LH, ‘Relevance and Influence’ 
dominates all other factors, at least as the author has ascribed this problem.  In the case of 
Israel, a secure existence is the dominant driver (this analysis was not shown).  The 
interests and their relative influence was derived mostly from discussions with Unified 
Combatant Command personnel, however, at the time those discussions occurred, the 
need for a better understanding of the interrelationships between the interests of LH and 
Israel was not as clear.  One of the weaker parts of the model as it is presented is an 
admitted lack of clarity on these interdependencies.  Consequently, the author developed 
these relationships based on open-source research, but believes it falls short in many 
ways.  Future research efforts should be focused on this area and any users of this model 
should keep this in mind. 
 With that said, some general insights can be drawn from this model: 
• Political power and influence for both LH and Israeli leadership seems to 
be largely derived from defining the other as the aggressor.  In every case run (those 
presented and those not), it seems that each has an interest in leading its own public 
toward a hostile view of its adversary.  This means that each may need the other as a 
“bogeyman” to maintain the political status quo.  This fact is very intriguing—though not 
completely surprising—and future iterations of the model could attempt to explore how 
this cycle can be broken. 
• The Diaspora does seem to matter if one assumes, as was the case here, 
that LH has a legitimate interest in maintaining its support.  The Diaspora and Lebanese 
popular opinion seem to have nearly identical effects on the system, though it is possible 
that the magnitude of the Diaspora’s influence is overstated in this analysis.  This 
analysis assumes independence between the Lebanese population and the Diaspora, but 
this is not likely to be the case.  This means the Diaspora is at least as potent as the 




• Without the involvement of Iran (and perhaps Syria) and the U.S., it is 
possible that LH and Israel would have some room to cooperate.  Both Israel and LH 
receive significant support from these actors and have interests in maintaining good 
relations with them.  This support provides the means for each to maintain power and 
influence (in the case of Israel, the means for the incumbent party to maintain power).  As 
such, in some sense, they seem incentivized to ensure they have an adversary to justify 
the “need” to maintain these supply lines (these resources are likely used for more than 
defending against their enemies).  In defining this model, it became apparent that without 
these resource incentives, the cost of provocation seems roughly balanced with the costs 
of maintaining peace and stability for each of these stakeholders.  The main counterpoint 
is this:  Israel may fear too much influence by LH in Lebanon and, on the other hand, LH 
may need a hostile Israel for its relevance. 
2. Discussion of the Model 
a. Model Capabilities 
  This model was developed in an effort to solve decision systems involving 
two or more stakeholders.  As mentioned in Chapter III, STANA is a application that 
leverages the efficient combinatorics algorithms of Genie v2.0, the flexibility of Java, and 
uses Excel to manage inputs and outputs.  A user’s guide for running the model is 
provided in Appendix C.  Current capabilities of this model are: 
• Solves 1-player games with an arbitrary number of choices within a single 
decision node.  Model tested up to 15 time steps. 
• In 1-player mode, can use Additive Linear Utility (ALU) to account for 
short-term goals of the decision maker. 
• Solve 2-player games where there are exactly two decision nodes with two 
choices in each node.  Model tested up to 12 time steps. 
• For both 1 and 2-player games, provides automated, single-variable 




• For both 1 and 2-player games, terminal conditions can be set to stop the 
model upon reaching the terminal decision.  However, the model currently does not allow 
specification of a terminal condition specific to a certain player. 
• Use of the Genie interface to construct the models allows the user an easy-
to-use and intuitive mechanism for constructing a wide range of decision scenarios.  The 
Java implementation is scalable, with exception to the limitations mentioned herein. 
• Allows for inputting model arguments from the command line or from an 
Excel spreadsheet. 
b. Model Limitations 
  This model has significant limitations.  The known limitations of this 
model are: 
• Handles only two decision nodes with only two choices each. 
• There is no ALU capability installed for the 2-player version. 
• Current implementation does not allow for the realization of chance 
variables feeding into decision variables.  This precludes use of common—and very 
important—decision analysis techniques such as Bayesian updating and use of forecasts 
(i.e., party problem). 
• The underlying transition matrix is stationary.  This means that the system 
does not evolve or adapt over time.  This precludes exploring the effects of time decay, 
such as decreasing relevance over time.  It may be possible to develop functions that 
update the relationships between variables and the probability distributions of the 
variables.  This was not attempted in this research effort. 
• In the 2-player version, both players operate from the same reading of the 
chance model.  In reality, different actors interpret situations differently.  The concept of 





A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This thesis set out to develop a decision support methodology to analyze decision-
making logic of stakeholders in a well-defined political system.  The study, at the request 
of Unified Combatant Command, used Lebanese Hezbollah as the case study for analysis.  
The goal, however, from the outset was the development of the methodology and 
decision support tool that could be generalized to aid decision analysis of any similar 
system of stakeholders.  The methodology and decision support tool presented in this 
thesis represents the first step toward achieving that goal. 
The first step in any such analysis is to define the system by conducting the 
necessary historical review to understand the components of the system.  With the 
research questions driving this effort, this thesis conducts a thorough review of the 
region’s history to develop a robust understanding of who should be considered the key 
stakeholders—those whose decisions must be fully accounted for.  Next, it was necessary 
to understand each stakeholder’s point of view and situation context in order to inform 
the development of what each stakeholder wants and what instruments it has available to 
achieve those interests.  These form the “Interests” and “Actions” components of the 
system.  Finally, as with any important decision-making system, there is uncertainty that 
must be accounted for.  The historical review provides the necessary information to 
inform the analyst how to plausibly construct the necessary probability models. 
Once the over-arching system is understood—having well-defined stakeholders, 
their interests, their actions, and the structure of chance—the model framework is 
developed around the research questions.  In this thesis, the model framework was 
developed by constructing an influence diagram representation of the system to provide a 
transparent mechanism by which to specify relationships between stakeholders, their 






conceptualize the model in its fullest form, seeking the highest degree of resolution while 
ensuring the model can be represented transparently and understood by those who would 
use it. 
 Having conceptualized and represented the model, this thesis then attempts to 
implement the conceptual model as accurately as possible.  In this case, notional data is 
used based on the author’s interpretation of facts.  However, the significant results will 
come when valid data from subject matter experts informs the model.  To ensure this is 
possible, the model is designed to provide an easy-to-use interface, allowing analysts to 
manipulate the data—and even the structure of the model—to run any number of 
scenarios with data as they see fit.  The point here is that this research does not seek a 
specific prescription of what LH would do under given circumstances, but provides the 
means by which informed analysts can investigate these relationships. 
 Finally, this thesis presents three scenarios using one of the two models 
developed.  The purpose of analysis here is to demonstrate use of the methodology and 
decision support tool.  Again, the focus is not on the interpretation of results to prescribe 
LH’s decision logic, but to demonstrate, using notional data, some ways in which the 
models and methodology can be used.  Additionally, this thesis demonstrates the model’s 
capability to quickly and easily conduct sensitivity analysis on all model variables.  It 
was felt this capability would be critical due to the large number of probability estimates 
that inform the model and the inherent uncertainty surrounding those estimates. 
B.  SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS 
 The research conducted in this thesis revealed a number of interesting insights 
that are worth noting.  They have been categorized and are presented below.  It should be 
noted that any inferences regarding the stakeholders of this analysis are the opinions of 
the author alone and are based on a combination of the historical review, specification of 




1. LH Decision Making 
• LH seems to have an incentive to attain its objectives politically, but LH’s 
political base seems to be defined in terms of its opposition to Israel.  As such, it is likely 
that LH will continue to antagonize Israel enough to ensure its base stays unified. 
• Regarding Lebanese opinion outside of its base, it seems that LH should 
desire tacit support or at least general indifference.  Should a significant portion of 
Lebanese reject LH outright, LH’s survival may become tenuous.  Therefore, LH seems 
bound to behave in a manner short of provoking a full Israeli response. 
• If the observations above are valid, the following consequences may be in 
order: 
o Demonstrated constraint by Israel could, over the longer term, 
allow for the development of some distance between LH’s base and the Lebanese 
population at large.  Or, at a minimum, it could prevent LH from expanding support 
beyond its Shi’a, pro-Syrian base. 
o LH’s militia may be the organization’s center of gravity by 
providing it the instrument of power necessary to impose its will, even if the general 
Lebanese population were to consider rejecting LH.  
• LH derives financial support and support in the court of international 
opinion via the Lebanese Diaspora.  However, it seems quite possible that there exist 
significant correlations between Diaspora support and Lebanese Popular Opinion.  That 
is, there is a component of Diaspora support that may be allocated by the Lebanese 
Population and there may be a component that is allocated independently of the Lebanese 
population.  It is unknown to the author the extent or magnitude of each of these 
components.  This thesis assumes they are independent and of roughly the same order of 
magnitude, but the author suspects this may not be the case.  A better understanding of 
Diaspora’s role in allocating power and resources to Lebanese political factions would 




• The U.S. and Iran seem to serve similar roles in this system.  That is, the 
U.S. and Iran are involved in a global confrontation and both LH and Israel are actors in 
this game.  Whether or not LH and Israel serve as proxy mechanisms for these powers in 
not clear to the author.  However, in the context of this larger conflict, LH and Israel each 
seem to have incentives to maintain hostile dispositions, while, at the same time, the U.S. 
and Iran seem to constrain Israel and LH from engaging in full-scale war.  An interesting 
application of this model might be to run a U.S.-Iran scenario to develop a better 
understanding of the roles these actors should play in the LH-IS game. 
2. Modeling and Implementation 
• Begin with the research question to be answered, as this will determine the 
scope and nature of the system to be modeled. 
• The most critical element in understanding a system of stakeholders is to 
define and understand what it is that each actor wants (i.e., their interests).  Stakeholder 
interests drive the decision-making logic and can be complex, interdependent models in 
their own right.  The process of modeling helps reveal the structure of these relationships. 
• The model is extremely sensitive to stakeholder interests.  The focus of 
research and understanding should initially focus on ensuring valid estimates of these 
parameters. 
• The model is also very sensitive to changes in variables of higher temporal 
order.  In effect, when a variable of high temporal order is adjusted, all of its predecessors 
(direct and indirect) are changed.  This is because the value of a chance node depends 
probabilistically on the distributions of all of its predecessors.  Thus, a chance variable 
adjusted in the final time period has a huge impact on the final outcome when compared 
the same adjustment to the same variable in a previous time period. 
• When modeling chance variables, it is advisable that a single variable 





predecessors, the process of estimating probabilities becomes nearly impossible.  
However, any chance node can be broken down into components to make the conditional 
probabilities easier to estimate. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
 There is significant potential for further development of the work performed for 
this thesis.  In fact, STANA—the application developed for this thesis—does not fully 
implement the conceptual model presented in Chapter III.  The most obvious 
improvement to this research effort would be to close the gap between the conceptual 
model and the model implementation.  Shortfalls of this thesis effort notwithstanding, 
recommendations for expanding this research are categorized and detailed below. 
1. Modeling 
• Popular Opinion Nodes.  Develop more detailed probability models to 
enable better understanding of the dynamics of these nodes.  For instance, this author has 
made some implicit assumptions about Lebanese popular opinion.  Namely, that a simple 
partition exists between LH’s “base” and all other Lebanese.  However, there are a 
variety of factions within the population that determine the allocation of political power.  
These probability models could be developed independently and used to inform the 
probability tables, or the sub-modeling capability of Genie could be used to specify more 
accurate relationships. 
• External Actors (U.S., IR, SY).  The author admits a rudimentary 
employment of these actors.  It would be beneficial in future work to develop basic 
decision models (such as those used for LH and IS in this thesis) for combinations of 
external actors to enhance understanding of their decision-making calculus.  This would 
improve estimates for the probability distributions of external actors. 
• Representation of Interests.  The non-linearity of stakeholder preferences 
is a complicating factor.  The solution in this thesis was to model this as combinations of 




approach and add complexity to the model where it is not desirable.  Future work could 
focus on providing a cleaner way to represent a non-linear objective function. 
2. Implementation 
• Number of players/decision nodes.  Currently, the multi-player component 
of STANA handles only two decision nodes with two choices each.  Expanding the 
number of decision nodes, the number of players, or the number of choices within a 
decision node would greatly enhance STANA’s capabilities.  Additionally, adding 
additional players would reduce the need to estimate the probability distributions of 
external actors, improving the quality of the model.   
• Behavior over time.  Behavior over time in this implementation is handled 
using temporal arcs native to Genie v2.0.  However, the transition matrix is essentially 
stationary and only changes over time if the user manually specifies temporal 
relationships AND the associated conditional probability tables.  It seems possible that 
certain behavioral “functions” could be implemented that might allow for transition 
probabilities to be a function of time (if say, it was desired that Lebanon support for LH 
would degrade over time under certain conditions).  Genie does not directly allow for this 
kind of behavior.  However, it may be possible to extract information from Genie, build 
the transition matrix, manipulate it, and then re-populate Genie’s probability tables using 
function-generated information.  This could lead to a non-stationary transition matrix that 
“evolves” over time. 
• Prior information and Bayesian updating.  The current implementation 
does not allow for the decision maker to have information available prior to making a 
decision (i.e., arcs into decision nodes).  This would require the model to solve for all 
possible combinations of realized chance outcomes prior to that decision node.  In a 
single time step with few chance nodes, this would be easy to handle.  However, given 
the desire to observe decisions over time, this is a formidable problem since the 




realizations of chance prior to decisions, this model could employ common forecasting 
structures such as those used in the well-known ‘Party Problem’.  
• Learning Effects.  If this implementation were enhanced to allow for non-
stationary transition probabilities and if the capability to observe prior information was 
possible, it may be possible allow the stakeholders to learn as the system evolves. 
• Perception.  The current implementation is set up so that each player 
works off of the same reading of the chance models.  However, it is possible, through 
Java API (jSmile), to replicate the chance structure using different probability definitions.  
Implemented correctly, this could be used to model different perspectives or perceptions 

















APPENDIX A.  STAKEHOLDER ACTIONS 
Stakeholder actions are the combination of the expressed belief of Unified 
Combatant Command subject matter experts and the interpretation by this author of the 
historical literature reviewed.  Section 1 describes the categorical break-down of actions.  
Section 2 describes the decisions within each category.  It should be noted that the list of 
actions presented in this appendix differs from those implemented.  This is due to 
limitations in the model’s implementation. 
A. ACTION CATEGORIES 
• Diplomatic/Economic/Financial.  Actions in this category include those 
that use political and diplomatic means to achieve stakeholder interests. 
• Information/Intelligence.  Actions in this category refer to the use of 
information propaganda and intelligence services aimed toward either 
internal or external groups, agencies, or actors. 
• Military/Law Enforcement.  The military component of this category is 
straightforward.  It is meant to capture actions where an actor uses military 
means against an external agency, group, or actor.  In cases where a 
stakeholder has a propensity to engage in acts of terror, such actions will 
be included in this category.  Law enforcement decisions, on the other 
hand, regard actions where force is used to police internal resistance. 
B. STAKEHOLDER ACTIONS 
1. Lebanese Hezbollah 
• Diplomatic.  Diplomatic choices include: 
o Cooperative.  Cooperative diplomacy could be viewed as using 





o Non-Cooperative.  Using political coordination in a manner that is 
intentionally contradictory to Israel’s interests. 
o Neutral.  Neither cooperative or non-cooperative. 
• Military/Law Enforcement.  Military choices include: 
o Provoke or Attack Israel.  LH could choose to attack Israel directly 
either using rocket attacks or border violence or incursions.  
Provoke Israel refers to any action that might use violence or force 
to attempt to induce Israel into instigating or escalating conflict.  
This action is specifically meant to imply use of LH’s more 
conventional means of military force.   
o Violence/Terror.  LH could attempt one or more attacks involving 
bombings, assassinations, skyjacking, hostage-taking, maiming, or 
kidnapping of any target deemed important to Israel or that might 
send a hostile message to Israel or its people.  This action is 
specifically meant to imply use of sub-conventional means of 
force.  This action also includes any effort to facilitate violence or 
terrorism through other groups such as Hamas or any other anti-
Israel terror group.  As such, this action does not imply direct 
application of conventional force by LH.  
o No Military Action.   
2. Israel 
• Diplomatic.  The same set of diplomatic actions as LH. 




o Offensive Military.  Any use of military force when Israel has not 
been provoked.  This could include limited or full-scale military 
action. 
o Defensive Military.  Use of military force after having been 
provoked by another actors.  This could also include limited or 
full-scale military action. 









APPENDIX B. STANA (JAVA APP) USER’S GUIDE 
This appendix details specific technical guidance for user’s of the Java application 
that executes the models presented in this thesis.  Java is used to provide an interface 
between Genie (using jSmile) and Microsoft Excel (using jExcel).  Excel is used to read-
in and read-out the data.  Genie is used to specify the model, and Java is used to give 
Genie the ability to solve temporal, multi-player influence diagrams. 
It is highly recommended that the Eclipse platform be used to execute the 
application.  This guide assumes the user is operating with Eclipse.  A zip file 
accompanies this thesis in the NPS archives.  The file is named STANA.zip (Stakeholder 
ANalysis Application).  This zip file includes all .java and .class files, compressed jExcel 
v. 2.6.12, and compressed jSmile. 
A. SETUP 
• Download Genie v2.0 from http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/downloads.  The user 
will need to register, but the software is free. 
• Extract all files from STANA.zip. 
• Open Eclipse.  Create a new package. 
• In windows explorer, locate the Eclipse file path associated with the 
package that was just created.   
o Copy and paste all .java files from the extracted STANA.zip to the 
workspace\src folder. 
o Copy and paste all .class files from the extracted STANA.zip to the 
workspace/bin folder. 





• Inside Eclipse, locate the package that was created.  Right click and select 
BUILD PATH and then ADD LIBRARIES. 
o Select USER LIBRARIES and click NEXT. 
o Click on the USER LIBRARIES… button. 
o Click on the NEW… button. 
o Give the library a name and select OK. 
o Now select the library that was just created and click the ADD 
JARS… button. 
o Navigate to the extracted jExcel folder.  Within this folder, find 
jExcel.jar (file type is executable jar file).  Open this file from 
within the current Eclipse window. 
o Several files should appear under your user library name.  Select 
OK. 
o The user should now be viewing the “Add Library” dialogue box.  
In this dialogue box, check the box corresponding to the jExcel 
library (or whatever it was named). 
o Repeat this process for to build the jSmile library. 
o Once both libraries have been added, returning to the command 
window of Eclipse the user should see three libraries under the 
package folder in the package explorer on the left side of the 
screen:  JRE System Library(JRE 6), jExcel, jSmile. 




B. RUNNING A MODEL 
• Inside the STANA.zip file, there is a folder titled “Sample Files.” 
• Open this folder and copy all files into whatever file directory the user 
desires.  This will be the workspace where the STANA application will 
look for user input and then write out the data. 
• The “Sample Files” folder contains:  
o LHIS_BaseCase.xdsl.  This is the base case used in this thesis. 
o LHMug.  This is the base case developed for the Mughniyah 
question. 
o DataInput.xls.  This file allows the user to specify the conditions of 
the model in one place, from which STANA will read the 
arguments and execute the program. 
• Open datainput.xls.  Change cell B1 to reflect the file path where the 
Genie files are located.  This cell determines where read-out files will be 
stored.  It does not have to in the same location as read-in files, but it’s a 
good idea to keep them together. 
• To run the LHIS_BaseCase.xdsl file, simply go to the Eclipse command 
window and press the “Run” button (green arrow). 
o The command window will ask for user input.  Select 1 to use the 
“read-in” option. 
o Press Enter. 
o The next question asks for a file path.  Enter a file path in the 





(note: the double backslashes are required).  Change the path 
appropriately to the location where datainput.xls resides on your 
computer. 
o Data input is pre-set to execute LHIS_BaseCase.xdsl.  This can, of 
course, be changed as necessary. 
o A two player game should execute.  It will print to the command 
line in Eclipse, and will write out three files:  solution.xls, 
sensanalysis.xls, and unrolledLHIS_BaseCase.xdsl. 
 Solution.xls provides the same data that prints to the 
console. 
 Sensanalysis.xls gives the high and low ranges associated 
with single-variable sensitivity analysis. 
 UnrolledLHIS_BaseCase.xdsl shows an unrolled version of 
the diagram.  This is primarily for developer diagnostics. 
C. CONSTRUCTING OR MODIFYING A MODEL 
• Open Genie.  Either open one of the sample files to start with 
(recommended), or build from scratch. 
• Ensure “Temporal Plates” are enabled.  Select “Network” from the menu 
bar.  In the drop down list, ensure “Temporal Plates” is checked.  When 
temporal plates are enabled, a rectangle will appear with the title 
“Temporal Plate(# slices)” at the top center.  All diagrams must be 
constructed entirely within these plates.  STANA is programmed to read 
the temporal information and use it in solving the diagram. 
• Specify the diagram as necessary to model the desired situation.  Ensure 




o One or two decision nodes may be present 
 If one decision node, then it is a single player game and 
must have only one value node. 
 If two decision nodes, then it is a two player game and 
there must exist exactly two value nodes. 
o In the one player game, the user may specify any number of 
choices within a decision node. 
o In a two player game, the user must specify exactly two choices 
inside each player’s decision node. 
o In a two-player game, Genie will assume the player order unless it 
is specified.  Player 1 should have a black “normal” arc going from 
player 1 to player 2.  Player 2 should have an “order 1” arc going 
from player 2 back to player 1.  (note: for unexplainable reasons, 
the temporal arc will be deleted each time the file is re-opened and 
Genie will complain.  So the temporal arc must be added each time 
the program is opened.  This only applies to arcs between decision 
nodes). 
• For each node, double click it and set its definition (using the definition 
tab): 
o For decision nodes, input the set of feasible actions (recall, not 
more than two each in a two player game). 
o For chance nodes, the definition is the conditional probability 
table.  This is where the probability estimates go. 
o For value nodes, this is where the preference ordering of chance 




scenario and 0 for the least favorable scenario.  This was arbitrary.  
The main thing is the distance between combinations of outcomes. 
• Finally, Genie has many capabilities that are not exploited by STANA.  
Some of these features may work with STANA, but many will not.  Any 
use of STANA outside these guidelines may result in failure of STANA, 
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